Also known as:pluralities · plurality opinion · plurality vote
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
1
in corporate law
A voting standard under which the candidate or slate receiving the greatest number of votes wins an election. The standard applies at a meeting where a quorum is present unless the articles of incorporation establish a different threshold.
2
in judicial opinions
Sense 1
1
in corporate law
A voting standard under which the candidate or slate receiving the greatest number of votes wins an election. The standard applies at a meeting where a quorum is present unless the articles of incorporation establish a different threshold.
See Our Sources· 1 primary source
Model Codes
Practice Questions
Sense 2
2
in judicial opinions
The opinion that receives the most votes among the justices when no single opinion commands a majority of the Court.
The opinion that receives the most votes among the justices when no single opinion commands a majority of the Court.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Examples1
Incumbent Slate Prevails by Plurality
Phoenix Technologies held its annual meeting with a quorum present to elect directors. The articles and bylaws contained no special voting rules. The incumbent nominees received more votes than any competing candidates even though they fell short of a majority of outstanding shares. The incumbents took their seats under the default rule.
3 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What vote total elects directors when the articles are silent?
Directors are elected by a plurality of the votes cast at a meeting where a quorum is present. The candidates who receive more votes than any competitors win even if they obtain less than a majority of votes cast or of outstanding shares.
Supporting sources
Does silence in the articles create cumulative voting rights?
No. Cumulative voting exists only when the articles expressly grant it or use words of similar import. Absent such language the default straight-voting plurality rule applies.
Supporting sources
What notice is required before shareholders may cumulate votes?
Either the meeting notice or proxy statement must conspicuously state that cumulative voting is authorized, or a shareholder must give the corporation at least forty-eight hours' written notice of intent to cumulate. Timely notice by one shareholder entitles the entire voting group to cumulate.
Supporting sources
5
Expert Relies on Non-Testifying Lab
At Victor Lang's trial the prosecution called Dr. Elena Rivera to compare mass spectrometry data from a foreign lab with state database profiles. Rivera had not performed the foreign testing yet formed her own opinion from the data. The court admitted the testimony after concluding the underlying profile was not offered for its truth.
Plurality Narrows General Jurisdiction
A Malaysian manufacturer moved to dismiss an indemnity claim brought by a Canadian distributor in a Midwestern state court. The court examined the manufacturer's contacts and concluded that stream-of-commerce awareness alone did not support jurisdiction when fairness factors weighed against it.
Daimler AG v. Bauman571 U.S. 117, 139 n.20 (2014)
In 2004, twenty-two residents of Argentina filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft, a German public stock company headquartered in Stuttgart that manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany.
The complaint alleged that Daimler's Argentinian subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina, collaborated with state security forces during Argentina's 1976–1983 Dirty War to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill MB Argentina workers, including plaintiffs or persons closely related to them. The complaint asserted claims under the Alien Tort Statute, the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, and California and Argentina law. Jurisdiction over Daimler was predicated on the California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, another Daimler subsidiary incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in New Jersey.
MBUSA serves as Daimler's exclusive importer and distributor in the United States, purchasing vehicles from Daimler in Germany and distributing them to independent dealerships throughout the nation, including California. MBUSA maintains a regional office in Costa Mesa, a Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a Classic Center in Irvine. MBUSA's California sales accounted for 2.4 percent of Daimler's worldwide sales.
A General Distributor Agreement between Daimler and MBUSA established MBUSA as an independent contractor that buys and sells vehicles for its own account and has no authority to make binding obligations for Daimler.
Daimler moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. After allowing jurisdictional discovery on the agency allegations, the District Court granted the motion in November 2005 and reaffirmed the dismissal in February 2007, concluding that Daimler's own contacts with California were too sporadic and that MBUSA's contacts could not be attributed to Daimler. The Ninth Circuit initially affirmed but, on rehearing, reversed in 2011, holding that MBUSA was Daimler's agent for jurisdictional purposes and that its California contacts supported the exercise of general jurisdiction over Daimler.
Daimler petitioned for rehearing and rehearing en banc, which the Ninth Circuit denied over the dissent of eight judges. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2013 to decide whether Daimler is amenable to suit in California for claims arising from events occurring entirely outside the United States and unrelated to any activity in California.
A city condemned neighborhood property for transfer to an automobile manufacturer. Property owners challenged the taking as lacking public use. The court upheld the condemnation after finding the legislative determination of public purpose was not palpably arbitrary.
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981)
This case arises out of a plan by the Detroit Economic Development Corporation to acquire, by condemnation if necessary, a large tract of land to be conveyed to General Motors Corporation as a site for construction of an assembly plant. The plaintiffs, a neighborhood association and several individual residents of the affected area, brought suit in Wayne Circuit Court to challenge the project on several grounds.
In the spring of 1980, General Motors informed the City of Detroit that it would close its Cadillac and Fisher Body plants located within the city in 1983. General Motors offered to build an assembly complex in the city if a suitable site could be found meeting four criteria: an area of between 450 and 500 acres, a rectangular shape, access to a long-haul railroad line, and access to the freeway system. The city evaluated nine potential sites and selected a parcel of approximately 465 acres straddling the Detroit-Hamtramck border known as Central Industrial Park.
In July 1980 the Detroit Common Council approved the boundaries of the project. On September 30, 1980, the completed project plan was approved by the Detroit Economic Development Corporation. On October 31, 1980, the Common Council passed a resolution approving the project plan with minor modifications and declaring that the project constituted a public purpose. General Motors required that title to the entire site and the rail marshalling yard must be vested in the City of Detroit by May 1, 1981. The projected public cost of preparing a site agreeable to the board of directors of General Motors is over $200 million. The site was to be sold to General Motors for little more than $8 million.
The trial court conducted a ten-day trial on defendants’ motion to dismiss from November 17 to December 2, 1980, limited to the question whether the city abused its discretion in determining that condemnation of plaintiffs’ property was necessary under 1980 PA 87. On December 9, 1980, the court entered judgment for defendants and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs filed a claim of appeal with the Court of Appeals on December 12, 1980, and an application for bypass with the Michigan Supreme Court on December 15, 1980, which the Court granted along with a motion for immediate consideration.
Court Recognizes Implied Cause of Action
Federal agents searched a residence without a warrant and arrested the occupant. The occupant later sued the agents for damages arising from the unconstitutional search. The court held that a private right of action existed directly under the Fourth Amendment.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)
On the morning of November 26, 1965, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Webster Bivens's apartment in the Bronx.
The agents broke open the door, handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and young children, and thoroughly searched the apartment. They then transported Bivens to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search.
Several days later Bivens was released on his own recognizance, and he was never indicted or prosecuted for any offense. Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the six agents in their individual capacities. His complaint sought fifteen thousand dollars in damages from each agent and alleged that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, that unreasonable force was employed, and that the arrest was made without probable cause. Bivens claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' conduct.
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the judgment.
Corporate Political Speech Protected
A nonprofit corporation produced a film critical of a political candidate and sought to air it within the election blackout period. The government blocked distribution under campaign finance restrictions. The court held that the First Amendment protects corporate political speech regardless of the speaker's identity.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010)
Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation with an annual budget of about $12 million. Most of its funds come from donations by individuals, though it accepts a small portion from for-profit corporations.
In January 2008, Citizens United released a 90-minute documentary film entitled Hillary: The Movie. The film mentions Senator Hillary Clinton by name and depicts interviews with political commentators, most of them critical of her. Hillary was released in theaters and on DVD, but Citizens United wanted to increase distribution by making the film available through video-on-demand.
In December 2007, a cable company offered to make Hillary available on a video-on-demand channel called Elections '08 for a payment of $1.2 million. The proposal was to make the film available to viewers free of charge. To promote the video-on-demand offering, Citizens United produced two 10-second ads and one 30-second ad. Each ad includes a short statement about Senator Clinton followed by the name of the movie and the movie's website address. Citizens United desired to promote the offering by running the advertisements on broadcast and cable television within 30 days of primary elections.
Before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, federal law prohibited corporations from using general treasury funds to make independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate in connection with certain federal elections. BCRA §203 amended the law to prohibit any electioneering communication. An electioneering communication is any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal office and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election when publicly distributed so that it can be received by 50,000 or more persons in a relevant state.
Concerned about possible civil and criminal penalties for violating 2 U.S.C. §441b, Citizens United filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in December 2007. It sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that §441b is unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and that BCRA's disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements are unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and the ads. The District Court denied Citizens United's motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the Federal Election Commission's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was reargued after the Court requested supplemental briefs addressing whether Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the relevant portion of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission should be overruled.
2 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
When does an expert's reliance on a non-testifying lab's report violate the Confrontation Clause?
A plurality approach permits the expert to rely on the report when it is not admitted for its truth but only to explain the basis of the expert's independent opinion and when the report was not prepared primarily to accuse a targeted individual.
Supporting sources
How does a plurality opinion differ from a majority opinion?
A plurality opinion receives the most votes among the justices but falls short of five. It announces the judgment yet lacks the binding precedential force of an opinion joined by a majority of the Court.
Supporting sources
571 U.S. 117 (2014)
…that an “obliga[tio]n arise[s]” to respond there to suit); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro , 564 U. S. , (2011) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 5) (same principle for general jurisdiction). The majority’s focus on the extent of a corporate defendant’s out-of-forum contacts is untethered from this rationale. After…