Also known as: perceptions · perceptio
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An observation, awareness, or realization based on physical sensation or experience. The term encompasses both accurate knowledge of actual circumstances and reasonable but mistaken beliefs about nonexistent circumstances.
Priscilla Parks saw a sedan cross the centerline three times before the collision. She testified that the driver appeared intoxicated. The court admitted the opinion because it rested on her direct perception of the vehicle's path.
Portia Price drove through an intersection without slowing. A reasonable person in her position would have perceived the child entering the crosswalk from the curb. Because she failed to exercise that perception, the jury found her negligent.
Peter Park, a commercial pilot with thousands of flight hours, recognized subtle airspeed decay that a novice would miss. His superior perception allowed him to correct the attitude before the stall warning activated. The court measured his conduct against that heightened personal standard.
Pablo Perez read the Supreme Court's opinion upholding a controversial statute. He concluded that the decision rested on both constitutional text and the public's perception of judicial fairness. That perception proved essential to whether the ruling would command voluntary compliance.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
View casePerry Pratt owned beachfront lots rendered unusable by a new coastal regulation. From his perspective the rule effected a complete deprivation of economic value. The Court rejected that perception as controlling the takings analysis.
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation. Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures. Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.
View casePierre Poulin heard his wife's recorded statement to police. He argued that only cross-examination could test her perception of whether the officers were neutral or adversarial. The Court agreed that her subjective perception mattered to the confrontation analysis.
On August 5, 1999, Michael Crawford stabbed Kenneth Lee in the torso during a confrontation at Lee's apartment. Crawford and his wife Sylvia had gone there after Sylvia alleged that Lee had attempted to rape her several weeks earlier. Lee was taken to the hospital and later died from his wounds. Police arrested both Crawford and Sylvia that night. Detectives gave Miranda warnings and interrogated Sylvia twice at the station house. In her recorded statement Sylvia initially denied involvement but eventually admitted she had led Crawford to Lee's apartment and had seen the stabbing. Crawford also gave police a statement describing the events and his belief that Lee may have reached for something before the stabbing. At trial Crawford asserted self-defense, but Sylvia did not testify because of Washington's marital privilege. The State offered Sylvia's tape-recorded statement as evidence that the stabbing was not in self-defense and invoked the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. The trial court admitted the statement after finding it bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The jury convicted Crawford of assault. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed after applying a nine-factor test and concluding the statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. It determined that Sylvia's statement interlocked with Crawford's statement and therefore bore adequate guarantees of trustworthiness, noting that both accounts were ambiguous on whether Lee had possessed a weapon. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseYes. Assault protects freedom from imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact. The plaintiff must actually perceive the threat at the moment the defendant acts. An unperceived attempt, even if intentional, does not create liability once the conduct ends.
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No. The law takes the plaintiff as found. Liability arises when the defendant intends to create apprehension and the plaintiff in fact experiences it, even if the fear would seem unreasonable to a person of ordinary courage.
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Yes, provided the opinion is rationally based on the witness's own perception. Direct observation of erratic driving or slurred speech supplies the required foundation under Rule 701(a).
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…government officers. But even if the court's assessment of the officer's motives was accurate, it says nothing about Sylvia's perception of her situation. Only cross-examination could reveal that. The State Supreme Court gave dispositive weight to the interlocking nature of the two statements — that they were both ambiguous…