pecuniary gain

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On November 21, 1973, Troy Gregg and Floyd Allen were hitchhiking north in Florida when they were picked up by Fred Simmons and Bob Moore in their car. Their car broke down. Simmons purchased another vehicle with some of the cash he was carrying. While still in Florida, the group picked up Dennis Weaver, who rode with them to Atlanta, where he was let out about 11 p.m. A short time later the four men stopped for a rest along the highway in Gwinnett County, Georgia. The next morning the bodies of Simmons and Moore were discovered in a nearby ditch. On November 23, after reading about the shootings in an Atlanta newspaper, Weaver communicated with the Gwinnett County police and related information concerning the journey with the victims, including a description of the car. The next afternoon, Gregg and Allen, while in Simmons' car, were arrested in Asheville, North Carolina. In the search incident to the arrest a .25-caliber pistol, later shown to be that used to kill Simmons and Moore, was found in Gregg's pocket. After receiving Miranda warnings and signing a written waiver, Gregg signed a statement admitting he shot Simmons and Moore but claiming self-defense. At the guilt stage of the bifurcated trial, a medical examiner testified that Simmons died from a bullet wound in the eye and that Moore died from bullet wounds in the cheek and in the back of the head. The examiner further testified that both men had several bruises and abrasions about the face and head. Gregg testified claiming self-defense after Simmons and Moore allegedly attacked with a pipe and knife, but the jury convicted him of two counts of armed robbery and two counts of murder. At the penalty stage before the same jury, neither side presented additional evidence. The trial judge instructed the jury that it could recommend either a death sentence or a life prison sentence on each count. The judge further charged the jury that in determining the sentence it was free to consider mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The judge instructed that death could not be imposed unless the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt one of the aggravating circumstances. The jury found the first and second aggravating circumstances and returned verdicts of death on each count. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and the death sentences for murder after reviewing the record and comparing the sentences to similar cases, but it vacated the death sentences for armed robbery. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the challenge to the death sentences under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

In September 1976, respondent David Washington committed a series of crimes over a ten-day period in the Miami area that included three brutal stabbing murders along with torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, Washington surrendered to police and gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third criminal episode. The State of Florida indicted him for kidnapping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him. Washington waived his right to a jury trial against counsel's advice and pleaded guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder counts. In the plea colloquy he stated that he had committed a string of burglaries but had no significant prior criminal record and that he had been under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family. Counsel spoke with Washington about his background, contacted his wife and mother by telephone, but did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination. At the sentencing hearing before the trial judge, counsel's strategy relied primarily on the plea colloquy to convey remorse and emotional stress and argued that these factors justified sparing Washington the death penalty. Counsel successfully moved to exclude Washington's rap sheet and decided not to request a presentence report because it would have included his criminal history. The trial judge found multiple aggravating circumstances for each murder and no mitigating circumstances, sentencing Washington to death on each of the three murder counts. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Washington sought collateral relief in state court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on six grounds including failure to request a psychiatric report, investigate and present character witnesses, and seek a presentence investigation report. He submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives willing to testify and two reports from a psychiatrist and psychologist. The state trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Washington then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. After an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel testified, the District Court denied relief, concluding that although counsel made errors in judgment by failing to investigate mitigating evidence further, no prejudice resulted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for application of a new framework it developed for analyzing ineffectiveness claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding.

In 1986 and 1988, the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority issued a total of $26 million in bonds to finance public improvements at Stetson Hills, a planned residential and commercial development in Colorado Springs. Petitioner Central Bank of Denver served as indenture trustee for the bond issues. The bonds were secured by landowner assessment liens covering about 250 acres for the 1986 issue and 272 acres for the 1988 issue. The bond covenants required that the land subject to the liens be worth at least 160% of the bonds' outstanding principal and interest, and AmWest Development, the developer, was to provide Central Bank with annual reports containing evidence that this test was met. In January 1988, AmWest provided Central Bank with an updated appraisal of the land securing the 1986 bonds and proposed for the 1988 bonds, showing values almost unchanged from 1986. A senior underwriter for the 1986 bonds soon expressed concern that declining property values in Colorado Springs meant the 160% test might not be met, given the appraisal was over 16 months old. Central Bank asked its in-house appraiser to review the 1988 appraisal, who found the values optimistic and suggested retaining an outside appraiser for an independent review. After an exchange of letters with AmWest in early 1988, Central Bank agreed to delay the independent review until the end of the year, six months after the June 1988 closing on the bond issue. Before the review was complete, the Authority defaulted on the 1988 bonds. Respondents First Interstate Bank of Denver and Jack K. Naber, who had purchased $2.1 million of the 1988 bonds, sued the Authority, underwriters, an AmWest director, and Central Bank for violations of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, alleging Central Bank was secondarily liable for aiding and abetting the fraud. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment to Central Bank. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact on recklessness and substantial assistance. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b).