Also known as:organized crimes · criminal syndicate · syndicated crime
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
1
Widespread criminal activities coordinated and controlled through a central syndicate.
2
A syndicate of persons who carry out those activities and derive income from unlawful conduct.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Sense 1
1
Sense 1
Widespread criminal activities coordinated and controlled through a central syndicate.
3 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
When does an accusation of organized crime activity support a defamation per se claim?
A written or broadcast statement accusing a person of laundering money for organized crime is actionable per se. The plaintiff need not prove special damages because the law presumes harm to reputation from such a serious criminal allegation.
Supporting sources
Sense 2
2
Sense 2
A syndicate of persons who carry out those activities and derive income from unlawful conduct.
Examples6
Judge Attends Racketeer Event
Judge Odette Orozco attends a private dinner hosted by a recently convicted racketeer. Several guests at the event maintain documented ties to organized crime syndicates. The attendance creates an appearance of impropriety that warrants judicial discipline even without evidence of actual bias.
Loan Sharking Affects Commerce
Members of an organized crime syndicate use threats of force to collect debts from local borrowers. Congress determines that these intra-state extortionate transactions facilitate syndicate operations that reach across state lines. The activity therefore falls within federal regulatory power under the Commerce Clause.
Does a single publication rule apply when the same organized crime story appears online and later in print?
The online posting and the identical print edition constitute separate single publications. The plaintiff must bring one action for each publication and may recover all damages from that publication in that single action.
Supporting sources
What must a warrant contain when the target is known only by association with organized crime activity?
The warrant must describe the defendant with reasonable certainty. A description limited to language ability and a single workplace location satisfies the requirement when it uniquely identifies the target among similarly named individuals.
Supporting sources
United States v. Lopez514 U.S. 549 (1995)
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises.
The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools.
The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release.
Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
After Otto Osman enters a plea, a new prosecutor recommends the maximum sentence by referencing Osman’s alleged connections to organized crime. Defense counsel objects that the original prosecutor had promised no sentencing recommendation. The court must decide whether the broken promise requires resentencing.
Santobello v. New York404 U.S. 257 (1971)
The State of New York indicted Santobello in 1969 on two felony counts of Promoting Gambling in the First Degree and Possession of Gambling Records in the First Degree. Santobello initially entered a plea of not guilty to both counts. After negotiations, the Assistant District Attorney agreed to permit a plea to the lesser-included offense of Possession of Gambling Records in the Second Degree and promised to make no recommendation as to sentence.
On June 16, 1969, Santobello withdrew the not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea to the lesser charge. The court accepted the plea after Santobello confirmed it was voluntary and the facts described by the prosecutor were true. A series of delays followed, owing primarily to the absence of a pre-sentence report, so that by September 23, 1969, Santobello had still not been sentenced.
By that date petitioner acquired new defense counsel. Petitioner's new counsel moved immediately to withdraw the guilty plea. In an accompanying affidavit, petitioner alleged that he did not know at the time of his plea that crucial evidence against him had been obtained as a result of an illegal search. In addition to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, petitioner renewed the motion to suppress and filed a motion to inspect the grand jury minutes. These motions in turn caused further delay until November 26, 1969, when the court denied all three and set January 9, 1970, as the date for sentencing.
On January 9, 1970, Santobello appeared before a different judge because the original judge had retired. A new prosecutor replaced the one who negotiated the plea and recommended the maximum one-year sentence, citing Santobello’s criminal record and alleged links with organized crime. Defense counsel objected on the ground that the State had promised no sentence recommendation and sought an adjournment to prove the promise, though the State later conceded in subsequent proceedings that the promise had been made.
The sentencing judge imposed the maximum one-year sentence at the New York City Correctional Institution for men, stating that the prosecutor’s recommendation did not influence the decision. Santobello obtained a certificate of reasonable doubt and was admitted to bail pending appeal. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction, and leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. Santobello then sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.
Police arrest Oscar Ortiz on suspicion of participating in an organized crime theft ring. Officers question him at length without advising him of his rights. Any resulting statements are later suppressed because the interrogation violated constitutional safeguards applicable to all suspects.
Miranda v. Arizona384 U.S. 436 (1966)
In March 1963 Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his home in Phoenix and taken to the police station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then questioned by two officers in Interrogation Room No. 2 for two hours. The officers did not advise him of any right to counsel. Miranda signed a typed confession that was introduced at his trial for kidnapping and rape.
On October 14 1960 Michael Vignera was arrested in connection with a Brooklyn robbery. He was taken first to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan and later to the 66th Detective Squad. A detective questioned him for several hours without any advice concerning counsel. Vignera made an oral admission. He was then questioned by an assistant district attorney whose transcribed statement was also introduced at his trial for first-degree robbery.
On March 20 1963 Carl Calvin Westover was arrested by Kansas City police as a suspect in two local robberies. Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest. The next day local officers interrogated him again throughout the morning. Westover was then turned over to FBI agents who questioned him for two to two-and-a-half hours about California robberies and obtained signed confessions. At the time the FBI agents began questioning Westover he had been in custody for over fourteen hours.
On January 31 1963 Roy Allen Stewart was arrested at his home in connection with a series of purse-snatch robberies. During the next five days police interrogated Stewart on nine different occasions without any advice of rights. On the ninth session Stewart confessed. Transcripts of the interrogations were introduced at his trial for kidnapping rape and murder.
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Miranda's conviction. The New York courts affirmed Vignera's conviction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Westover's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed Stewart's conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the four cases and consolidated them for argument.
Ophelia O'Brien sets fire to a warehouse used by an organized crime syndicate to store contraband. Federal prosecutors charge her under the explosives statute enacted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act. The court must determine whether the statute reaches the private, noncommercial structure.
United States v. Jones529 U.S. 848 (2000)
On February 23, 1998, Dewey Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail through a window into a home in Fort Wayne, Indiana, owned and occupied by his cousin. No one was injured in the ensuing fire, but the blaze severely damaged the home.
A federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging Jones with arson under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), using a destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and making an illegal destructive device under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(f). Jones was tried in the Northern District of Indiana and convicted by a jury on all three counts.
The District Court sentenced Jones to a total prison term of 35 years, to be followed by five years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $77,396.87 in restitution to the insurer of the damaged home. Jones appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the judgment of the District Court.
Jones had argued before the District Court and on appeal that the statute, when applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari after noting divisions among the Courts of Appeals on the statute's coverage of noncommercial buildings and on the constitutionality of such applications.
Octavia Okonkwo is convicted of racketeering offenses committed through an organized crime syndicate. The district court imposes sentence under the federal guidelines promulgated by the Sentencing Commission. Okonkwo challenges the guidelines as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
Mistretta v. United States488 U.S. 361 (1989)
In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act to address widespread criticisms that federal sentencing was a national scandal marked by unwarranted disparities and uncertainty. The legislation created the United States Sentencing Commission as an independent commission in the judicial branch consisting of seven voting members. The President appoints the members with the advice and consent of the Senate, and at least three members must be federal judges selected after consideration of recommendations from the Judicial Conference of the United States, while the Attorney General serves as an ex officio nonvoting member.
Petitioner John M. Mistretta was indicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri on three counts centering on a cocaine sale. He pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The district court sentenced him under the Guidelines to 18 months' imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release, along with a $1,000 fine and a $50 assessment.
Mistretta appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, challenging the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission and the Guidelines. Both Mistretta and the United States petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari before judgment in the Eighth Circuit. The Court granted the petitions because of the imperative public importance of the issue and the disarray among the federal district courts.
…every defendant, whether the professional criminal or one committing a crime of momentary passion who is not part and parcel of organized crime. It will slow down the investigation and the apprehension of confederates in those cases where time is of the essence, such as kidnapping, see Brinegar v. United States , 338 U. S. 160,…