Also known as: ordinary meaning · customary meaning · plain meaning
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard of interpretation that assigns to words in a legal instrument the meaning they would ordinarily carry to a person of ordinary skill or understanding in the relevant field or context.
Dr. Hall's will left shares to my nurses who stood by me in the operating room. Hospital records listed dozens of rotating nurses, yet testimony showed Hall consistently called only three long-term nurses his OR team. The court admitted the testimony to determine whether the ordinary description of nurses matched Hall's actual usage.
Marjorie's deed conveyed land to current tenants in good standing, but several subtenants and renewal disputes existed at her death. Clear and convincing evidence showed she meant only those with executed leases and current rent. The court reformed the text to match that intention rather than applying a rigid ordinary reading.
Bilski's application claimed a method for hedging risk in commodities markets. The Court gave the statutory term process its ordinary contemporary meaning instead of imposing a machine-or-transformation requirement. That reading allowed the claim to proceed to further patentability analysis.
Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw submitted a patent application to the Patent and Trademark Office seeking protection for a method allowing buyers and sellers of commodities in the energy market to hedge against the risk of price changes. Claim 1 describes a series of steps for initiating transactions between a commodity provider and consumers at a fixed rate based on historical averages, identifying market participants with a counter-risk position, and initiating transactions with those participants at a second fixed rate to balance the risk. Claim 4 reduces the hedging concept to a simple mathematical formula. Additional claims apply the method to energy markets and suggest the use of statistical techniques such as random analysis to determine inputs. The patent examiner rejected the application on the ground that it was not implemented on a specific apparatus and merely manipulated an abstract idea while solving a purely mathematical problem without any limitation to a practical application. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the examiner’s rejection, concluding that the application involved only mental steps that do not transform physical matter and was directed to an abstract idea. Petitioners appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which heard the case en banc and affirmed the rejection. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Federal Circuit’s judgment.
View caseChakrabarty sought a patent on a genetically engineered bacterium capable of breaking down oil. The Court interpreted the term manufacture according to its ordinary meaning at the time of the statute. The engineered organism therefore fell within the statutory categories of patentable subject matter.
In 1972, microbiologist Ananda Chakrabarty filed a patent application assigned to the General Electric Co. The application asserted 36 claims related to his invention of a bacterium from the genus Pseudomonas containing at least two stable energy-generating plasmids, each providing a separate hydrocarbon degradative pathway. This human-made, genetically engineered bacterium is capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil. This property is possessed by no naturally occurring bacteria. It is believed to have significant value for the treatment of oil spills. Chakrabarty's patent claims were of three types: process claims for the method of producing the bacteria; claims for an inoculum comprised of a carrier material floating on water, such as straw, and the new bacteria; and claims to the bacteria themselves. The patent examiner allowed the claims falling into the first two categories. He rejected claims for the bacteria on two grounds. Those grounds were that micro-organisms are products of nature and that as living things they are not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Chakrabarty appealed the rejection to the Patent Office Board of Appeals. The Board affirmed the examiner on the second ground after relying on the legislative history of the 1930 Plant Patent Act. The Board concluded that section 101 was not intended to cover living things such as these laboratory-created micro-organisms. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed on the authority of its prior decision in In re Bergy. That decision held that the fact that micro-organisms are alive is without legal significance for purposes of the patent law. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bergy. It vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Parker v. Flook. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals then vacated its judgment in Chakrabarty. It consolidated the case with Bergy. After re-examining both cases, it reaffirmed its earlier judgments. Bergy was subsequently dismissed as moot. This left only Chakrabarty for decision. The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks again sought certiorari. The Supreme Court granted the writ as to both cases.
View caseOrdinary and customary meaning controls unless the text or extrinsic evidence other than direct contradictory intent reveals uncertainty in application. Courts then treat the language as ambiguous and may consider surrounding circumstances to determine the intended meaning.
Supporting sources
No. Even an unambiguous document may be reformed when clear and convincing evidence shows a mistake of fact or law affected its terms and reveals the donor's true intention. Direct evidence of intention contradicting plain meaning may be considered in that reformation inquiry.
Supporting sources
Claim terms receive their ordinary and customary meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. That meaning is determined from the claim language itself, read in light of the specification and prosecution history, without importing limitations from the specification.
The description is treated as ambiguous when extrinsic facts show it reasonably applies to more than one group. The court then construes the language according to the donor's intention established by a preponderance of the evidence rather than a rigid ordinary reading.
Supporting sources
…Court," SEC v. Sloan , 436 U. S. 103, 120-121 (1978), there is no basis for reading into its actions an intent to modify the plain meaning of the words found in § 101. See TVA v. Hill , 437 U. S. 153, 189-193 (1978); United States v. Price , 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). (B) The petitioner's second argument is that…