447 U.S. 303
In 1972, microbiologist Ananda Chakrabarty filed a patent application assigned to the General Electric Co. The application asserted 36 claims related to his invention of a bacterium from the genus Pseudomonas containing at least two stable energy-generating plasmids, each providing a separate hydrocarbon degradative pathway.1
This human-made, genetically engineered bacterium is capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil.2 This property is possessed by no naturally occurring bacteria.3 It is believed to have significant value for the treatment of oil spills.4 Chakrabarty's patent claims were of three types: process claims for the method of producing the bacteria; claims for an inoculum comprised of a carrier material floating on water, such as straw, and the new bacteria; and claims to the bacteria themselves.5
The patent examiner allowed the claims falling into the first two categories.6 He rejected claims for the bacteria on two grounds.7 Those grounds were that micro-organisms are products of nature and that as living things they are not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.8 Chakrabarty appealed the rejection to the Patent Office Board of Appeals.9 The Board affirmed the examiner on the second ground after relying on the legislative history of the 1930 Plant Patent Act.10 The Board concluded that section 101 was not intended to cover living things such as these laboratory-created micro-organisms.11
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed on the authority of its prior decision in In re Bergy.12 That decision held that the fact that micro-organisms are alive is without legal significance for purposes of the patent law.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bergy.14 It vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Parker v. Flook.15 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals then vacated its judgment in Chakrabarty.16 It consolidated the case with Bergy.17 After re-examining both cases, it reaffirmed its earlier judgments.18
Bergy was subsequently dismissed as moot.19 This left only Chakrabarty for decision.20 The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks again sought certiorari.21 The Supreme Court granted the writ as to both cases.22
Whether a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101?23
35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.24 The terms manufacture and composition of matter are interpreted broadly to include anything under the sun that is made by man, excluding only laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.25 A product of human ingenuity having a distinctive name, character, and use qualifies as patentable subject matter.26
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that Chakrabarty's invention is a human-made, genetically engineered bacterium from the genus Pseudomonas containing at least two stable energy-generating plasmids.27 This bacterium is capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil, a property not possessed by any naturally occurring bacteria.28 The patent claims to the bacteria themselves were rejected by the examiner on the grounds that micro-organisms are products of nature and living things are not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.29
Applying the rule, the invention is not a product of nature but a manufacture or composition of matter because it is the result of human ingenuity and research, as the facts show it was created by transferring plasmids to create a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature.30
A live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the 1930 Plant Patent Act and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act demonstrated Congress's understanding that § 101 does not include living organisms.32 He noted that Congress had specifically excluded bacteria from the 1970 Act.33 Brennan concluded that the majority's decision extended patent protection beyond the limits Congress had set for animate inventions.34
He emphasized that it is the role of Congress, not the Court, to broaden the reach of the patent laws in this area of public concern.35