Also known as: NGRI · insanity defense · insanity plea
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A criminal verdict or plea finding the defendant not guilty because a mental disease or defect prevented the defendant from knowing the wrongfulness of the conduct or from conforming the conduct to the requirements of law. The verdict typically leads to involuntary commitment to a mental institution rather than outright release.
Natalie Norris was charged with assault after stabbing a coworker. She received Miranda warnings and remained silent during questioning. At trial she raised an insanity defense supported by psychiatric testimony. The court found her not guilty by reason of insanity and the prosecutor was barred from using her post-warning silence to suggest the defense was fabricated.
Nolan Nunez was indicted for arson. His counsel intended to assert an insanity defense but filed the required written notice only after the pretrial motion deadline had passed. The government moved to preclude the defense. After the court allowed late notice for good cause, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Nyah Ndlovu was charged with burglary after entering a neighbor's home and removing valuables. She had a documented history of schizophrenia with delusions that the neighbor was storing government surveillance devices inside the residence. Under the Durham test the jury found that the offense was the product of her mental disease and returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Monte Durham was convicted of housebreaking by the District Court of the District of Columbia sitting without a jury. The prosecution proceeded on a charge arising from an incident on July 13, 1951, in which Durham was found in a house. Durham's history included discharge from the Navy in 1945 at age seventeen following a psychiatric examination revealing a profound personality disorder rendering him unfit for service. In 1947 he pleaded guilty to violating the National Motor Theft Act and was placed on probation for one to three years. In January 1948, as a result of a conviction in the District of Columbia Municipal Court for passing bad checks, the District Court revoked his probation and he commenced service of his Motor Theft sentence. His conduct within the first few days in jail led to a lunacy inquiry in the Municipal Court where a jury found him to be of unsound mind. Upon commitment to St. Elizabeths he was diagnosed as suffering from 'psychosis with psychopathic personality.' He experienced multiple discharges and readmissions to St. Elizabeths between 1949 and 1951, including a conditional release in June 1950 that he violated, and a further lunacy finding in 1951. Following the July 1951 housebreaking, Durham was indicted in October 1951 and adjudged of unsound mind based on psychiatrists' affidavits diagnosing psychosis with psychopathic personality. He underwent subshock insulin therapy during a six-month commitment ending in February 1953, after which Dr. Silk certified him mentally competent to stand trial and able to assist counsel. At the ensuing trial, the prosecutor expressed a plan to allow Durham to raise an insanity defense on this charge. The court accepted waivers of jury trial and additional competency proceedings despite Durham's expressed desire for further hospitalization. Testimony included that of Durham's mother regarding his post-May 1951 behavior and a psychiatrist who examined him in September 1951 and opined on his mental condition around the time of the offense. The trial court found the defense of insanity not established under the prevailing standards. The appeal reached the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
View caseNicholas Nunez faced misdemeanor charges and wished to plead guilty to avoid commitment. The court refused the plea after a psychiatric report indicated possible insanity at the time of the offense. Nunez was later tried, found not guilty by reason of insanity, and committed despite his preference for a criminal conviction.
On December 2, 1963, Henry C. Alford was indicted in North Carolina for first-degree murder. The court appointed counsel who interviewed witnesses identified by Alford, but those witnesses provided statements indicating Alford's guilt rather than supporting his claim of innocence. The prosecutor agreed to accept a plea of guilty to a charge of second-degree murder, and on December 10, 1963, Alford pleaded guilty to the reduced charge. Before the plea was finally accepted by the trial court, the court heard the sworn testimony of a police officer who summarized the State's case. Although there was no eyewitness to the crime, the testimony indicated that shortly before the killing Alford took his gun from his house, stated his intention to kill the victim, and returned home with the declaration that he had carried out the killing. After the summary presentation of the State's case, Alford took the stand. He testified that he had not committed the murder but that he was pleading guilty because he faced the threat of the death penalty if he did not do so. In response to the questions of his counsel, he acknowledged that his counsel had informed him of the difference between second- and first-degree murder and of his rights in case he chose to go to trial. After eliciting information about Alford's prior criminal record, which was a long one, the trial court sentenced him to 30 years' imprisonment, the maximum penalty for second-degree murder. Alford sought post-conviction relief in the state court. Among the claims raised was the claim that his plea of guilty was invalid because it was the product of fear and coercion. After a hearing, the state court in 1965 found that the plea was "willingly, knowingly, and understandingly" made on the advice of competent counsel and in the face of a strong prosecution case. Subsequently, Alford petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, first in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, and then in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Both courts denied the writ on the basis of the state court's findings that Alford voluntarily and knowingly agreed to plead guilty. On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that Alford's guilty plea was made involuntarily. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1969.
View caseNoah Nakamura was charged with murder and raised an insanity defense. He made a preliminary showing that his mental condition would be central to the defense but lacked funds to retain a psychiatrist. The court ordered the state to provide access to a psychiatric expert. With that assistance Nakamura was found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Late in 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with murdering a couple and wounding their two children. He was arraigned in the District Court for Canadian County, Oklahoma, in February 1980. His behavior at arraignment and in other prearraignment incidents at the jail was so bizarre that the trial judge, sua sponte, ordered him to be examined by a psychiatrist for the purpose of advising with the Court as to his impressions of whether the Defendant may need an extended period of mental observation. The examining psychiatrist reported that at times Ake appeared to be frankly delusional and claimed to be the sword of vengeance of the Lord. He diagnosed Ake as a probable paranoid schizophrenic and recommended a prolonged psychiatric evaluation to determine whether Ake was competent to stand trial. In March 1980, Ake was committed to a state hospital to be examined with respect to his present sanity. On April 10, the chief forensic psychiatrist informed the court that Ake was not competent to stand trial. The court held a competency hearing at which a psychiatrist testified that Ake was a psychotic with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia chronic with exacerbation, that he was dangerous, and that he required a maximum security facility. The court found Ake to be a mentally ill person in need of care and treatment and incompetent to stand trial, and ordered him committed to the state mental hospital. Six weeks later, the chief forensic psychiatrist informed the court that Ake had become competent to stand trial while receiving 200 milligrams of Thorazine three times daily. At a pretrial conference in June, Ake's attorney informed the court that his client would raise an insanity defense. Counsel requested that a psychiatrist examine Ake with respect to his mental condition at the time of the offense or that the court provide funds for such an examination. The trial judge denied the motion. Ake was tried for two counts of murder in the first degree and two counts of shooting with intent to kill. At the guilt phase, defense counsel called the psychiatrists who had examined Ake at the state hospital, but none testified about his mental state at the time of the offense. The jury rejected the insanity defense and returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. At the sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor relied on the testimony of the state psychiatrists that Ake was dangerous to society. Ake had no expert witness to rebut this testimony or to introduce evidence in mitigation. The jury sentenced Ake to death on each of the two murder counts and to 500 years' imprisonment on each of the two counts of shooting with intent to kill. On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseNoelle North was charged with homicide in a high-profile case. Extensive media coverage detailed the facts before trial. She entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The court considered the publicity when evaluating motions for change of venue but allowed the insanity defense to proceed, resulting in an NGRI verdict.
On the evening of October 18, 1975, local police found the six members of the Henry Kellie family murdered in their home in Sutherland, Nebraska, a town of about 850 people. Police released the description of a suspect, Erwin Charles Simants, to the reporters who had hastened to the scene of the crime. Simants was arrested and arraigned in Lincoln County Court the following morning. Three days after the crime, the County Attorney and Simants' attorney joined in asking the County Court to enter a restrictive order relating to matters that may or may not be publicly reported. This request responded to the mass coverage by news media and the reasonable likelihood of prejudicial news that would make difficult the impaneling of an impartial jury. The County Court heard oral argument but took no evidence. On October 22 the County Court granted the motion and entered an order. The order prohibited everyone in attendance from releasing for public dissemination any testimony given or evidence adduced. It also required members of the press to observe the Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines. Simants' preliminary hearing was held the same day, open to the public but subject to the order. The County Court bound the defendant over for trial to the State District Court on charges that included commission of the murders in the course of a sexual assault. Petitioners, several press and broadcast associations, publishers, and individual reporters, moved on October 23 for leave to intervene in the District Court. They asked that the restrictive order be vacated. The District Court conducted a hearing at which the County Judge testified and newspaper articles about the case were admitted in evidence. On October 27 the District Court granted the motion to intervene and entered its own restrictive order. The order applied only until the jury was impaneled. It specifically prohibited reporting of the existence or contents of a confession Simants had made to law enforcement officers, statements Simants had made to other persons, the contents of a note he had written the night of the crime, aspects of the medical testimony at the preliminary hearing concerning the sexual assault, and the identity of the victims of the alleged sexual assault. Four days later petitioners asked the District Court to stay its order. They applied to the Nebraska Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, a stay, and an expedited appeal. The Nebraska Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 25 and on December 1 issued a per curiam opinion that modified the District Court's order. The modified order prohibited reporting of only three matters: the existence and nature of any confessions or admissions made by the defendant to law enforcement officers, any confessions or admissions made to any third parties except members of the press, and other facts strongly implicative of the accused. The Nebraska Supreme Court remanded the case to the District Judge for reconsideration of whether pretrial hearings should be closed to the press and public. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. The parties informed the Court that Simants had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death, with his appeal pending in the Nebraska Supreme Court. The restrictive order expired by its own terms when the jury was impaneled on January 7, 1976. There were no restraints on publication once the jury was selected.
View caseThe defendant is typically committed to a mental institution rather than released. Commitment continues until the defendant is no longer dangerous or has recovered sufficiently to be released under applicable standards.
Yes. Under federal rules a defendant must file written notice of intent to assert an insanity defense within the time for pretrial motions or at a later time set by the court. Failure to provide timely notice bars reliance on the defense absent good cause.
No. The prosecution may not introduce evidence of post-Miranda silence to rebut or counter an insanity defense because such use violates the implicit assurance that silence carries no penalty.
No. While virtually every state recognizes some form of the insanity defense, the federal constitution probably does not require states to provide insanity as a complete defense to criminal liability.
…was ratified. Commonwealth v. York , 50 Mass. 93 (1845). In 1895 the common-law view was abandoned with respect to the insanity defense in federal prosecutions. Davis v. United States , 160 U. S. 469 (1895). This ruling had wide impact on the practice in the federal courts with respect to the burden of proving various…