Also known as: nolo contendere plea · no contest · no-contest plea
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A criminal defendant's formal response to charges that accepts the court's judgment without admitting factual guilt. The plea produces a conviction and sentence but shields the defendant from using the admission against the defendant in later civil proceedings.
Nia Nkosi was charged with securities fraud and entered a nolo contendere plea. In a later civil action by investors, the plaintiffs offered the plea to prove the underlying misrepresentations. The court excluded the evidence because the rule bars a nolo plea against the defendant who entered it.
Naomi Norton and Natalie Norris faced related misdemeanor charges. Their lawyer presented a package offer under which both would enter nolo contendere pleas or the deal would collapse. The lawyer obtained each client's separate written consent after disclosing every term and the interdependence of the pleas.
Nathaniel Newman was indicted in one district but arrested in another. He filed a written statement requesting to plead nolo contendere and waive trial in the charging district, consented to disposition in the arrest district, and obtained approval from both United States attorneys. The case transferred and the plea proceeded.
Nikhil Narayan was convicted after a nolo contendere plea to a felony. In a later civil suit the plaintiff offered the judgment to prove an essential fact. The court refused the evidence because the hearsay exception for prior convictions excludes judgments based on nolo pleas.
Nigel Nelson's lawyer raised an oral challenge to the indictment during arraignment and immediately announced a nolo contendere plea. The court accepted the plea without ruling on the challenge. On appeal the court held that the voluntary plea waived the nonjurisdictional defect.
In 1959, petitioner Brady was charged with kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). The indictment charged that the victim of the kidnapping was not liberated unharmed, so Brady faced a maximum penalty of death if the jury recommended it. Represented by competent counsel throughout, Brady first elected to plead not guilty. He made no serious attempt to reduce the possibility of a death penalty by waiving a jury trial because the trial judge was unwilling to try the case without a jury. Upon learning that his codefendant, who had confessed to the authorities, would plead guilty and be available to testify against him, Brady changed his plea to guilty. The trial judge twice questioned Brady as to the voluntariness of his plea before accepting it. Brady was sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment, later reduced to thirty years. In 1967, Brady sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his plea of guilty was not voluntarily given because the statute operated to coerce his plea, because his counsel exerted impermissible pressure upon him, and because his plea was induced by representations with respect to reduction of sentence and clemency. He also alleged that the trial judge had not fully complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. After a hearing, the District Court for the District of New Mexico denied relief. The District Court found that Brady's counsel did not put impermissible pressure on him to plead guilty and that no representations were made with respect to a reduced sentence or clemency. The court determined that Brady decided to plead guilty when he learned that his codefendant was going to plead guilty. The court concluded that the plea was voluntarily and knowingly made. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, determining that the District Court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and specifically approving the finding that Brady's plea of guilty was voluntary. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the claim that the Court of Appeals was in error in not reaching a contrary result on the authority of United States v. Jackson.
Two adults were charged under a state sodomy statute after private consensual conduct. They entered nolo contendere pleas, were fined, and appealed the constitutional validity of the statute. The Supreme Court reached the merits and struck down the law.
In Houston, Texas, officers of the Harris County Police Department were dispatched to a private residence in response to a reported weapons disturbance. They entered an apartment where one of the petitioners, John Geddes Lawrence, resided. The officers observed Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sexual act. The two petitioners were arrested, held in custody overnight, and charged and convicted before a Justice of the Peace. The complaints described their crime as "deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex (man)." Texas Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003) provides that a person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex. The statute defines deviate sexual intercourse as any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person, or the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object. The petitioners exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal Court. They challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution. Those contentions were rejected. The petitioners, having entered a plea of nolo contendere, were each fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25. The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the petitioners' federal constitutional arguments under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. After hearing the case en banc the court, in a divided opinion, rejected the constitutional arguments and affirmed the convictions. The majority opinion indicates that the Court of Appeals considered our decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), to be controlling on the federal due process aspect of the case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider three questions. The petitioners were adults at the time of the alleged offense. Their conduct was in private and consensual.
No. Federal Rule of Evidence 410(a)(2) excludes evidence of a nolo contendere plea offered against the defendant who entered it in any civil or criminal proceeding. The rule treats the plea the same as a withdrawn guilty plea to encourage resolution without creating usable admissions.
…the Texas Constitution. Tex. Const., Art. 1, § 3a. Those contentions were rejected. The petitioners, having entered a plea of nolo contendere , were each fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25. App. to Pet. for Cert. 107a-110a. The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the petitioners' federal…
…and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any prior conviction and pleas: Provided, however, that only such evidence in aggravation as the State has made known to the defendant prior to his trial…
…pleaded guilty, Rule 11 read as follows: “A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere . The court may refuse to accept a plea
…the law’s demands. When the express terms of a statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written word is the law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit. I Few facts are needed to appreciate the legal question we face. Each of the three cases before us…
…see Pet. for Cert. 10-11), approximately 92.2% of the convictions in the Ninth Circuit were secured through pleas of guilty or nolo contendere . Annual Report of the Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts 278 (1992) (Table D-7). During that same period, about…
Only with informed consent. Model Rule 1.8(g) prohibits a lawyer from participating in an aggregated agreement as to nolo contendere pleas unless each client gives informed consent in a signed writing that discloses the existence, nature, and participation of every person in the arrangement.
No. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(22) expressly limits the exception to judgments entered after trial or a guilty plea and excludes those based on a nolo contendere plea. The conviction therefore cannot be offered to prove an essential fact under that exception.
The court must consider the parties' views and the public interest in the effective administration of justice under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(3). The court must also ensure the plea is voluntary under Rule 11(b)(2).
Generally no. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) provides that after the court imposes sentence the defendant may not withdraw a nolo contendere plea, and the plea may be set aside only on direct appeal or collateral attack.