Also known as: facially neutral
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A statutory or regulatory provision whose language does not expressly classify individuals on the basis of a protected characteristic. The provision may still violate constitutional guarantees when applied with discriminatory purpose or when its operation unduly burdens a fundamental right.
The state personnel office adopted a rule granting hiring points to any applicant with prior military service. Norman Nash, a male veteran, received the points and secured a supervisory post. Natalie Norris, a female civilian applicant with superior qualifications, received no points and was passed over. The rule's text mentions only military experience.
Oregon's controlled-substance statute prohibited peyote possession without mentioning religion. Alfred Smith and another employee ingested peyote during a Native American Church ritual and were fired. The state denied unemployment benefits under the facially neutral prohibition.
Alfred Smith and Galen Black were members of the Native American Church employed at a private drug rehabilitation organization in Oregon. They ingested peyote for sacramental purposes during a church ceremony. Their employer fired them for this conduct, treating it as work-related misconduct. Smith and Black applied to the Employment Division of the Oregon Department of Human Resources for unemployment compensation benefits, but the Division denied the claims on the ground that the firings constituted misconduct. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the denials, holding that they violated the respondents' free exercise rights under the First Amendment. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that respondents were entitled to payment of unemployment benefits. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for a determination whether Oregon law prohibited the sacramental use of peyote. On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the statute made no exception for sacramental use and reaffirmed its conclusion that denying benefits violated the respondents' constitutional rights. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time. Oregon law prohibits knowing or intentional possession of peyote, a Schedule I controlled substance, making it a Class B felony. The respondents' peyote use occurred at a Native American Church ceremony and formed the sole basis for their terminations and benefit denials.
View caseWisconsin's attendance statute required school until age sixteen and contained no religious exemption. Jonas Yoder and other Amish parents withdrew their children after eighth grade to avoid worldly influences. State officials prosecuted the parents under the uniform age requirement.
In Green County, Wisconsin, respondents Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller are members of the Old Order Amish religion, and respondent Adin Yutzy is a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church. They and their families reside in Green County. Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children to attend public or private school until reaching age 16. The respondents declined to send their children, ages 14 and 15, to public school after they completed the eighth grade. The children involved were Frieda Yoder, aged 15, Barbara Miller, aged 15, and Vernon Yutzy, aged 14. All had graduated from the eighth grade of public school. On complaint of the school district administrator for the public schools, respondents were charged, tried, and convicted in Green County Court of violating the compulsory-attendance law. They were each fined the sum of five dollars. At trial, respondents defended on the ground that application of the compulsory-attendance law violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial testimony showed that respondents believed, in accordance with the tenets of Old Order Amish communities generally, that their children's attendance at high school, public or private, was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life. The State stipulated that respondents' religious beliefs were sincere. Expert witnesses, including scholars on religion and education such as Dr. John Hostetler and Dr. Donald A. Erickson, testified regarding the relationship of Amish beliefs to school attendance and the impact of compulsory high school attendance on Amish communities. The Wisconsin Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that the compulsory school-attendance law violated respondents' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On petition of the State of Wisconsin, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The record showed that the Amish have a history dating back to the 16th century Swiss Anabaptists and maintain a way of life emphasizing separation from the world, harmony with nature, and informal learning through doing on the family farm. Respondents presented evidence that an additional one or two years of formal high school education would do little to serve the state's interests in preparing citizens for political participation and self-sufficiency. The Amish have functioned effectively as a self-sufficient community for more than 200 years. There was no evidence in the record that any of the children in this case expressed a desire to attend high school against their parents' wishes.
View caseArlington Heights denied a rezoning request for a multifamily project in a single-family district. The village board cited traffic and density concerns in its written denial. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation showed that the decision prevented construction of units likely to house minority residents.
In 1971 Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation applied to the Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois, for rezoning of a 15-acre parcel from single-family to multiple-family classification. Using federal financial assistance under section 236 of the National Housing Act, MHDC planned to build 190 clustered townhouse units for low- and moderate-income tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC, joined by other plaintiffs, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that the denial was racially discriminatory and violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago located about 26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop. Most land in the Village is zoned for detached single-family homes. The Clerics of St. Viator own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington Heights that includes a high school, a novitiate building, and vacant land. Since 1959 all land surrounding the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3 for single-family use with relatively small minimum lot-size requirements. In 1970 MHDC entered into a 99-year lease and accompanying agreement of sale covering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian property. The agreement set a bargain purchase price of $300,000 with the sale contingent upon securing zoning clearances and section 236 housing assistance. MHDC's plans for the Lincoln Green project called for 20 two-story buildings containing 190 units with a mix of one-, two-, three-, and four-bedroom configurations and a large portion of the site left open. The development did not conform to the Village zoning ordinance and required rezoning to the R-5 multiple-family classification. MHDC filed a petition for rezoning with the Village Plan Commission accompanied by supporting materials that included an affirmative marketing plan designed to assure racial integration. MHDC consulted with Village staff and incorporated every recommended change into the plans. During the spring of 1971 the Plan Commission considered the proposal at three public meetings that drew large crowds. Opponents focused on the zoning aspects. They argued that the area had always been single-family. They also argued that the buffer policy adopted in 1962 called for R-5 zoning primarily to serve as a buffer between single-family development and commercial or manufacturing districts. At the close of the third meeting the Plan Commission recommended denial. On September 28, 1971, the Village Board denied the rezoning by a 6-1 vote. In June 1972 MHDC and three Black individuals filed suit against the Village. A second nonprofit corporation and an individual of Mexican-American descent intervened. After a bench trial the District Court entered judgment for the Village in 1974. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed in 1975. The Supreme Court granted the Village's petition for certiorari in 1975.
View caseSan Francisco's laundry licensing ordinance required permits for operating laundries in wooden buildings and contained no ethnic classification. Yick Wo, a Chinese immigrant, was denied a permit while non-Chinese owners received them. City officials enforced the facially neutral rule almost exclusively against Chinese-owned businesses.
The City of Boerne enacted an ordinance requiring permits for any exterior alteration to historic structures. Archbishop Flores sought to enlarge a church building within a designated district. City officials denied the permit under the uniform historic-preservation rule.
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses. To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building. A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district. Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application. The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses. Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.
View caseNo. A facially neutral provision can still violate equal protection when adopted or maintained with discriminatory purpose, even if the text itself contains no explicit classification.
Courts examine circumstantial evidence such as disparate impact, historical background, sequence of events, and departures from normal procedures to decide whether discriminatory purpose motivated the action.
Yes. A regulation neutral on its face may still offend the constitutional requirement of governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion in its application.
…Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability. . . . A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for government neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.” Id. , at 219-220 (emphasis added;…