Also known as: necessary party rule · necessary parties · Rule 19
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A procedural doctrine requiring joinder of every person whose legal interests may be impaired or defeated by the outcome of litigation. The rule ensures that a judgment binds all affected parties and that complete relief can be granted among those already before the court. Failure to join such parties can render the proceeding ineffective as to omitted interests or subject the judgment to later attack.
Liberty Trust begins foreclosure on Sun Charity's building but names only the mortgagor as defendant. Atlantic Coalition holds a recorded option to purchase upon default and several tenants hold recorded leaseholds. Because those recorded interests may be cut off by the sale, the court refuses to extinguish them and the purchaser takes subject to the unjoined claims.
Blue Production sues East Industries for defective control boards. East moves under Rule 12(b)(7) to dismiss because Ash Industries fabricated the boards and assumed primary warranty duties. The court denies the motion after finding that complete relief remains available between the existing parties even without Ash.
Carl, a State A citizen, sues Premier Athletic in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. He later seeks to add a nondiverse supplier as a required party under Rule 19. Section 1367(b) blocks supplemental jurisdiction over the new claim because it would destroy complete diversity.
Harold holds a fee tail limited to issue working in the automotive business. A repair shop claims adverse possession and a buyer seeks court approval of a sale. Steven and Laura, living issue who satisfy the class description, must be joined because the judgment may defeat their future interests.
A plaintiff repeatedly fails to join a party required by Rule 19 despite court orders. The defendant moves under Rule 41(b) to dismiss. The court grants the motion but the dismissal does not operate as an adjudication on the merits because the omitted party was required under Rule 19.
White firefighters challenge a consent decree that affects their seniority. The decree was entered in litigation to which they were not parties. The Supreme Court holds that they cannot be bound because they were never joined and had no obligation to intervene.
In 1974 and 1975, the Ensley Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and seven black individuals filed separate class-action complaints against the City of Birmingham and the Jefferson County Personnel Board. They alleged racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in public service jobs including the fire department in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other federal law. After a bench trial in 1976 on some issues and a second trial in 1979 focused on promotion practices but before judgment, the parties negotiated two consent decrees. One was between the black individuals and the City, and the other was between them and the Board. These proposed decrees set forth an extensive remedial scheme including long-term and interim annual goals for the hiring of blacks as firefighters and goals for promotion of blacks within the fire department. The District Court entered an order provisionally approving the decrees and directing publication of notice of the upcoming fairness hearings. Notice of the hearings with a reference to the general nature of the decrees was published in two local newspapers. At that hearing the Birmingham Firefighters Association appeared and filed objections as amicus curiae. After the hearing but before final approval the BFA and two of its members moved to intervene on the ground that the decrees would adversely affect their rights. The District Court denied the motions as untimely and approved the decrees in August 1981. Seven white firefighters, all members of the BFA, then filed a complaint against the City and the Board seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the decrees. The District Court denied relief. Both the denial of intervention and the denial of injunctive relief were affirmed on appeal in 1983. A new group of white firefighters, the Wilks respondents, then brought suit against the City and the Board. They alleged that because of their race they were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks in violation of federal law. The Board and the City admitted making race-conscious employment decisions but argued that the decisions were required by the consent decrees. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss after trial, concluding that the promotions of the black individuals were in fact required by the terms of the consent decree. On appeal the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that because the Wilks respondents were neither parties nor privies to the consent decrees their independent claims of unlawful discrimination are not precluded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1988.
Living issue of the described class are necessary parties when litigation may defeat or impair their future interests. In an action challenging adverse possession or seeking court approval of a sale, the court must join those issue so the judgment binds them.
Supporting sources
…14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional…
…court holding (as to this issue) in the Secretary's favor. There is no support for the dissent's novel contention, ibid. , that Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governing joinder of indispensable parties
…and completeness of judgments would be "better [served] by mandatory joinder procedures." 18 Wright § 4452, p. 453. Accordingly, Rule 19(a) provides for mandatory joinder in circumstances where a judgment rendered in the absence of a person may "leave. . . persons already
…husband, she cannot maintain a suit against him at law; but in equity she may do so, and against all others who may be proper or necessary parties. But it must be done under the protection of some other person who acts as her next friend, and the bill is accordingly exhibited in her name by such next friend. (Story's Equity Pl., 6th…
…of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only where there are special and important reasons therefor." Supreme Court Rule 19 (1). Review on certiorari therefore does not provide a normal appellate channel in any sense comparable to the writ of error. It is also true that Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, a decision…
The omitted junior lienholders, option holders, and tenants remain unaffected by the judgment. Their interests survive the sale because they were not joined and given notice as required by the necessary parties rule.
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Rule 12(b)(7) permits a motion to dismiss for failure to join a party required by Rule 19. The court first determines whether the absent person is required and then decides whether the action can proceed in equity and good conscience without that person.
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Section 1367(b) withholds supplemental jurisdiction over claims against persons joined under Rule 19 when the original jurisdiction rests solely on diversity. The rule prevents plaintiffs from using joinder to circumvent the complete-diversity requirement.
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Physical custodians are necessary parties because the court may order them to surrender the child. Due process requires formal service so they receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before any order binds them.
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