Also known as: motions for new trial · motion for a new trial · new trial motion
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A postjudgment request that the court vacate the judgment and order a new trial for reasons such as factually insufficient evidence, newly discovered evidence, or jury misconduct. The motion supplies a procedural mechanism for the trial court to correct errors that affected the fairness or outcome of the proceeding before an appeal is taken.
Meredith Maxwell obtained a defense verdict in a contract dispute. Judgment was entered on March 1. On April 2 she filed a motion for new trial citing newly discovered documents. The court denied the motion because more than twenty-eight days had elapsed since entry of judgment.
Musa Mensah was convicted after a bench trial. Nearly two years later his counsel located encrypted messages that contradicted the government's key witness. Mensah filed a motion for new trial grounded on the messages. The district court could consider the motion because it was filed within three years of the verdict.
Melissa Mills lost a nonjury trademark case. Within twenty-eight days she filed a motion for new trial together with a request under Rule 52 to amend the court's factual findings on likelihood of confusion. The court considered both requests in a single order.
Madison Meyers was convicted of wire fraud. Fourteen days after the verdict she moved for a new trial alleging an erroneous jury instruction. The court denied the motion as untimely because it was not based on newly discovered evidence.
Mustafa Mahmoud lost an equitable accounting action after a nonjury trial. He filed a timely motion for new trial and asked the court to reopen the record for testimony from a previously unavailable accountant. The court granted the motion, took the additional testimony, and entered a revised judgment.
Mason McCarthy obtained a Florida judgment affecting a Delaware trust. After the Delaware court refused to give the judgment full faith and credit, McCarthy filed a motion for new trial in the Florida action to address the jurisdictional findings. The Florida court considered whether the motion supplied a basis to alter its earlier decree.
In 1935 Dora Browning Donner, then a domiciliary of Pennsylvania, executed a trust instrument in Delaware naming the Wilmington Trust Company as trustee. The corpus consisted of securities. Mrs. Donner reserved the income for life and retained a power of appointment over the remainder exercisable by inter vivos deed or will. She also retained the rights to amend, alter, or revoke the agreement, to change the trustee, and to require the consent of a trust advisor she appointed for sales of assets, investments, and participation in reorganizations. In 1944 Mrs. Donner became domiciled in Florida and remained there until her death in 1952. On December 3, 1949, while in Florida, she executed both her will and an inter vivos power of appointment. The appointment directed $200,000 to each of two trusts benefiting her grandchildren Donner Hanson and Joseph Donner Winsor, with the balance appointed to her executrix. Mrs. Donner died on November 20, 1952. Her will was admitted to probate in Florida, naming Elizabeth Donner Hanson as executrix. Fourteen months after the death, residuary legatees Katherine N. R. Denckla and Dorothy B. R. Stewart petitioned a Florida chancery court for a declaratory judgment concerning property passing under the residuary clause. Personal service was made on the executrix and beneficiaries. Nonresident defendants including the Wilmington Trust Company and the Delaware Trust Company were served by ordinary mail and local publication under Florida statutes. The Delaware trustee did not appear. After the Florida suit began, the executrix filed a declaratory judgment action in Delaware to determine rights to the trust assets held there. All trust companies and most beneficiaries appeared in the Delaware proceeding. The Florida chancellor initially ruled he lacked jurisdiction over the nonresident trustees because no personal service had been made and the trust corpus was outside Florida. He proceeded as to appearing parties and held the power of appointment testamentary and void under Florida law, so that the $400,000 passed under the residuary clause. The Delaware Chancellor ruled the trust and appointment valid under Delaware law and that the corpus had been properly paid to the appointees. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the jurisdictional ruling, held Florida law applied, and affirmed that the trust was invalid and the appointment ineffective. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed its own judgment and refused to accord full faith and credit to the Florida decree. The United States Supreme Court postponed the question of jurisdiction in the Florida appeal and granted certiorari to the Delaware Supreme Court. Both state supreme court judgments are before the Court.
A motion for new trial must be filed no later than twenty-eight days after entry of judgment. The deadline is strict and applies regardless of the ground asserted. An untimely motion deprives the court of authority to grant relief under the rule.
A motion grounded on newly discovered evidence must be filed within three years after the verdict or finding of guilty. If an appeal is pending the district court may not grant the motion until the appellate court remands the case.
…opinion, Nov. 28, 1956. The full faith and credit question was first raised in the Delaware litigation by an unsuccessful motion for new trial filed with the Chancellor Jan. 20, 1956. After the Florida Supreme Court decision the matter was renewed by a motion to remand filed with the Delaware Supreme Court. In a decision of Jan.…
…No less stringent rules should be applied by the reviewing court in such a case than those which govern in the consideration of motions for new trial because the verdict is against the evidence. It must be made clearly to appear that upon the evidence the court ought to have found the juror had formed such an opinion that he could not in…
…the profound importance of finality in criminal proceedings. Moreover, it comports with the widely used standard for assessing motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19-20, and nn. 10, 11. Nevertheless, the standard is not quite appropriate. Even when the specified…
…and of his malice aforethought, killed and murdered one Sol Blackwell. He was found guilty of the charge in the indictment. A motion for a new trial having been overruled, and the court having adjudged that the accused was guilty of the crime of murder, as charged, he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by hanging. At the…
…to the submission of the case to the jury"); Burks v. United States , 437 U. S. 1, 17-18 (under federal law a post-trial
Any motion grounded on a reason other than newly discovered evidence must be filed within fourteen days after the verdict or finding of guilty. Filing after that period deprives the court of power to grant relief on those grounds.
Yes. A motion to amend findings under Rule 52 may accompany a motion for new trial under Rule 59. The court may open the judgment, take additional testimony, amend findings, and enter a new judgment after a nonjury trial.
The party is barred on appeal from arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict. The failure to move for a new trial or for judgment as a matter of law waives the sufficiency argument.