Also known as: exacting scrutiny · strict scrutiny
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The most demanding standard of judicial review. It requires the government to prove that a challenged law or policy serves a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
The city council enacts a rule that prohibits the ritual slaughter of animals in a manner required by a particular faith while allowing other methods of killing animals for food. Madison Meyers, a practitioner of that faith, challenges the ordinance. The court applies most exacting scrutiny because the rule singles out religious conduct and finds that the city cannot show the ban is necessary to any compelling interest.
A city requires that a fixed percentage of public contracts go to minority-owned firms without evidence of past discrimination in the local construction industry. Michael Miller, a non-minority contractor, sues. The court subjects the program to most exacting scrutiny and invalidates it because general assertions of societal discrimination do not supply the required compelling justification.
A city allows officials to grant case-by-case exemptions from its rule barring agencies from rejecting same-sex couples but refuses to extend that flexibility to a religious agency. Maria Morales, who runs the agency, sues. The court applies most exacting scrutiny because the discretionary exemption mechanism renders the policy not generally applicable and finds the city cannot satisfy the standard.
A federal statute prevents registration of trademarks that are disparaging. Maurice Marshall seeks to register a mark that some find offensive. The court subjects the bar to most exacting scrutiny because it regulates private speech on the basis of viewpoint and holds that the government cannot justify the restriction under that standard.
A state statute limits inheritance rights of children born outside marriage. Melissa Mills, an affected child, challenges the law. The court applies most exacting scrutiny to the classification and concludes that the state's asserted interests do not justify the distinction.
Deta Mona Trimble is the illegitimate daughter of Jessie Trimble and Sherman Gordon. Trimble and Gordon lived together in Chicago with Deta Mona from 1970 until Gordon died in 1974 as the victim of a homicide. On January 2, 1973, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, entered a paternity order finding Gordon to be the father of Deta Mona and ordering him to pay fifteen dollars per week for her support. Gordon thereafter supported Deta Mona in accordance with the paternity order and openly acknowledged her as his child. Gordon died intestate at the age of twenty-eight, leaving an estate consisting only of a 1974 Plymouth automobile worth approximately twenty-five hundred dollars. Shortly after Gordon's death, Trimble, as the mother and next friend of Deta Mona, filed a petition for letters of administration, determination of heirship, and declaratory relief in the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County. That court entered an order determining heirship, identifying as the only heirs of Gordon his father Joseph Gordon, his mother Ethel King, and his brother, two sisters, and a half brother. The Circuit Court excluded Deta Mona on the authority of section twelve of the Illinois Probate Act. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court on the authority of its earlier decision in In re Estate of Karas. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to consider the arguments that section twelve violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by invidiously discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy and sex.
View caseA state law criminalizes the use of contraceptives by married couples. Mustafa Mahmoud and his spouse seek to obtain and use the devices. The court subjects the prohibition to most exacting scrutiny as an infringement on a fundamental liberty interest and invalidates the statute.
Estelle Griswold served as Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. C. Lee Buxton served as the League's Medical Director and was a professor at Yale Medical School. Together they opened and operated a center in New Haven that was open from November 1 to November 10, 1961. At the center they gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free. The statutes involved were sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). Section 53-32 made it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Section 54-196 punished accessories as principals. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed that judgment in State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The appellants asserted standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married persons with whom they had a professional relationship. A criminal conviction for serving married couples removes doubts about case or controversy. The rights of husband and wife would be diluted unless considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.
View caseA law triggers most exacting scrutiny when it discriminates against religious status or practice by disqualifying otherwise eligible recipients from public benefits solely because of their religious character. This imposes a penalty on free exercise that the government must justify under the demanding standard.
Most exacting scrutiny applies when a law is not neutral or generally applicable and targets religious conduct. Rational basis review applies only to neutral and generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religion. Under most exacting scrutiny the government must prove a compelling interest and narrow tailoring rather than merely a legitimate interest and rational relation.
Supporting sources
Yes. Content-based restrictions on protected speech, including viewpoint-based trademark rules and financial burdens on speech about crime, are subject to most exacting scrutiny and are presumptively unconstitutional unless narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.
Supporting sources
…law restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples constituted a classification on the basis of sex and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution. Baehr v. Lewin , 74 Haw. 530, 852 P. 2d 44. Although this decision did not mandate that same-sex marriage be allowed, some States were concerned by its…