Also known as:marriage ceremonies · ceremony of marriage
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A formal act of solemnization in which the parties exchange consent to marry before an authorized officiant. Capacity to understand the act and agree to it is determined at the precise moment the ceremony takes place.
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Common Examples
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Intoxicated Party at Ceremony
Musa Mensah consumed hard cider and marijuana throughout the afternoon before his scheduled wedding. At the ceremony he laughed inappropriately and required repeated prompting to recite his lines. The officiant pronounced the couple married anyway. A court later declared the marriage invalid because Musa lacked capacity at the exact time of the ceremony.
Religious Polygamy Ceremony
Miguel Mendoza participated in a second marriage ceremony authorized by his church leaders. The ceremony followed the same formal steps used for his first marriage. Prosecutors charged him with bigamy. The court upheld the conviction because the religious ceremony did not shield the second union from criminal law.
Reynolds v. United States98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145 (1878)
George Reynolds, a longtime member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, was indicted in the District Court of the third judicial district of the Territory of Utah for bigamy after entering a second marriage to Amelia Jane Schofield while his first wife remained alive.
Reynolds had obtained permission from recognized church authorities to contract the polygamous marriage. He and other male church members believed the practice was a religious duty enjoined by divine revelation to Joseph Smith. Refusal would bring damnation when circumstances permitted.
The grand jury that returned the indictment consisted of fifteen persons under a territorial statute. This differed from the sixteen to twenty-three persons required by federal statute for United States circuit and district courts. During voir dire, the trial court overruled Reynolds's challenges for cause to prospective jurors including Charles Read who stated they had formed opinions about the case. The court sustained government challenges to other prospective jurors who were or had been living in polygamy.
At trial the prosecution offered the transcript of testimony given by Amelia Jane Schofield at an earlier prosecution of Reynolds for the same offense under a different indictment. The government showed that subpoenas were served at Reynolds's house. An officer was told the witness was not at home. Reynolds declined to disclose her location. A later subpoena with the correct name also failed to locate her. Reynolds had been present and able to cross-examine at the prior trial but offered no explanation for her absence.
Reynolds requested a jury instruction that he must be acquitted if the jury found he acted in the sincere belief that the second marriage fulfilled a religious duty. The court refused and instead instructed that religious belief could not excuse a knowing violation of the criminal law. The court further instructed the jury to consider the consequences of polygamy for innocent women and children. Reynolds was convicted and the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of error.
Michael Miller and his partner went through a marriage ceremony that would have been valid but for a legal impediment. After his death the child sought survivor benefits. The court treated the child as the decedent's offspring because the ceremony satisfied the statutory test even though the marriage itself was invalid.
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C.132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012)
Karen Capato married Robert Capato in May 1999. Shortly thereafter, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal cancer and was told that the chemotherapy he required might render him sterile. Because the couple wanted children, Robert deposited his semen in a sperm bank before undergoing chemotherapy. Despite Robert's treatment, Karen conceived naturally and gave birth to a son in August 2001.
Robert's health deteriorated in late 2001, and he died in Florida in March 2002. His will, executed in Florida, named as beneficiaries the son born of his marriage to Karen and two children from a previous marriage, but made no provision for children conceived after his death. Shortly after Robert's death, Karen began in vitro fertilization using her husband's frozen sperm. She conceived in January 2003 and gave birth to twins in September 2003, eighteen months after Robert's death.
Karen Capato claimed survivors insurance benefits on behalf of the twins. The Social Security Administration denied her application. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed the agency's decision. The court determined that the twins would qualify for benefits only if they could inherit from the deceased wage earner under Florida intestacy law.
Under Florida law, a child born posthumously may inherit only if conceived during the decedent's lifetime. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. It concluded that the undisputed biological children of a deceased wage earner and his widow qualify for survivors benefits without regard to state intestacy law. Courts of Appeals had divided on the question, with some circuits reaching conflicting results. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
Meredith Maxwell and her partner raised children together without ever participating in a marriage ceremony. After her death the state sought to remove the children from the surviving father. The court held that the absence of a ceremony did not destroy the protected family relationship under the Constitution.
Stanley v. Illinois405 U.S. 645 (1972)
Joan Stanley and Peter Stanley lived together intermittently for 18 years, during which time they had three children. When Joan Stanley died, Peter Stanley lost not only her but also his children. Under Illinois law, the children of unwed fathers become wards of the State upon the death of the mother. Accordingly, upon Joan Stanley’s death, in a dependency proceeding instituted by the State of Illinois, Stanley’s children were declared wards of the State and placed with court-appointed guardians.
Stanley appealed. He claimed that he had never been shown to be an unfit parent. Since married fathers and unwed mothers could not be deprived of their children without such a showing, he had been deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Illinois Supreme Court accepted the fact that Stanley’s own unfitness had not been established, but rejected the equal protection claim, holding that Stanley could properly be separated from his children upon proof of the single fact that he and the dead mother had not been married. Stanley’s actual fitness as a father was irrelevant. The decision is reported at In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N. E. 2d 814 (1970).
Stanley presses his equal protection claim in the United States Supreme Court. The State responds that unwed fathers are presumed unfit to raise their children. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 400 U. S. 1020 (1971), to determine whether this method of procedure by presumption could be allowed to stand in light of the fact that Illinois allows married fathers — whether divorced, widowed, or separated — and mothers — even if unwed — the benefit of the presumption that they are fit to raise their children.
Mariam Mansour and her same-sex partner obtained a marriage license and participated in a ceremony in one state. When they moved, the new state refused to recognize the marriage for benefit purposes. The court required equal recognition because the ceremony created the same marital status as opposite-sex unions.
Obergefell v. Hodges576 U.S. 644 (2015)
The petitioners were fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners were deceased. They lived in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee. Those states defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman under their constitutions and statutes.
The petitioners filed suits in federal district courts in their home states. They sought marriage licenses or recognition of marriages lawfully performed elsewhere. James Obergefell and John Arthur traveled from Ohio to Maryland to marry aboard a medical transport plane because Arthur suffered from ALS; Obergefell later sought to be listed as surviving spouse on Arthur's death certificate. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse, Michigan nurses, adopted three children but could not both serve as legal parents under state adoption rules. Army Reserve Sergeant Ijpe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura married in New York before DeKoe's deployment to Afghanistan and later settled in Tennessee.
Each district court ruled in the petitioners' favor. The respondents appealed. The Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed the district court judgments. The petitioners sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.
Same-sex couples had begun establishing families after substantial cultural and political developments in the late twentieth century. Earlier litigation had addressed the legal status of gays and lesbians, including challenges that reached the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas.
Melanie Morris, an inmate, authorized a proxy to stand in for her at a marriage ceremony conducted outside the prison. Prison rules required approval for such ceremonies. The court struck down a near-total ban because the ceremony implicated fundamental marital rights that could not be restricted without sufficient justification.
Turner v. Safley482 U.S. 78 (1987)
Respondents, a class of inmates confined or to be confined at the Renz Correctional Institution, brought this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri against petitioners, officials of the Missouri Division of Corrections. The Renz facility, located in Cedar City, Missouri, housed both male and female prisoners of varying security classifications in a minimum security setting without guard towers or walls. Most female prisoners at Renz were medium or maximum security inmates, while most male prisoners were minimum security offenders. The facility was occasionally used to provide protective custody for inmates from other Missouri prisons.
Two regulations were at issue in the litigation. The correspondence regulation permitted inmate-to-inmate letters only with immediate family members at other institutions or concerning legal matters, and otherwise only when the classification team of each inmate deemed it in the best interest of the parties. As applied at Renz, the rule operated as a complete prohibition on correspondence between non-family inmates. The marriage regulation, promulgated while the suit was pending, required the prison superintendent's approval for any inmate marriage and directed that approval be granted only upon a finding of compelling reasons, which officials generally limited to situations involving pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child.
The District Court certified a class encompassing persons confined or to be confined at Renz who wished to correspond with inmates at other Missouri facilities or to marry inmates of Missouri correctional institutions. Following a bench trial, the District Court concluded that both regulations violated the inmates' constitutional rights. The court applied a strict scrutiny standard derived from prior precedent and determined that the regulations were not the least restrictive means of achieving the state's asserted interests. The District Court also found that the correspondence regulation had been enforced in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment in its entirety. The appellate court agreed that strict scrutiny was the proper standard and that neither regulation satisfied that standard. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the validity of the regulations.
Does a public ceremony alone create a valid marriage?
No. Most states require both a marriage license issued by a civil authority and a subsequent ceremony of solemnization. A ceremony without the prior license fails to satisfy the statutory prerequisites even if performed by an ordained officiant before witnesses.
Supporting sources
When is capacity to marry measured?
Capacity is measured at the precise moment of the ceremony. A party who is intoxicated or under the influence of drugs at that instant lacks the mental capacity to understand the act and consent to it, rendering the marriage invalid.
Supporting sources
Can a proxy ceremony produce a valid marriage?
Yes, in jurisdictions that expressly authorize proxy marriage. The absent party must supply written authorization for the proxy, and the ceremony must otherwise meet all formal requirements including issuance of a license.
Supporting sources
Does a prior religious ceremony bar issuance of a new license?
Only if the prior ceremony created a marriage recognized under civil law that remains undissolved. A purely religious or unregistered ceremony may not constitute a legal impediment, and the clerk must determine whether satisfactory proof shows no prohibited existing marriage.
Supporting sources
405 U.S. 645 (1972)
…479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Nor has the law refused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony. The Court has declared unconstitutional a state statute denying natural, but illegitimate, children a wrongful-death action for the death of their mother, emphasizing that such children…