market price

Plaintiffs contracted with defendant Retail Marine Corp. to purchase a new boat of a specified model for $12,587.40, initially depositing $40 and later increasing the deposit to $4,250 to obtain immediate delivery on a firm sale basis instead of the originally specified four-to-six-week period. Plaintiffs' attorney sent defendant a letter rescinding the contract on the ground that plaintiff Neri faced imminent hospitalization and surgery that would make payments impossible. The boat had already been ordered from the manufacturer and was delivered to defendant at or before receipt of the rescission letter. Plaintiffs commenced an action to recover their deposit after defendant declined to refund it. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract and damages in the amount of $4,250. Defendant obtained summary judgment on the issue of liability, after which Special Term directed an assessment of damages to determine whether plaintiffs were entitled to return of any portion of their down payment. At the damages hearing, the boat was shown to have been sold four months later to another buyer for the same price negotiated with plaintiffs. Defendant proved without contradiction that its profit on the contract sale would have been $2,579 and that it had incurred $674 in expenses for storage, upkeep, finance charges, and insurance during the period the boat remained unsold; defendant also sought $1,250 in attorneys' fees. The trial court awarded defendant $500 on its counterclaim and directed that plaintiffs recover the $3,750 balance of their deposit. The judgment was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division, and defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals by leave.

Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, served as lead plaintiff in a class action filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on behalf of purchasers of Charter Communications, Inc., common stock. The suit named as defendants Charter itself, some of its executives, its independent auditor Arthur Andersen LLP, and two other companies that had acted as both suppliers and customers of Charter. Charter, a cable operator, engaged in a variety of fraudulent accounting practices throughout 2000 so that its quarterly reports would meet Wall Street expectations for subscriber growth and operating cash flow. By late 2000 Charter executives realized that these practices would still leave the company short of projected operating cash flow by fifteen to twenty million dollars. To close the gap, Charter entered into arrangements with Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., and Motorola, Inc., under which Charter overpaid the respondents twenty dollars for each digital cable converter box it purchased through the end of the year. In return, the respondents agreed to purchase advertising time from Charter at prices higher than fair value, with the transactions documented through backdated contracts and false statements about increased production costs. The arrangements had no economic substance, yet Charter recorded the advertising purchases as revenue and capitalized its purchases of the set-top boxes, thereby inflating reported revenues and operating cash flow by approximately seventeen million dollars on financial statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and disseminated to the public. Respondents had no role in preparing or disseminating Charter's financial statements, and they recorded the transactions as a wash on their own books under generally accepted accounting principles. It is alleged that respondents knew or were in reckless disregard of Charter's intention to use the transactions to mislead research analysts and investors. The District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the allegations showed at most aiding and abetting by respondents. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment.

The plaintiff, a courier, and the defendant entered into an agreement on 12 April 1852. Under its terms, the plaintiff was to serve as the defendant's courier on a tour of the continent of Europe beginning 1 June 1852 for three months at a monthly salary of 10l. The plaintiff agreed to be ready to start on that date, and the defendant promised to employ him on those terms. On 11 May 1852 the defendant wrote to the plaintiff that he had changed his mind, declined the services, and refused any compensation. The plaintiff had remained ready and willing to perform from the time of the agreement. The action was commenced by writ dated 22 May 1852. Between the filing of the suit and 1 June the plaintiff secured employment with Lord Ashburton on terms equally good, though the new engagement was not to begin until 4 July. At the trial before Erle J. during the London sittings in Easter Term, the defendant's counsel contended that no breach could occur before 1 June. The judge left the remaining questions to the jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff, while reserving leave to enter a nonsuit on the timing objection. The defendant then obtained a rule nisi to enter a nonsuit or arrest the judgment. The principal question presented on the motion was whether a contract can be broken before the day fixed for performance arrives when one party has repudiated it in advance.