Also known as: manufactured home · mobile home · modular home
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A structure transportable in one or more sections that meets detailed size thresholds, is built on a permanent chassis, and is designed for use as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation once connected to utilities. The definition expressly encompasses the structure's plumbing, heating, air-conditioning, and electrical systems. In secured transactions law the item qualifies as goods when a security interest attaches.
Monarch Pharmaceuticals extends credit to Miguel Mendoza to purchase a new dwelling unit. Miguel signs a security agreement granting the company an interest in the unit. Because the unit meets the statutory criteria for a manufactured home, it constitutes goods to which the security interest attaches upon Miguel's acquisition of rights in the collateral.
Monarch Pharmaceuticals extends credit to Miguel Mendoza secured by a manufactured home. After default, the secured party obtains a court order and removes the unit from its temporary site. Because the unit meets the statutory criteria for a manufactured home, it remains goods subject to the security interest and the removal is governed by Article 9 remedies.
Edward Soldal and his family resided in their trailer home on a rented lot in the Willoway Terrace mobile home park in Elk Grove, Illinois. In May 1987 Terrace Properties, the park owner, and its manager Margaret Hale filed an eviction proceeding against the Soldals in Illinois state court under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act; that suit was dismissed on June 2, 1987. In August 1987 Terrace Properties filed a second eviction action claiming nonpayment of rent, and the case was set for trial on September 22, 1987. Rather than await judgment, Terrace Properties and Hale elected to remove the trailer forcibly on September 4, 1987. Hale notified the Cook County Sheriff’s Department that she would remove the home and requested deputies to prevent resistance. Two Terrace Properties employees arrived accompanied by Deputy Sheriff O’Neil; they disconnected the sewer, water, and phone lines, tore off the canopy and skirting, and hooked the trailer to a tractor while O’Neil told Soldal he was present to ensure Soldal did not interfere. Two additional deputies arrived, and Soldal asked to file a criminal trespass complaint. The deputies referred him to Deputy Lieutenant Jones, who remained in Hale’s office for over twenty minutes, consulted a district attorney, and then refused to accept the complaint, stating the dispute was between landlord and tenant and that the removal would proceed. Throughout the episode the deputies knew Terrace Properties lacked an eviction order and that its conduct was unlawful, yet they remained while the trailer was pulled free of its moorings and towed onto the street, later to be hauled to neighboring property. On September 9 the state judge presiding over the pending eviction case ruled the removal unauthorized and ordered the home returned to the lot, but the trailer had already been badly damaged. The Soldals filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court against Terrace Properties, Hale, and Cook County deputy sheriffs, alleging a conspiracy to seize their home in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that no evidence supported the conspiracy claim or state action. The Seventh Circuit panel accepted the existence of state action but held that the removal did not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure or a due-process deprivation; sitting en banc, the court of appeals reaffirmed that decision, after which the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseThe statute requires a minimum size of eight feet in width or forty feet in length when traveling, or 320 square feet when erected, plus a permanent chassis and design for dwelling use. Recreational vehicles intended only for temporary vacation use fall outside the definition even if they otherwise resemble mobile homes.
Supporting sources
A manufactured home is goods when it remains personal property at the moment a security interest attaches. Once affixed to land in a manner that satisfies fixture rules under UCC § 9-334, the home may become a fixture, but the statute expressly includes it within goods until that transformation occurs.
Supporting sources
Yes. A purchase-money security interest in a manufactured home that is not inventory may be perfected by notation on a certificate of title or by filing, and special rules under UCC § 9-334(e)(4) and § 9-102(a)(54) govern priority when the home is the primary collateral in a manufactured-home transaction.
Supporting sources