lunatic

Alvin Bernard Ford was convicted of murder in a Florida state court in 1974 and sentenced to death. There was no suggestion at the time that he was incompetent to stand trial or to be sentenced. In early 1982, while on death row, Ford began to exhibit bizarre behavior that grew more serious over time. After reading about a Ku Klux Klan rally, he developed an obsession with the Klan and delusions that he was the target of a conspiracy involving the Klan and prison guards, who he believed were holding 135 of his friends and family hostage in the prison and torturing his women relatives. He began referring to himself as Pope John Paul III and claimed to have fired prison officials and appointed new justices to the Florida Supreme Court. Ford's counsel arranged for examinations by two psychiatrists. Dr. Jamal Amin evaluated Ford over roughly 14 months using taped conversations, letters, interviews, and medical records and concluded that Ford suffered from a severe mental disease resembling paranoid schizophrenia with suicide potential. Dr. Harold Kaufman interviewed Ford in November 1983 and concluded that Ford had no understanding of why he was being executed, sincerely believed he would not be executed because he owned the prisons and could control the Governor through mind waves, and showed no signs of malingering. Pursuant to Florida Statute § 922.07, Ford's counsel invoked the state procedure for determining competency of a condemned inmate. The Governor appointed a panel of three psychiatrists who together interviewed Ford for approximately 30 minutes in the presence of eight other people. Each psychiatrist filed a separate two- or three-page report. Although the diagnoses differed, all three concluded that Ford had the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and the reasons why it was imposed on him. On April 30, 1984, the Governor signed a death warrant without explanation or statement. Ford's attorneys unsuccessfully sought a hearing in state court. They then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, proffering the conflicting findings and subsequent challenges by other psychiatrists. The District Court denied the petition without a hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In February 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion entered into an agreement for the sale and servicing of cellular telephones with AT&T Mobility LLC. The contract provided for arbitration of all disputes between the parties but required that claims be brought in the parties' individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding. The agreement authorized AT&T to make unilateral amendments, which it did to the arbitration provision on several occasions. The parties agree that the December 2006 revisions control. The revised agreement requires customers to complete a one-page Notice of Dispute form. It allows AT&T to offer settlement. It provides that AT&T must pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims. Arbitration must take place in the county where the customer is billed. For claims of $10,000 or less, the customer may choose in-person, telephone, or submission-based proceedings. The agreement preserves the right to bring claims in small claims court. It requires AT&T to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery plus twice the claimant's attorney's fees if the arbitration award exceeds AT&T's last written settlement offer. The Concepcions purchased AT&T service advertised as including free phones but were charged $30.22 in sales tax based on the phones' retail value. In March 2006, the Concepcions filed a complaint against AT&T in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. Their suit was consolidated with a putative class action alleging that AT&T had engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on phones it advertised as free. In March 2008, AT&T moved to compel arbitration under the terms of its contract with the Concepcions. The Concepcions opposed the motion on the ground that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable under California law because it disallowed classwide procedures. The District Court denied AT&T's motion. It described the arbitration agreement favorably in several respects. Nevertheless, the court found the provision unconscionable under the California Supreme Court's Discover Bank decision because AT&T had not shown that bilateral arbitration adequately substituted for the deterrent effects of class actions. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It also found the provision unconscionable under California law as announced in Discover Bank. The court held that the Discover Bank rule was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act because the rule was simply a refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in California. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Washington has prohibited assisting suicide since its territorial days. In 1854, the first Territorial Legislature outlawed assisting another in the commission of self-murder. The current statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060, provides that a person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide, and classifies it as a class C felony punishable by up to five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. Washington's Natural Death Act, enacted in 1979, states that the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment at a patient's direction shall not constitute a suicide, but the state has consistently rejected efforts to legalize physician-assisted suicide, including a 1991 ballot initiative defeated by voters. The respondents in this case are four physicians who practice in Washington and treat terminally ill patients, three terminally ill patients who sought to end their lives with physician assistance and have since died, and Compassion in Dying, a nonprofit organization that counsels people considering physician-assisted suicide. The physicians declared that they would assist their patients in ending their lives if not for the assisted-suicide ban. Petitioners are the State of Washington and its Attorney General. In January 1994, the respondents filed this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. They sought a declaration that Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060 is unconstitutional on its face and an injunction against its enforcement. The District Court held that the statute was unconstitutional. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision, but the full court sitting en banc reversed the panel and affirmed the District Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.

In 1993 Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 by enacting the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which directed the Attorney General to create a national instant background-check system by November 30, 1998, and imposed interim requirements on firearms dealers and chief law enforcement officers until that system became operational. Under the interim scheme a dealer proposing to transfer a handgun had to obtain a sworn Brady Form from the purchaser, verify the purchaser's identity, forward notice and a copy of the form to the CLEO of the purchaser's residence, and wait five business days before completing the sale unless the CLEO notified the dealer that the transfer would not violate the law. Jay Printz, CLEO for Ravalli County, Montana, and Richard Mack, CLEO for Graham County, Arizona, filed separate federal actions challenging the constitutionality of the interim provisions that required CLEOs to perform background checks and related tasks. In each case the district court held that the obligation imposed on CLEOs was unconstitutional but severable from the remainder of the Act, leaving in place a voluntary background-check system. The Ninth Circuit consolidated the appeals and reversed, holding that none of the Brady Act's interim provisions violated the Constitution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Jeffrey M. Masson served as Projects Director of the Sigmund Freud Archives until his termination. In 1983, Janet Malcolm published a two-part article in The New Yorker magazine detailing the circumstances of Masson's departure from the Archives and his disputes with board members including Dr. Kurt Eissler and Dr. Anna Freud. The article drew primarily from tape-recorded interviews Malcolm conducted with Masson and was subsequently published in book form by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Masson claimed that several quotations attributed to him in the article did not appear on the tape recordings of his conversations with Malcolm. Among the challenged passages were statements that he changed his middle name because it sounded better, that he was viewed as an intellectual gigolo, that Freud's theory was the product of moral cowardice, that Anna Freud's house would have been a place of sex, women, fun, and that he would be considered the greatest analyst who ever lived after Freud. On November 29, 1984, Masson filed a diversity action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Malcolm, The New Yorker Magazine, Inc., and Knopf. He alleged that the defendants had libeled him and placed him in a false light by fabricating quotations and by misleadingly editing his statements to portray him as unscholarly, irresponsible, vain, and lacking in honesty and moral integrity. Masson further alleged that The New Yorker and Knopf knew of Malcolm's misconduct prior to publication. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the ground that Masson had failed to establish actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Masson appealed the district court's order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which heard argument on June 16, 1988, and issued its decision on August 4, 1989.