Also known as:limited liability company · limited liability companies · LLC · LLCs
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An unincorporated business organization formed under state law that shields its members from personal liability for the entity's debts while permitting flexible management structures and pass-through taxation.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Diversity Jurisdiction Challenge
Leo Lynch and Levi Lowe formed Lexicon Media LLC with members in Illinois and Indiana. When Lexicon Media sued a supplier in federal court, the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of diversity. The court looked to the citizenship of each member rather than treating the LLC as having its own state of formation or principal place of business.
Winding Up Surplus Distribution
After Lattice Systems LLC dissolved, it paid creditors and then distributed remaining surplus first to members for unreturned contributions and then proportionally to their transferable interests. Latoya Lane received her full contribution amount before any pro-rata share went to other members.
Lunar Dynamics LLC, a Delaware entity with operations in California, faced a products liability suit in that state. The court examined whether the LLC's contacts were so continuous and systematic as to render it at home in California for general jurisdiction purposes.
Daimler AG v. Bauman571 U.S. 117, 139 n.20 (2014)
In 2004, twenty-two residents of Argentina filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft, a German public stock company headquartered in Stuttgart that manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany.
The complaint alleged that Daimler's Argentinian subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina, collaborated with state security forces during Argentina's 1976–1983 Dirty War to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill MB Argentina workers, including plaintiffs or persons closely related to them. The complaint asserted claims under the Alien Tort Statute, the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, and California and Argentina law. Jurisdiction over Daimler was predicated on the California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, another Daimler subsidiary incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in New Jersey.
MBUSA serves as Daimler's exclusive importer and distributor in the United States, purchasing vehicles from Daimler in Germany and distributing them to independent dealerships throughout the nation, including California. MBUSA maintains a regional office in Costa Mesa, a Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a Classic Center in Irvine. MBUSA's California sales accounted for 2.4 percent of Daimler's worldwide sales.
A General Distributor Agreement between Daimler and MBUSA established MBUSA as an independent contractor that buys and sells vehicles for its own account and has no authority to make binding obligations for Daimler.
Daimler moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. After allowing jurisdictional discovery on the agency allegations, the District Court granted the motion in November 2005 and reaffirmed the dismissal in February 2007, concluding that Daimler's own contacts with California were too sporadic and that MBUSA's contacts could not be attributed to Daimler. The Ninth Circuit initially affirmed but, on rehearing, reversed in 2011, holding that MBUSA was Daimler's agent for jurisdictional purposes and that its California contacts supported the exercise of general jurisdiction over Daimler.
Daimler petitioned for rehearing and rehearing en banc, which the Ninth Circuit denied over the dissent of eight judges. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2013 to decide whether Daimler is amenable to suit in California for claims arising from events occurring entirely outside the United States and unrelated to any activity in California.
Liberty Trust LLC purchased securities after an investment firm allegedly aided a scheme to inflate values. The court considered whether the LLC could pursue a private right of action against secondary actors who had no direct duty to disclose.
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc.552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008)
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, served as lead plaintiff in a class action filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on behalf of purchasers of Charter Communications, Inc., common stock. The suit named as defendants Charter itself, some of its executives, its independent auditor Arthur Andersen LLP, and two other companies that had acted as both suppliers and customers of Charter. Charter, a cable operator, engaged in a variety of fraudulent accounting practices throughout 2000 so that its quarterly reports would meet Wall Street expectations for subscriber growth and operating cash flow.
By late 2000 Charter executives realized that these practices would still leave the company short of projected operating cash flow by fifteen to twenty million dollars. To close the gap, Charter entered into arrangements with Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., and Motorola, Inc., under which Charter overpaid the respondents twenty dollars for each digital cable converter box it purchased through the end of the year. In return, the respondents agreed to purchase advertising time from Charter at prices higher than fair value, with the transactions documented through backdated contracts and false statements about increased production costs.
The arrangements had no economic substance, yet Charter recorded the advertising purchases as revenue and capitalized its purchases of the set-top boxes, thereby inflating reported revenues and operating cash flow by approximately seventeen million dollars on financial statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and disseminated to the public. Respondents had no role in preparing or disseminating Charter's financial statements, and they recorded the transactions as a wash on their own books under generally accepted accounting principles. It is alleged that respondents knew or were in reckless disregard of Charter's intention to use the transactions to mislead research analysts and investors.
The District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the allegations showed at most aiding and abetting by respondents. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment.
Lena Lawson, a member of an LLC targeted for acquisition, challenged the deal as unfair. The court applied the business judgment rule after finding that a fully informed vote of disinterested members approved the transaction.
KKR Financial Holdings LLC was structured from its inception with a management agreement under which KKR Financial Advisors, an affiliate of KKR & Co. L.P., managed its day-to-day operations. The agreement could be terminated only upon payment of a termination fee by Financial Holdings. KKR owned less than 1 percent of Financial Holdings stock and had no right to appoint directors or veto board decisions. These structural features were known to investors when they purchased shares in Financial Holdings.
KKR acquired each share of Financial Holdings stock for 0.51 of a share of KKR stock, a 35% premium to the unaffected market price. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The Court of Chancery dismissed the plaintiffs‘ complaint.
The appeal was submitted on September 16, 2015, and the Supreme Court issued its decision on October 2, 2015.
Liam Larson invested in an LLC that later faced securities litigation. The court evaluated whether the fraud-on-the-market presumption applied to the LLC's publicly traded interests when proving reliance on alleged misstatements.
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.573 U.S. 258, 268 (2014)
Between June 3, 1999, and December 7, 2001, Halliburton Company and one of its executives made a series of public statements about the company's potential liability in asbestos litigation, its expected revenue from construction contracts, and the anticipated benefits of a merger with another company.
Respondent Erica P. John Fund, Inc., serving as lead plaintiff, alleged that these statements were materially false and misleading and were made to inflate the price of Halliburton's common stock. Halliburton later issued corrective disclosures that EPJ Fund contends caused the stock price to drop and produced losses for investors who had purchased shares during the class period.
EPJ Fund moved in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas to certify a class of all investors who purchased Halliburton common stock during the class period. The district court determined that the proposed class satisfied the four threshold requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). It nevertheless denied certification under Rule 23(b)(3) because Fifth Circuit precedent at the time required securities fraud plaintiffs to prove loss causation at the class certification stage to rely on the presumption from Basic Inc. v. Levinson.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of class certification on the same ground. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804 (2011), and remanded the case. On remand, Halliburton presented evidence that none of its alleged misrepresentations had actually affected the company's stock price and argued that this evidence rebutted the Basic presumption, so that individual issues of reliance would predominate.
The district court declined to consider the price impact evidence at the certification stage and certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the certification order. It acknowledged that Halliburton's price impact evidence could be used at trial on the merits but held that such evidence could not be considered at the class certification stage to rebut the presumption of reliance. The Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time to address whether Basic's presumption should be overruled or modified and whether defendants may present evidence of no price impact before class certification.
How is an LLC treated for federal diversity jurisdiction purposes?
An LLC is treated as an unincorporated association. Its citizenship is determined by the citizenship of each of its members rather than by a state of incorporation or principal place of business.
Supporting sources
Does failure to observe formalities expose LLC members to personal liability?
No. State statutes provide that failure to observe formalities relating to the exercise of powers or management is not a ground for imposing liability on a member for the company's debts.
Supporting sources
What distribution order applies when an LLC winds up its affairs?
After paying creditors, surplus is first returned to persons for unreturned contributions reflected in transferable interests and then distributed proportionally among holders of transferable interests according to their rights immediately before dissolution.
Supporting sources
571 U.S. 117 (2014)
…the United States, where its subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA), distributes Daimler vehicles. MBUSA is a Delaware limited liability company and has its principal place of business in New Jersey. MBUSA’s marketing and sales efforts in California are undertaken by a regional office in Costa Mesa and a network of independent…