Also known as: limitation period · limitations periods · limitation periods
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A statutory time limit that bars assertion of a claim after a specified period measured from accrual. The period requires diligent prosecution of known claims to promote finality and preserve evidence while it remains fresh.
Lamar Lewis, a nonmarital child, sought support from his father six years after birth. State law imposed a six-year limitations period only on nonmarital children while allowing marital children to seek support indefinitely. The court applied intermediate scrutiny and held the disparate period unconstitutional because the state failed to show it substantially advanced the interest in preventing stale claims.
Luna Lang conceived children using her deceased husband's gametes sixteen months after his death. State intestacy law imposed a limitations period for paternity claims against the estate. The court upheld the period as a means to achieve certainty of filiation and orderly estate administration.
In January 1993, Lauren Woodward and her husband Warren Woodward, who had been married for approximately three and one-half years and remained childless, learned that Warren had leukemia. The couple arranged for a quantity of Warren's semen to be medically withdrawn and preserved through a process known as sperm banking before he began treatment. Warren underwent an unsuccessful bone marrow transplant and died in October 1993, after which Lauren was appointed administratrix of his estate. In October 1995, Lauren gave birth to twin girls who had been conceived through artificial insemination using Warren's preserved semen. In January 1996, she applied to the Social Security Administration for child's insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) and mother's benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1). The SSA denied the claims on the ground that the twins were not the husband's children within the meaning of the Act. In February 1996, while pursuing appeals from the SSA denial, Lauren filed a complaint for correction of birth record in the Probate and Family Court against the clerk of the city of Beverly, seeking to add Warren as the father on the twins' birth certificates. In October 1996, a Probate Court judge entered a judgment of paternity based on stipulations of voluntary acknowledgment of parentage and ordered the birth certificates amended to declare Warren the children's father. An administrative law judge conducted a de novo hearing. The judge concluded that the children did not qualify for benefits because they were not entitled to inherit from Warren under Massachusetts intestacy and paternity laws. The SSA appeals council affirmed that decision. Lauren appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The court certified the question regarding the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children under Massachusetts intestacy law to the Supreme Judicial Court because the parties agreed that a determination under state law was dispositive and no directly applicable precedent existed.
View caseLakeshore Industries held a claim against a decedent's estate. The probate court published notice and set a nonclaim period. The court held that due process requires reasonable notice to known creditors before the period can bar the claim, because significant state action through court supervision is involved.
In November 1978, H. Everett Pope, Jr., was admitted to St. John Medical Center, a hospital in Tulsa, Oklahoma. On April 2, 1979, while still at the hospital, he died testate. His wife, appellee JoAnne Pope, initiated probate proceedings in the District Court of Tulsa County. The court entered an order setting a hearing, admitted the will to probate, and named appellee as executrix, issuing letters testamentary to her. Following her appointment, the court ordered appellee to immediately give notice to creditors. Appellee published notice in the Tulsa Daily Legal News for two consecutive weeks beginning July 17, 1979. The notice advised creditors that they must file any claim against the estate within two months of the first publication. Appellant Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc., a subsidiary of St. John Medical Center and the assignee of a claim for expenses connected with the decedent's hospital stay, did not file a claim with appellee within the two-month period. In October 1983, appellant filed an Application for Order Compelling Payment of Expenses of Last Illness in the District Court of Tulsa County. The district court denied the application. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. Appellant then sought rehearing, raising a due process challenge to the nonclaim statute's notice provisions for the first time. The Court of Appeals rejected the due process claim on the merits in a supplemental opinion. Appellant sought review in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, which granted certiorari and affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard the case.
View caseLuis Lopez sought to inherit from his father's estate. State law required a formal paternity adjudication during the father's lifetime. The court upheld the requirement because it substantially related to the state's interest in orderly estate distribution.
Robert Lalli claims to be the illegitimate son of Mario Lalli, who died intestate on January 7, 1973, in New York. Robert’s mother, who died in 1968, was never married to Mario. After Mario’s widow, Rosamond Lalli, was appointed administratrix of the estate, Robert and his sister Maureen petitioned the Surrogate’s Court for Westchester County for a compulsory accounting, asserting their entitlement to inherit as Mario’s children. Rosamond Lalli opposed the petition. She argued that Robert and Maureen had not obtained an order of filiation during Mario’s lifetime as required by New York Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law § 4-1.2. Robert conceded the absence of such an order. He presented evidence. This included a notarized document in which Mario referred to him as “my son” when consenting to his marriage. There were also affidavits from individuals stating that Mario had openly acknowledged Robert and Maureen as his children. The Surrogate’s Court ruled that Robert and Maureen were excluded as distributees. On direct appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. While the case was pending before the United States Supreme Court, the Court decided Trimble v. Gordon and vacated and remanded for further consideration. On remand, the New York Court of Appeals adhered to its prior disposition. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard the case.
View caseLegacy Motors owned severed mineral interests that had not been used for twenty years. A state statute automatically extinguished unused interests after that period. The court upheld the self-executing limitations period as a valid exercise of state power to clear title.
In 1971 the Indiana Legislature enacted the Dormant Mineral Interests Act. The Act provided that any severed mineral interest unused for a period of twenty years would be extinguished and its ownership would revert to the then-current surface owner unless the mineral owner filed a statement of claim in the county recorder's office. The statute took effect on September 2, 1971, and included a two-year grace period allowing owners of already unused interests to preserve them by filing claims. A mineral interest was deemed used if minerals were produced, rents or royalties were paid, or taxes were paid on the interest. Owners could also preserve interests by filing statements of claim, and an exception allowed owners of ten or more interests in the same county who inadvertently omitted some to file a supplemental claim within sixty days of receiving notice. The first of the two consolidated cases concerned fractional mineral interests severed in 1942 and 1944 from a 132-acre tract in Gibson County, Indiana. Eleven appellants claimed ownership of those interests, and a twelfth appellant held oil and gas leases executed by the others in 1976 and 1977. The appellee owned the surface of the tract. The parties stipulated that the mineral interests had not been used for twenty years and no statement of claim had been filed within the grace period, so the interests lapsed on September 2, 1973. On April 28, 1977, the surface owner published and mailed notice of the lapse. The mineral owners then filed statements of claim, and the surface owner commenced an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the interests had been extinguished. In the second case the severed mineral estate was created on March 1, 1954, when appellants Pond and Bobe conveyed land to the appellees by warranty deed that reserved the minerals. On June 17, 1976, Pond and Bobe executed a coal mining lease with appellant Consolidated Coal Co. The parties stipulated that the interest had not been used and no statement of claim had been filed during the twenty years following its creation, resulting in lapse on March 1, 1974. Notice of the lapse was given by letter and by publication in the Princeton Daily Clarion on March 4, 1977. The parties jointly filed suit on January 12, 1978, to resolve their conflicting claims to the mineral rights. In both cases the agreed statements of facts recorded that the mineral owners had neither used their interests nor filed claims within the statutory periods, and the surface owners had given notice after the periods had expired. The statements did not indicate whether any appellant had known of the Act or its possible effect before receiving notice. The state trial court held the statute unconstitutional. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the appeals.
View caseYes. Statutes of limitations and their associated tolling rules are substantive for Erie purposes because they determine whether a claim exists when filed. Applying federal rules instead would produce different outcomes and encourage forum shopping.
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It does when the period is not substantially related to an important governmental objective such as preventing stale claims. Classifications based on illegitimacy receive intermediate scrutiny, and a shorter period for nonmarital children fails that test absent a demonstrated connection to the asserted interest.
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It begins at the date of the decedent's death or the date the claim accrues, subject to any statutory tolling or discovery rules. The period serves the state's interest in certainty of filiation and prompt estate administration.
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Yes when significant state action is involved through court supervision. The self-executing nature of ordinary statutes of limitations does not apply. Due process therefore requires reasonable notice before the period bars a known claim.
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