485 U.S. 478 (1988)
In November 1978, H. Everett Pope, Jr., was admitted to St. John Medical Center, a hospital in Tulsa, Oklahoma.1 On April 2, 1979, while still at the hospital, he died testate.2 His wife, appellee JoAnne Pope, initiated probate proceedings in the District Court of Tulsa County.3 The court entered an order setting a hearing, admitted the will to probate, and named appellee as executrix, issuing letters testamentary to her.4
Following her appointment, the court ordered appellee to immediately give notice to creditors.5 Appellee published notice in the Tulsa Daily Legal News for two consecutive weeks beginning July 17, 1979.6 The notice advised creditors that they must file any claim against the estate within two months of the first publication.7 Appellant Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc., a subsidiary of St. John Medical Center and the assignee of a claim for expenses connected with the decedent's hospital stay, did not file a claim with appellee within the two-month period.8
In October 1983, appellant filed an Application for Order Compelling Payment of Expenses of Last Illness in the District Court of Tulsa County.9 The district court denied the application.10 The Oklahoma Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment.11 Appellant then sought rehearing, raising a due process challenge to the nonclaim statute's notice provisions for the first time.12
The Court of Appeals rejected the due process claim on the merits in a supplemental opinion.13 Appellant sought review in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, which granted certiorari and affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment.14 The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard the case.15
Whether Oklahoma's nonclaim statute, which requires creditors to present claims arising upon a contract within two months after publication of notice of the commencement of probate proceedings, satisfies the Due Process Clause when notice is given solely by publication?16
Due process requires actual notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors when state action in probate proceedings triggers a nonclaim statute that bars their claims. Publication notice alone is not reasonably calculated to apprise them of the proceedings.17
No. Applying the principles from Mullane and Mennonite, the Court determined that Oklahoma's nonclaim statute involves significant state action because the probate court appoints the executrix, orders the publication of notice, and requires filing of proof, thereby activating the time bar.18 This distinguishes it from self-executing statutes of limitations.19 The statute adversely affects the creditor's property interest by extinguishing the claim.20 Although the State has a legitimate interest in expeditious estate settlement, actual notice by mail to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors is feasible and not unduly burdensome.21
Because the record does not establish whether appellant's identity as a creditor was known or reasonably ascertainable by appellee, the case was remanded for further proceedings on that question.22
Oklahoma's nonclaim statute does not satisfy the Due Process Clause when it provides only publication notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors.23
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that the Oklahoma nonclaim statute is comparable to the Indiana mineral lapse statute upheld in Texaco v. Short.24 He argued that the probate court's administrative role in appointing the executor and ordering notice is trivial and does not constitute the significant state action necessary to implicate heightened due process requirements.25 Rehnquist noted that from the claimant's perspective, the practical effect of the time bar is the same whether triggered by publication ordered by a court-appointed executor or by the operation of a self-executing statute.26
He concluded that the majority's emphasis on court involvement would improperly extend due process protections to purely administrative contexts.27