Also known as: life tenures · tenure for life
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An office held during good behavior with compensation that may not be diminished during the holder's continuance in office. The protection secures judicial independence by insulating the officeholder from removal or salary reduction by the political branches.
Lena Lawson challenged an order from an internal agency panel that reviewed her financial-market dispute. The panel members served fixed terms and faced possible salary cuts by Congress. Because the panel was an Article I hybrid tribunal, the district court upheld its authority even though the members lacked life tenure.
Luke Latham appealed an adverse Tax Court ruling on his deduction claim. The Tax Court judges held fixed terms without life tenure or salary protection. The Supreme Court upheld the structure because the tribunal performed functions incidental to Congress's legislative powers.
In 1969 Congress established the United States Tax Court as an Article I court of record and authorized it to appoint commissioners, later renamed special trial judges, to assist its judges. The Tax Court consists of nineteen judges appointed by the President with Senate confirmation to fifteen-year terms. In 1984 and 1986 Congress expanded the Chief Judge's authority to assign special trial judges to hear four categories of proceedings, including any other proceeding the Chief Judge may designate, though only regular Tax Court judges may enter final decisions in the fourth category. Several petitioners deducted approximately $1.5 billion in losses from a tax shelter scheme on their federal income tax returns. In March 1982 they petitioned the Tax Court for review of deficiency determinations. Their cases were assigned to Tax Court Judge Richard C. Wilbur and trial began in 1984. Judge Wilbur became ill in November 1985. The Chief Judge assigned Special Trial Judge Carleton D. Powell to preside over the trial as evidentiary referee with proceedings videotaped. When Judge Wilbur retired effective April 1, 1986, the cases were reassigned to Judge Powell with petitioners' consent for preparation of written findings and an opinion. Judge Powell concluded that the tax shelter consisted of sham transactions and that petitioners owed additional taxes. The Chief Judge adopted Judge Powell's opinion as the opinion of the Tax Court. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the Tax Court's decision. Petitioners contended on appeal that assignment of their complex cases to a special trial judge exceeded statutory authority and violated the Appointments Clause. The Fifth Circuit held that the constitutional claim could be raised for the first time on appeal but rejected it on the merits, finding waiver by consent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the statutory and constitutional questions.
View caseLeah Lamb objected to an independent counsel's investigation into her business dealings. The counsel was appointed by a judicial panel whose members enjoyed life tenure. The Court found the appointment valid because the life-tenured judges remained insulated from political control.
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View caseLars Lindstrom sued state officials who punished students for refusing to salute the flag. The state board argued that life-tenured federal judges should defer to elected bodies on such policy questions. The Court rejected the argument, noting that life tenure exists precisely to permit independent review of constitutional claims.
Following the Supreme Court's 1940 decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the West Virginia legislature amended its statutes to require all schools in the state to conduct courses of instruction in history, civics, and the Constitutions of the United States and West Virginia for the purpose of teaching, fostering, and perpetuating the ideals, principles, and spirit of Americanism. The State Board of Education was directed to prescribe the courses of study covering these subjects for public schools. Private, parochial, and denominational schools were required to prescribe similar courses. On January 9, 1942, the West Virginia State Board of Education adopted a resolution ordering that the salute to the flag become a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools, with all teachers and pupils required to participate. The resolution specified the stiff-arm salute with the right hand raised and palm turned up while repeating the pledge: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Refusal to salute was defined as an act of insubordination to be dealt with by expulsion. Readmission was denied by statute until compliance. The expelled child was treated as unlawfully absent. Parents or guardians faced prosecution with fines not exceeding $50 and jail terms not exceeding thirty days. The appellees are citizens of the United States and West Virginia who are Jehovah's Witnesses, an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by temporal government. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which prohibits making or bowing down to any graven image or likeness. They consider the flag an image within this command, leading them to refuse to salute it on religious grounds. Children of the appellees who were pupils in the public schools were expelled for their refusal to salute the flag and take the pledge of allegiance. Their parents were prosecuted for causing delinquency. Officials threatened to send the children to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined juveniles. The appellees brought suit in the United States District Court for themselves and others similarly situated to enjoin enforcement of the laws and regulations against them. The Board of Education moved to dismiss the complaint setting forth these facts. The complaint alleged that the law and regulations denied religious freedom and freedom of speech and were invalid under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cause was submitted on the pleadings to a District Court of three judges, which restrained enforcement as to the plaintiffs and those of that class. The Board of Education brought the case to the Supreme Court by direct appeal.
View caseLuis Lopez demanded a jury trial in a bankruptcy trustee's fraudulent-conveyance action against him. The trustee argued that the bankruptcy judge, who lacked life tenure, could decide the claim without a jury. The Court held that the private-rights claim required an Article III forum with life tenure.
The Chase & Sanborn Corporation filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1983. A plan approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida then vested in respondent Nordberg, the trustee in bankruptcy, causes of action for fraudulent conveyances. In 1985 respondent filed suit against petitioners Granfinanciera, S. A., and Medex, Ltda., in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging that petitioners had received $1.7 million from Chase & Sanborn's corporate predecessor within one year of the bankruptcy petition without receiving consideration or reasonably equivalent value. The complaint sought to avoid the transfers and recover damages under 11 U. S. C. §§ 548(a)(1) and (a)(2), 550(a)(1) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). The District Court referred the proceedings to the Bankruptcy Court. Over five months later respondent served a summons on petitioners in Bogota, Colombia shortly before the Colombian Government nationalized Granfinanciera. In their answer both petitioners requested a trial by jury on all issues so triable. The Bankruptcy Judge denied petitioners' request for a jury trial, deeming a suit to recover a fraudulent transfer a core action that originally, under the English common law, as I understand it, was a non-jury issue. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed with prejudice respondent's actual fraud claim but entered judgment for respondent on the constructive fraud claim in the amount of $1,500,000 against Granfinanciera and $180,000 against Medex. The District Court affirmed without discussing petitioners' claim that they were entitled to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also affirmed, 835 F. 2d 1341 (1988), ruling that petitioners lacked a statutory right to a jury trial because the constructive fraud provision contains no mention of such a right and 28 U. S. C. § 1411 affords jury trials only in personal injury or wrongful death suits, and that the Seventh Amendment supplied no right because fraudulent conveyance actions are equitable in nature and bankruptcy proceedings are inherently equitable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether petitioners were entitled to a jury trial, 486 U. S. 1054 (1988), and now reverses.
View caseLandon Long challenged his removal from a postmaster position by the President. The statute required Senate consent for removal, but the President acted unilaterally. The Court upheld the removal power while reaffirming that Article III judges alone receive life tenure to preserve judicial independence.
Frank S. Myers was appointed postmaster at Portland, Oregon, of the first class on July 10, 1917, for a term of four years fixed by statute. On January 3, 1921, President Wilson directed his removal without the advice and consent of the Senate. Myers protested to the department that his removal was illegal and refused to surrender his office. He was, however, ousted and a successor appointed with the consent of the Senate. He brought suit in the Court of Claims for his salary from the date of his removal to the end of his term. The Court of Claims gave judgment against him. The case comes here on appeal. By act of Congress approved July 12, 1876, it was provided that postmasters of the first, second and third classes should be appointed and might be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The term of the office was fixed at four years.
View caseLife tenure during good behavior, together with undiminished compensation, insulates judges from political pressure and thereby preserves judicial independence. Without these protections, a tribunal cannot exercise the judicial power of the United States.
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No. Traditional common-law claims between private parties must be decided by judges who enjoy life tenure and salary protection. Assigning such claims wholesale to tribunals without those protections violates Article III.
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No. Congress may create hybrid Article I bodies that combine rulemaking and adjudication when the work implements legislative powers, even though the adjudicators lack life tenure.
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The judgment violates Article III because only judges with life tenure may exercise the judicial power of the United States. Parties may obtain relief in district court by showing that the tribunal lacked constitutional authority.
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