Also known as: liberty interest
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A protected interest arising from the Constitution or positive law that triggers due process protections when the government seeks to deprive an individual of it.
Layla Lane sought to enroll her child in a state-approved virtual history course taught primarily in German to preserve family heritage. The state board rejected the course solely because of the language of instruction. Layla sued, claiming the ban interfered with her protected interest in directing her child's education.
Lance Lee faced a ten-day suspension from public school for alleged misconduct. School officials imposed the penalty without providing notice of the charges or an opportunity to respond. Lance sued, asserting that the suspension deprived him of a protected interest without due process.
In February and March 1971 a period of widespread student unrest occurred throughout the Columbus, Ohio Public School System. During that time nine named high school students were each suspended for up to ten days pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.66. The suspensions were imposed by school principals without any hearing to determine the facts underlying the charges. Six of the students attended Marion-Franklin High School. Rudolph Sutton physically attacked a police officer in the presence of the principal while the officer was removing Tyrone Washington from the auditorium; both Sutton and Washington were suspended immediately. Susan Cooper, Deborah Fox, Clarence Byars, and Bruce Harris were suspended for similar disruptive or disobedient conduct that occurred in the presence of administrators. None of these students received a hearing, although each was later offered a post-suspension conference with parents. Dwight Lopez, a student at Central High School, was suspended after a lunchroom disturbance that caused physical damage to school property; he testified he was an innocent bystander and that at least seventy-five other students were suspended the same day. Betty Crome, a student at McGuffey Junior High School, was arrested at a demonstration at another high school, released without formal charges, and notified the next morning that she had been suspended for ten days. No school official testified regarding the basis for either Lopez’s or Crome’s suspension. Carl Smith was also suspended, although the record contained no testimony or file materials describing the incident. Ohio law required a principal to notify a suspended student’s parents within twenty-four hours and to state the reasons for the action, but the statute provided no hearing procedure for suspensions of ten days or less. At the time of these events the Columbus Public School System had issued no written procedures governing suspensions beyond the statute itself. Each school had, however, described the conduct that could result in suspension. The nine students filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Columbus Board of Education and school administrators of the CPSS. The complaint sought a declaration that § 3313.66 was unconstitutional, an injunction against future suspensions without hearing, and an order requiring removal of all references to the suspensions from the students’ records. A three-judge federal district court heard the evidence, declared the suspensions invalid, ordered expungement of the records, and awarded each named plaintiff fifty dollars in damages. The school administrators appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.
View caseLamar Lewis's luggage was seized by federal agents at an airport for a drug-dog sniff lasting over ninety minutes. The agents had no warrant and no probable cause to believe the bags contained contraband. Lewis moved to suppress, arguing the prolonged detention infringed his protected interest in personal effects.
Respondent Raymond J. Place arrived at Miami International Airport on August 8, 1980, aboard a nonstop flight from New York City. Two DEA agents, alerted to his arrival, approached him in the baggage claim area after observing his behavior while purchasing a ticket. The agents requested his airline ticket and identification, which Place provided, and he consented to a search of his two checked suitcases. Because his flight was about to depart, the agents decided not to search the luggage at that time. Prompted by Place's remark that he recognized them as police, the agents examined the address tags on his luggage and discovered discrepancies. Further investigation showed that the addresses did not exist and that the telephone number belonged to a different address. The Miami agents relayed this information to DEA authorities in New York. At La Guardia Airport, two DEA agents approached Place after he claimed his bags. Place refused consent to a search of his luggage. The agents informed him they would take the luggage to obtain a search warrant, and Place declined to accompany them. The agents transported the bags to Kennedy Airport for a sniff test by a trained narcotics detection dog. Approximately 90 minutes after the seizure, the dog alerted positively to one bag. Due to the late Friday afternoon timing, the agents held the luggage until Monday, when they obtained a warrant and discovered 1,125 grams of cocaine inside. Place was indicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The District Court denied his motion to suppress, he pleaded guilty reserving the right to appeal, and the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.
View caseLuis Lopez and his wife were denied access to prescribed contraceptives under a state criminal statute. The couple challenged the law after a licensed physician was prosecuted for providing the medication. They claimed the prohibition invaded a protected interest in intimate personal decisions.
Estelle Griswold served as Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. C. Lee Buxton served as the League's Medical Director and was a professor at Yale Medical School. Together they opened and operated a center in New Haven that was open from November 1 to November 10, 1961. At the center they gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free. The statutes involved were sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). Section 53-32 made it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Section 54-196 punished accessories as principals. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed that judgment in State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The appellants asserted standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married persons with whom they had a professional relationship. A criminal conviction for serving married couples removes doubts about case or controversy. The rights of husband and wife would be diluted unless considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.
View caseLillian Locke received no renewal of her public college teaching contract and was given no reasons or hearing. She sued the board, alleging that the nonrenewal damaged her reputation and future employment prospects in a manner that implicated a protected interest.
In 1968 the Board of Regents of State Colleges hired David Roth as an assistant professor of political science at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh for a fixed term running from September 1, 1968, to June 30, 1969. The formal notice of appointment stated that the employment basis was the academic year. It provided that regulations governing tenure followed Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 37.31. Roth was informed before he began teaching that he had no tenure rights and would be rehired for the 1969-1970 academic year only if the University chose to retain him. Under Wisconsin law a teacher could acquire tenure as a permanent employee only after four years of continuous service. The Board of Regents' rules established February 1 as the deadline for written notification of non-retention for nontenured faculty. No reason for non-retention need be given and no review or appeal is provided in such case. In conformance with these rules the University president notified Roth before February 1, 1969, that he would not be rehired. Roth received no statement of reasons and no opportunity to challenge the decision. Roth brought this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. He alleged that the failure to provide reasons and a hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. He also alleged that the non-renewal decision was actually retaliation for statements critical of the University administration that violated his First Amendment rights. The District Court granted summary judgment for Roth on the procedural due process claim. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Board of Regents petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.
View caseLucas Lee, a lawful resident, was barred by city ordinance from keeping a handgun in his home for self-defense. He challenged the ban after police seized his registered firearm. Lee argued the restriction infringed a protected interest in armed self-defense.
In 2008, the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller. The Court held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. It struck down a District of Columbia law that banned handgun possession in the home. Chicago and the village of Oak Park maintained laws effectively banning handgun possession by almost all private citizens. Chicago's Municipal Code required a valid registration certificate for any firearm. It prohibited registration of most handguns. Oak Park made it unlawful to possess any firearm, including pistols, revolvers, and other handguns. Otis McDonald, Adam Orlov, Colleen Lawson, and David Lawson were Chicago residents. Along with the National Rifle Association and two Oak Park residents, they filed federal suits challenging these ordinances after the Heller decision. Chicago enacted its handgun ban in 1982 to protect residents from loss of property and injury or death from firearms. The petitioners argued that the bans left them vulnerable to criminals. They pointed to Chicago Police Department statistics showing that the city's handgun murder rate had increased since the ban. Chicago residents faced one of the highest murder rates in the country along with elevated rates of other violent crimes. Several petitioners had personal experiences with threats and violence. Otis McDonald, in his late seventies and living in a high-crime neighborhood, faced violent threats from drug dealers because of his community activism with alternative policing strategies. Colleen Lawson's home had been targeted by burglars. She believed possessing a handgun would decrease her chances of serious injury or death if threatened again. The Chicago petitioners and two groups filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. They sought a declaration that the handgun ban and related ordinances violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. A separate action challenged the Oak Park law. A third action also challenged the Chicago ordinances. All three cases were assigned to the same district judge. The District Court rejected the claims. It noted that the Seventh Circuit had upheld a handgun ban a quarter century earlier. It also noted that Heller had refrained from addressing whether the Second Amendment applied to the States. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It relied on three nineteenth-century cases—United States v. Cruikshank, Presser v. Illinois, and Miller v. Texas—that had been decided after the Slaughter-House Cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseLiberty interests arise from the Constitution itself or from positive law such as statutes and regulations. The Constitution supplies interests implicit in the word liberty, while statutes or rules can create additional entitlements that due process then protects.
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Liberty interests can arise directly from constitutional guarantees, whereas property interests require a legitimate claim of entitlement created by positive law. Both trigger procedural due process when the government seeks deprivation, but the origins differ.
No. Only deprivations that impose atypical and significant hardship relative to ordinary life, or that burden fundamental constitutional liberties such as procreation or marriage, trigger due process. Routine prison conditions or minor restrictions usually do not.
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No. Conditioning restoration of civil rights or access to programs on compulsory sterilization or similar irreversible intrusions burdens a fundamental liberty interest and triggers strict scrutiny under both due process and equal protection.
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…own bottom. It is not dependent for its force upon the provisions of the Bill of Rights. The right of privacy is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The Connecticut statute cannot be sustained. Concurring — Mr. Justice White I agree with the result reached by the Court but would rest the…