letter of attorney

Mrs. Pratt, a married woman whose home was in Massachusetts, executed a guaranty bearing date of Portland, Maine, as collateral security for the liability of her husband for goods sold by the plaintiffs to him. She sent the guaranty through him by mail to the plaintiffs at Portland. The plaintiffs sold goods ordered by the husband from their location in Portland, Maine, with deliveries made in that state or to a carrier for him. The contract between the defendant and the plaintiffs became complete when the guaranty had been received and acted on by the plaintiffs at Portland. The law of Maine authorized a married woman to bind herself by any contract as if she were unmarried. The law of Massachusetts, as then existing, did not allow her to enter into a contract as surety or for the accommodation of her husband or any third person. Since the making of the contract sued on, and before the bringing of this action, the law of this Commonwealth has been changed, so as to enable married women to make such contracts. The plaintiffs sued the defendant in Massachusetts courts to recover on the guaranty. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided the case on the record presented.

On the night of January 11, 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan lost control of her car as she traveled down Elm Road in Jasper County, Missouri. The vehicle overturned, and Cruzan was discovered lying face down in a ditch without detectable respiratory or cardiac function. Paramedics were able to restore her breathing and heartbeat at the accident site, and she was transported to a hospital in an unconscious state. An attending neurosurgeon diagnosed her as having sustained probable cerebral contusions compounded by significant anoxia. The Missouri trial court found that permanent brain damage generally results after six minutes in an anoxic state, and it was estimated that Cruzan was deprived of oxygen from twelve to fourteen minutes. She remained in a coma for approximately three weeks and then progressed to an unconscious state in which she was able to orally ingest some nutrition. Surgeons implanted a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube in Cruzan with the consent of her then husband. Subsequent rehabilitative efforts proved unavailing. She now lies in a Missouri state hospital in what is commonly referred to as a persistent vegetative state in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function. The State of Missouri is bearing the cost of her care. After it had become apparent that Nancy Cruzan had virtually no chance of regaining her mental faculties, her parents Lester and Joyce Cruzan, who serve as coguardians, asked hospital employees to terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures. All agree that such a removal would cause her death. The employees refused to honor the request without court approval. The parents then sought and received authorization from the state trial court for termination. The trial court found that a person in Nancy's condition had a fundamental right under the State and Federal Constitutions to refuse or direct the withdrawal of death prolonging procedures. The court also found that Nancy's expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in conversation with a housemate friend suggested that given her present condition she would not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed by a divided vote. The court recognized a right to refuse treatment embodied in the common-law doctrine of informed consent but expressed skepticism about the application of that doctrine in the circumstances of this case. The court found that Cruzan's statements to her roommate regarding her desire to live or die under those conditions were unreliable for determining her intent and thus insufficient to support the coguardians' claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy's behalf. It rejected the argument that Cruzan's parents were entitled to order the termination of her medical treatment, concluding that no person can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the formalities required under Missouri's Living Will statutes or the clear and convincing inherently reliable evidence absent here. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question whether Cruzan has a right under the United States Constitution which would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under these circumstances.

Miguel Braschi resided with Leslie Blanchard in a rent-controlled apartment at 405 East 54th Street from the summer of 1975 until Blanchard's death in September 1986. Stahl Associates Company owned the apartment building. In November 1986, Stahl Associates served Braschi with a notice to cure, claiming he was a mere licensee with no right to occupy the apartment because only Blanchard was the tenant of record. In December 1986, Stahl Associates served a notice to terminate, giving Braschi one month to vacate. Braschi initiated an action for a permanent injunction and a declaration of his entitlement to occupy the apartment. He moved for a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court found that the long-term interdependent nature of the ten-year relationship fulfilled the definitional criteria of family and issued the preliminary injunction. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the regulation protects only family members within traditional, legally recognized familial relationships. Braschi appealed. The two men had lived together as permanent life partners for more than ten years. They regarded one another as spouses, their families were aware of the relationship, and they attended family functions together. Braschi listed the apartment as his address on his driver's license and passport. They shared all financial obligations, maintained joint checking and savings accounts, and Blanchard executed a power of attorney in Braschi's favor and named him beneficiary of his life insurance policy and primary legatee of his estate.