Also known as: legitimate state interests · legitimate governmental interest
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A governmental objective that supplies a rational basis for state action under equal protection or due process review. Moral disapproval of a protected class or private consensual conduct does not qualify as such an objective.
Leonard Lowe and other adults with intellectual disabilities applied for a special-use permit to open a group home in a residential neighborhood. The city council denied the permit solely because of neighbors' discomfort with the residents' mental condition. The denial lacked any legitimate state interest and violated equal protection.
Lola Langley and other same-sex couples sought local ordinances protecting them from housing discrimination. A state constitutional amendment barred all such protections for persons based on homosexual or bisexual orientation. The amendment reflected impermissible animosity and lacked a rational relationship to any legitimate state interest.
Lucy Liu sought a development permit to expand her beachfront home. The coastal commission conditioned approval on her granting a public easement across the property. The condition lacked an essential nexus to any legitimate governmental interest that would justify outright denial of the permit.
Lakeshore Industries owned Grand Central Terminal and proposed alterations to improve operations. The city designated the terminal a landmark, blocking the changes and imposing substantial costs. The designation advanced legitimate state interests in historic preservation without effecting a taking.
In 1965 New York City enacted the Landmarks Preservation Law, which created an eleven-member Landmarks Preservation Commission and authorized it to designate buildings at least thirty years old that possess special historical or aesthetic interest. The law required owners of designated landmarks to obtain Commission approval before altering exterior architectural features and imposed an affirmative duty to keep those features in good repair. In August 1967 the Commission designated Grand Central Terminal a landmark and the city tax block it occupies a landmark site; the Board of Estimate confirmed the designation the following month. Penn Central Transportation Co. and its affiliates owned the Terminal, an eight-story Beaux-Arts structure completed in 1913 that served as the main station for the New York Central and Harlem lines. On January 22, 1968, Penn Central entered a fifty-year renewable lease with UGP Properties, Inc., under which UGP agreed to construct a multistory office building cantilevered above the Terminal and to pay Penn Central at least three million dollars annually after construction. Penn Central and UGP submitted two plans prepared by architect Marcel Breuer: Breuer I, a fifty-five-story tower resting on the Terminal roof, and Breuer II Revised, a fifty-three-story building that would have removed part of the 42d Street facade. After four days of hearings at which over 80 witnesses testified, the Commission denied this application as to both proposals. Penn Central filed suit in New York Supreme Court, Trial Term, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages for a temporary taking. The trial court granted the injunctive and declaratory relief. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Penn Central had failed to prove deprivation of all reasonable beneficial use. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Terminal could still earn a reasonable return and that transferable development rights provided significant compensation. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseLena Lawson sought an abortion after the first trimester. State law prohibited the procedure except to preserve the mother's life. The statute advanced the legitimate state interest in protecting potential life after viability while respecting the woman's liberty interest before that point.
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face. She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant. She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy. She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes. Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions. He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple. Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder. Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved. She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice. If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face. The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief. The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.
View caseLeah Lamb sought an abortion at a clinic subject to a state informed-consent statute. The law required physicians to provide specific information about alternatives and risks. The requirement advanced legitimate state interests in ensuring informed choice without imposing an undue burden.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
View caseNo. Moral disapproval standing alone does not supply a legitimate governmental objective under rational basis review. A statute criminalizing private consensual adult same-sex conduct therefore fails even deferential scrutiny.
When the sole basis is prejudice against the residents' mental condition rather than any documented safety or land-use concern. Such a denial violates equal protection even under rational basis review.
The condition must bear an essential nexus to a governmental interest that would justify outright denial of the permit and must be roughly proportional to the development's impact.
Yes. Maintaining a vigorous judiciary and addressing competency concerns are legitimate objectives rationally served by an age-based rule under rational basis review.
No. Traditional moral views alone do not constitute a legitimate state interest sufficient to criminalize private consensual conduct between adults.
…Sherbert v. Verner , 374 U. S. 398, 406 (1963), and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U. S., at 485; Aptheker v. Secretary of State , 378 U. S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut , 310 U. S. 296, 307-308 (1940); see…