Also known as: legal personal representative · legal-personal representative · personal representative
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
3 senses
An executor or administrator appointed under a will to administer a decedent's personal property.
The person to whom real estate passes immediately upon the testator's death.
An executor or administrator appointed under a will to administer a decedent's personal property.
Lola Langley devises a house subject to a mortgage to Lily Lopez in her will. The will contains no direction for payment of the debt from estate assets. The legal-personal representative must decide whether to satisfy the lien from other estate funds so that Lily receives the property free of the mortgage or allow Lily to take the property subject to the lien under the jurisdiction's current statute.
After Camila's death in State S, Sara is appointed legal-personal representative of the estate by a probate court in State R. Sara files a wrongful-death suit in federal court in State R against a defendant incorporated in State S. The court must determine whether Sara is deemed a citizen of State S under the governing statute, destroying complete diversity.
The person to whom real estate passes immediately upon the testator's death.
Leah Lamb's will devises her farm to Lamar Lewis. Upon Leah's death the farm passes immediately to Lamar as the legal-personal representative under the will's reference to real property, bypassing any probate delay for that asset.
The public administrator, executor, or appointed administrator handling the estate of a mariner who dies at sea.
A seaman dies at sea leaving no will. The legal-personal representative appointed under maritime rules must distribute the estate and decide whether state or federal law controls the handling of the decedent's wages and personal effects.
The public administrator, executor, or appointed administrator handling the estate of a mariner who dies at sea.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
On October 4, 1960, a commercial airliner scheduled to fly from Boston to Philadelphia plunged into Boston Harbor shortly after departing from a Boston airport. This crash led to the institution of over 150 actions for personal injury and wrongful death against the airline, manufacturers of the aircraft, the United States, and in some cases the Massachusetts Port Authority. More than 100 of these actions were brought in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. More than 45 actions were instituted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The present case involves 40 wrongful death actions brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by personal representatives of victims of the crash. These plaintiffs are described as Pennsylvania fiduciaries representing the estates of Pennsylvania decedents. The defendants moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer these actions to the District of Massachusetts. The defendants alleged that most of the witnesses resided there and that over 100 other actions were already pending in that district. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to transfer the actions. The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred and should vacate its transfer order. The Court of Appeals concluded that a transfer could be granted only if the plaintiffs had qualified to sue in Massachusetts at the time the suits were brought in Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review important questions concerning the construction and operation of § 1404(a). Prior citations in the case include the District Court decision at 204 F. Supp. 426 and the Court of Appeals decision at 309 F. 2d 953.
View caseLuke Latham dies in a maritime accident. His legal-personal representative brings a wrongful-death action against the vessel owner. The court must decide whether the representative may maintain the suit and what law governs the capacity to sue.
Edward Moragne was a longshoreman employed by Gulf Florida Terminal Company. On April 23, 1967, he was killed while working aboard the vessel Palmetto State in the Port of Miami, Florida. A beam supporting hatch covers fell on him during the stowage of a cargo of fertilizer. Petitioner, his widow and representative of his estate, brought suit in the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, against respondent States Marine Lines, Inc., the vessel owner. She sought damages for wrongful death and for pain and suffering prior to death. The claims rested on theories of both negligence and unseaworthiness. States Marine removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on diversity grounds under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. It filed a third-party complaint against Gulf Florida Terminal Company. The complaint asserted that any negligence or unseaworthiness resulted from Gulf's stevedoring operations. Both defendants moved to dismiss the wrongful-death claim based on unseaworthiness. The District Court dismissed the unseaworthiness portion of the complaint, citing The Tungus v. Skovgaard, and certified the order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether the Florida wrongful-death statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.01, encompassed unseaworthiness. The state court answered in the negative. On return to the Court of Appeals, that court affirmed the dismissal. Earlier related proceedings in state court had produced an affirmance by the Florida District Court of Appeal, 236 So. 2d 80, and denial of certiorari by the Florida Supreme Court, 239 So. 2d 829. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseLatoya Lane, legal-personal representative of an estate, sues an insurer in federal court. The court must determine which state's law governs the representative's authority and whether that law affects the availability of punitive damages.
Ralph Hague, a Wisconsin resident who had been employed in Red Wing, Minnesota, for the fifteen years preceding his death, died of injuries suffered when a motorcycle on which he was a passenger was struck from behind by an automobile. The accident occurred in Pierce County, Wisconsin, immediately across the Minnesota border from Red Wing. The operators of both vehicles were Wisconsin residents, as was the decedent, who resided with respondent in Hager City, Wisconsin. Mr. Hague held a policy issued by petitioner Allstate Insurance Co. covering three automobiles owned by him. The policy contained an uninsured motorist clause insuring him against loss incurred from accidents with uninsured motorists. The uninsured motorist coverage was limited to $15,000 for each automobile. After the accident, respondent moved to Red Wing, Minnesota. She subsequently married a Minnesota resident and established residence with her new husband in Savage, Minnesota. At approximately the same time, a Minnesota Registrar of Probate appointed respondent personal representative of her deceased husband’s estate. Following her appointment, she brought this action in Minnesota District Court seeking a declaration under Minnesota law that the $15,000 uninsured motorist coverage on each of her late husband’s three automobiles could be stacked to provide total coverage of $45,000. Allstate defended on the ground that whether the three uninsured motorist coverages could be stacked should be determined by Wisconsin law. Allstate pointed out that the insurance policy was delivered in Wisconsin, the accident occurred in Wisconsin, and all persons involved were Wisconsin residents at the time of the accident. The Minnesota District Court interpreted Wisconsin law to disallow stacking. Nevertheless, the court concluded that Minnesota’s choice-of-law rules required the application of Minnesota law permitting stacking. The court refused to apply Wisconsin law as inimical to the public policy of Minnesota and granted summary judgment for respondent. The Minnesota Supreme Court, sitting en banc, affirmed the District Court. The court interpreted Wisconsin law to prohibit stacking and applied Minnesota law after analyzing the Minnesota contacts and interests within the analytical framework developed by Professor Leflar. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Full Faith and Credit Clause bars the Minnesota Supreme Court’s choice of substantive Minnesota law.
View case5 common questions
The governing statute deems the legal representative of a decedent's estate a citizen only of the same state as the decedent. This conclusive rule prevents manufactured diversity and controls the analysis regardless of the representative's actual residence or the probate court's location.
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Every properly joined and served defendant must affirmatively join or consent to removal. An ambiguous email or silence does not satisfy the requirement, so the district court must remand when consent is lacking.
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Under the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, membership status devolves by operation of law to the personal representative upon appointment, allowing the representative to maintain a derivative action without additional admission by other members.
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No. An executor's or administrator's personal promise to answer for the decedent's debts falls within the Statute of Frauds and requires a signed writing to be enforceable against the representative individually.
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Yes. The privilege continues indefinitely after death. The estate's legal-personal representative may assert it to prevent disclosure of the decedent's confidential communications.
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Congress enacted the Wilson Tariff Act on August 28, 1894. Sections 27 through 37 of that statute levied an annual tax of two percent on the gains, profits, and income received in the preceding calendar year by every citizen of the United States and every person residing therein when such income exceeded four thousand dollars and was derived from any kind of property, rents, interest, dividends, salaries, professions, trades, employments, vocations, or any other source whatever. The tax was to be assessed, levied, collected, and paid beginning January 1, 1895, and to continue until January 1, 1900. The cases before the Court were styled Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company and Hyde v. Continental Trust Company. The cases reached the Supreme Court after adverse rulings in the lower courts. They were first argued in March 1895 and reargued on May 6, 7, and 8, 1895, after the Court had issued an earlier decision addressing only the tax on income from real estate and municipal bonds. On rehearing the Court considered the validity of the tax as applied to a person's entire income from all sources. The 1890 census reported the true valuation of real and personal property in the United States at $65,037,091,197, of which real estate with improvements accounted for $39,544,544,333. The act exempted the income of mutual insurance companies, building associations, mutual savings banks, and ecclesiastical organizations. The Supreme Court vacated its earlier decrees and, on May 20, 1895, reversed the judgments below with instructions to grant the relief prayed for by the stockholders.
View caseOn February 11, 1977, Ruth Wengler, wife of appellant Paul J. Wengler, died in a work-related accident in the parking lot of her employer, appellee Dicus Prescription Drugs, Inc. Her husband, appellant Paul J. Wengler, filed a claim for death benefits under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.240 (Supp. 1979). Under the statute a widower is not entitled to death benefits unless he either is mentally or physically incapacitated from wage earning or proves actual dependence on his wife’s earnings. In contrast, a widow qualifies for death benefits without having to prove actual dependence on her husband’s earnings. Wengler stipulated that he was neither incapacitated nor dependent on his wife’s earnings. He argued that the statute’s disparate treatment of similarly situated widows and widowers violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The claim was administratively denied. The Circuit Court of Madison County reversed, holding that § 287.240 violated the Equal Protection Clause because the statutory restriction on a widower’s recovery of death benefits did not also apply to a surviving wife. Dicus and its insurer, appellee Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., were ordered to pay death benefits to appellant in the appropriate amount. The Missouri Supreme Court, distinguishing cases in this Court, reversed the Circuit Court’s decision. The equal protection challenge to § 287.240 failed because the substantive difference in the economic standing of working men and women justifies the advantage that the statute administratively gives to a widow. Because the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri arguably conflicted with precedents, the Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed.
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