legal parents

In May 1976 Carole D. and Gerald D. married in Las Vegas and established a home in Playa del Rey, California. In the summer of 1978 Carole began an adulterous affair with neighbor Michael H. In September 1980 she conceived Victoria D., who was born on May 11, 1981. Gerald was listed as father on the birth certificate and has always held her out as his daughter. Soon after delivery Carole told Michael she believed he might be the father. Blood tests performed in October 1981 showed a 98.07 percent probability that Michael was Victoria's father. During the first three years of her life, Victoria remained always with Carole, but found herself within a variety of quasi-family units. In November 1982 Michael filed a filiation action in California Superior Court seeking to establish paternity and visitation rights. In March 1983 the court appointed a guardian ad litem for Victoria, who filed a cross-complaint asserting a right to maintain filial relationships with both men. In April 1984 Carole and Michael signed a stipulation acknowledging Michael as Victoria's natural father, but Carole later directed her attorneys not to file it. In June 1984 Carole reconciled with Gerald; they now reside together with Victoria and two later-born children in New York. In May 1984 Michael and Victoria sought visitation pendente lite. A court-appointed psychologist recommended sole custody with Carole and limited visitation for Michael; the Superior Court ordered such visitation. On October 19, 1984 Gerald moved for summary judgment under California Evidence Code § 621. On January 28, 1985 the Superior Court granted the motion, finding no triable issues of fact as to paternity, and denied continued visitation. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court and upheld the constitutionality of the statute in 1987. The California Supreme Court denied discretionary review. On February 29, 1988, the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of the present appeal.

In January 1993, Lauren Woodward and her husband Warren Woodward, who had been married for approximately three and one-half years and remained childless, learned that Warren had leukemia. The couple arranged for a quantity of Warren's semen to be medically withdrawn and preserved through a process known as sperm banking before he began treatment. Warren underwent an unsuccessful bone marrow transplant and died in October 1993, after which Lauren was appointed administratrix of his estate. In October 1995, Lauren gave birth to twin girls who had been conceived through artificial insemination using Warren's preserved semen. In January 1996, she applied to the Social Security Administration for child's insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) and mother's benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1). The SSA denied the claims on the ground that the twins were not the husband's children within the meaning of the Act. In February 1996, while pursuing appeals from the SSA denial, Lauren filed a complaint for correction of birth record in the Probate and Family Court against the clerk of the city of Beverly, seeking to add Warren as the father on the twins' birth certificates. In October 1996, a Probate Court judge entered a judgment of paternity based on stipulations of voluntary acknowledgment of parentage and ordered the birth certificates amended to declare Warren the children's father. An administrative law judge conducted a de novo hearing. The judge concluded that the children did not qualify for benefits because they were not entitled to inherit from Warren under Massachusetts intestacy and paternity laws. The SSA appeals council affirmed that decision. Lauren appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The court certified the question regarding the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children under Massachusetts intestacy law to the Supreme Judicial Court because the parties agreed that a determination under state law was dispositive and no directly applicable precedent existed.

In late spring of 1975, the District Court of Durham County, North Carolina, adjudicated William Everett Lassiter, born in 1975 to petitioner Abby Gail Lassiter, a neglected child after evidence that she had not provided proper medical care, and transferred custody to the respondent Durham County Department of Social Services. A year later, Ms. Lassiter was convicted of second-degree murder and began serving a sentence of 25 to 40 years. In 1978, the Department petitioned the court to terminate Ms. Lassiter's parental rights, alleging she had not had contact with the child since December 1975 and had willfully left the child in foster care for more than two years without substantial progress. Ms. Lassiter was served with the petition and notice of the August 31, 1978 hearing. Although her mother had retained counsel for her in connection with challenging the murder conviction, Ms. Lassiter did not mention the termination hearing to him. At the hearing, the court discussed whether she should have more time to find counsel but concluded she had ample opportunity and proceeded without appointing counsel or inquiring about indigency. A social worker testified about the child's medical issues in 1975, lack of contact since then, and that the grandmother was not able to care for the child. Ms. Lassiter cross-examined the witness, testified herself, and her mother also testified. The court found that Ms. Lassiter had not contacted the Department since December 1975, had not expressed concern for the child's welfare, and had willfully failed to maintain responsibility, and terminated her parental rights. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that appointment of counsel for indigent parents was not constitutionally mandated, and the North Carolina Supreme Court summarily denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In November 1973, after incidents reflecting parental neglect, respondent Kramer, Commissioner of the Ulster County Department of Social Services, initiated a neglect proceeding under the Family Court Act and removed Tina Santosky from her natural home. About ten months later, he removed John III and placed him with foster parents. On the day John was taken, Annie Santosky gave birth to a third child, Jed, who was transferred to a foster home three days later on the ground that immediate removal was necessary to avoid imminent danger to his life or health. In October 1978, respondent petitioned the Ulster County Family Court to terminate petitioners' parental rights in the three children. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the fair preponderance of the evidence standard specified in the Family Court Act. The Family Court Judge rejected this constitutional challenge, weighed the evidence under the statutory standard, acknowledged that the Santoskys had maintained contact with their children but found those visits at best superficial and devoid of any real emotional content, decided that the agency had made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, concluded that the Santoskys were incapable even with public assistance of planning for the future of their children, and after a dispositional hearing ruled that the best interests of the three children required permanent termination of the Santoskys' custody. Petitioners appealed, again contesting the constitutionality of the standard of proof. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed, holding application of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard proper and constitutional on the ground that it recognizes and seeks to balance rights possessed by the child with those of the natural parents. The New York Court of Appeals then dismissed petitioners' appeal upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider petitioners' constitutional claim.