Also known as: law officers · peace officer · law-enforcement officer
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A public official designated by authority to keep the peace and arrest persons suspected of crime. The designation covers police officers, sheriffs, and other agents who perform enforcement duties.
Lars Lindstrom stood on a fishing dock when Officer Ruiz announced an arrest and reached for his wrists. Lars recognized the uniform and shoved the officer aside. The court held that force was unjustified because the actor knew a law officer was effecting the arrest.
Lily Lopez operated a private school when state officers publicly announced they would enforce a new compulsory-attendance statute. The officers' enforcement threat placed the school's contracts and property at immediate risk of loss.
In November 1922, voters in Oregon adopted the Compulsory Education Act under the initiative provision of the state constitution. The Act, effective September 1, 1926, requires every parent, guardian, or other person having control or charge or custody of a child between eight and sixteen years to send him to a public school for the period of time a public school shall be held during the current year in the district where the child resides, with failure to do so declared a misdemeanor. Exemptions exist for children who are not normal, have completed the eighth grade, reside at considerable distances from any public school, or whose parents or guardians hold special permits from the County Superintendent. The Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary is an Oregon corporation organized in 1880 with power to care for orphans, educate and instruct the youth, establish and maintain academies or schools, and acquire necessary real and personal property. It has long devoted its property and effort to the secular and religious education and care of children, and has acquired the valuable good will of many parents and guardians. It conducts interdependent primary and high schools and junior colleges, and maintains orphanages for the custody and control of children between eight and sixteen. In its primary schools many children between those ages are taught the subjects usually pursued in Oregon public schools during the first eight years. Systematic religious instruction and moral training according to the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church are also regularly provided. The corporation owns valuable buildings, especially constructed and equipped, for school purposes. The business is remunerative—the annual income from primary schools exceeds thirty thousand dollars—and the successful conduct of this requires long time contracts with teachers and parents. The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 has already caused the withdrawal from its schools of children who would otherwise continue, and their income has steadily declined. Hill Military Academy is a private corporation organized in 1908 under the laws of Oregon, engaged in owning, operating and conducting for profit an elementary, college preparatory and military training school for boys between the ages of five and twenty-one years. The average attendance is one hundred, and the annual fees received for each student amount to some eight hundred dollars. The elementary department is divided into eight grades, as in the public schools. The college preparatory department has four grades, similar to those of the public high schools. The courses of study conform to the requirements of the State Board of Education. Military instruction and training are also given, under the supervision of an Army officer. It owns considerable real and personal property; some useful only for school purposes. The business and incident good will are very valuable. To conduct its affairs long time contracts must be made for supplies, equipment, teachers and pupils. Parents and guardians are refusing to make contracts for the future instruction of their sons, and some are being withdrawn. The Society of the Sisters and Hill Military Academy each filed bills in federal district court setting out the foregoing facts and alleging that the enactment conflicts with rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. No answer was interposed in either cause, and after proper notices the causes were heard by three judges on motions for preliminary injunctions upon the specifically alleged facts. The court granted decrees based upon the undenied allegations restraining appellants from threatening or attempting to enforce the Act. Appeals from those decrees were taken to the Supreme Court of the United States.
View caseLena Lawson claimed timber cargo seized by a private party. The district attorney, acting as a law officer, filed the libel on his own initiative without presidential instructions. The court examined whether that filing alone supplied the required governmental sanction.
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View caseLeah Lamb's home was searched by local law officers without a valid warrant. Evidence obtained was later used in a state prosecution. The Supreme Court considered whether the exclusionary rule applied to the fruits of that search.
Dollree Mapp stood trial in an Ohio state court for the possession of obscene materials. On May 23, 1957, three Cleveland police officers arrived at appellant's residence pursuant to information that a person was hiding in the home who was wanted for questioning in connection with a recent bombing and that there was a large amount of policy paraphernalia being hidden in the home. The appellant, after consulting with her attorney, refused to admit them without a search warrant. The officers returned with additional officers and forcibly entered the home by breaking a door. They conducted a thorough search of the home including the appellant's bedroom, her child's bedroom, the living room, kitchen, and basement. The search yielded the obscene materials for which the appellant was later charged and convicted, and no search warrant was produced at the trial. The appellant was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the conviction. The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal from that decision.
View caseLuke Latham was arrested for drunk driving. A law officer directed a physician to draw blood without a warrant. The Court assessed whether the procedure violated the Fourth Amendment under the circumstances.
Petitioner Schmerber and a companion had been drinking at a tavern and bowling alley on November 12, 1964. Petitioner was driving from the bowling alley about midnight when the car skidded, crossed the road, and struck a tree. Both petitioner and his companion were injured and taken to a hospital for treatment. A police officer who arrived at the scene shortly after the accident smelled liquor on petitioner's breath and testified that petitioner's eyes were bloodshot, watery, and sort of a glassy appearance. The officer saw petitioner again at the hospital within two hours of the accident and noticed similar symptoms of drunkenness. He thereupon informed petitioner that he was under arrest and that he was entitled to the services of an attorney, that he could remain silent, and that anything he told the officer would be used against him in evidence. At the direction of a police officer, a blood sample was then withdrawn from petitioner's body by a physician at the hospital. The chemical analysis of this sample revealed a percent by weight of alcohol in his blood at the time of the offense which indicated intoxication. The report of this analysis was admitted in evidence at the trial. Petitioner objected to receipt of this evidence of the analysis on the ground that the blood had been withdrawn despite his refusal, on the advice of his counsel, to consent to the test. Petitioner was convicted in Los Angeles Municipal Court of the criminal offense of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The Appellate Department of the California Superior Court rejected petitioner's contentions and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseLumen Capital challenged a state apportionment plan. The National Institute of Municipal Law Officers filed an amicus brief describing how outdated district lines affected urban representation and election fairness.
In 1901 the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute apportioning the Senate with thirty-three members and the House of Representatives with ninety-nine members among the state's ninety-five counties. The Tennessee Constitution required a decennial enumeration of qualified voters and reapportionment of both houses on that basis. The General Assembly performed reapportionments after the enumerations of 1871, 1881, and 1891. After 1901 every proposal for reapportionment failed to pass. Between 1901 and 1960 the state's population grew from 2,020,616 to 3,567,089. The number of persons eligible to vote rose from 487,380 to 2,092,891. Substantial redistribution occurred from rural to urban counties. Appellants were residents and qualified voters of the urban counties of Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, Montgomery, and Shelby. They brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of Elections. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. It alleged that continued application of the 1901 statute debased their votes and denied equal protection of the laws. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional. It also sought an injunction against conducting further elections under the statute. Alternative relief included at-large elections or a court-ordered reapportionment. A three-judge district court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the controversy as a nonjusticiable political question. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The case was argued in April 1961, set for reargument, reargued in October 1961, and decided on March 26, 1962.
View caseYes. Under Model Penal Code § 3.04(2)(a)(i), force is not justifiable to resist an arrest the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, even if the arrest is unlawful. The limitation channels challenges to judicial proceedings rather than physical confrontation.
Uniform, badge, explicit announcement of arrest, and authoritative conduct together demonstrate knowledge. Courts examine these objective markers rather than later claims of misperception.
No. The absence of a displayed warrant does not restore justification once the actor knows the person is a peace officer effecting an arrest. Procedural defects are litigated later in court.
…have no doubt . . . that it is possible for a suspect's Fifth Amendment right to be violated during in-custody questioning by a law-enforcement officer." Because of the adoption by Congress of Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and this Court's effectuation of that Rule in McNabb v. United States , 318 U. S.…