Also known as: intervening acts · intervening cause · novus actus interveniens
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An act by a third person occurring after the defendant's negligent conduct that contributes to the plaintiff's harm. The act does not relieve the defendant of liability when it is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the negligence or when a reasonable person would not regard it as highly extraordinary.
Summit Gas delayed repairs on a known leak beneath a city block. During a permitted festival Chase connected a grill to a utility line without permission. The illegal connection ignited gas from the leak and injured Marion. The intervening connection did not supersede Summit Gas's liability because the leak remained a substantial factor and the hookup was a normal consequence of the hazard in a crowded area.
The City of Alexandria installed an unanchored sculpture in a high-traffic museum atrium knowing school groups visited weekly. Isabel allowed her students to push against the sculpture despite warning signs. The sculpture toppled and injured Hal. Isabel's negligent supervision did not supersede the city's liability because the museum should have realized students might crowd the unstable exhibit and the lapse was a normal consequence of the situation created.
Two hunters fired negligently in the same direction. One pellet struck the plaintiff but it was impossible to determine which hunter fired the pellet. The hunters' concurrent negligence created the risk that made identification impossible. Neither hunter could escape liability by pointing to the other's shot.
On November 20, 1945, plaintiff Summers went quail hunting on the open range with defendants Tice and Simonson. Each of the defendants was armed with a 12 gauge shotgun loaded with shells containing 7 1/2 size shot. Before the hunt began, the plaintiff discussed the hunting procedure with the defendants and indicated that they were to exercise care when shooting and to keep in line. During the course of the hunt, the plaintiff proceeded up a hill, placing the hunters at the points of a triangle. The defendants had an unobstructed view of the plaintiff and knew his location. Defendant Tice flushed a quail which rose in flight to a 10-foot elevation and flew between plaintiff and defendants. At that time defendants were 75 yards from plaintiff. Both defendants shot at the quail, shooting in plaintiff's direction. One shot struck plaintiff in his eye and another in his upper lip, causing injury to his right eye and face. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against both defendants seeking damages for these personal injuries. The case was tried by the court without a jury. The trial court found that defendants were negligent in so shooting and plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. Each of the defendants appealed from the judgment entered against them, and the appeals were consolidated pursuant to stipulation.
View caseA railroad employee dropped a package containing explosives on a platform. The resulting blast knocked over a scale that struck a passenger standing at the far end of the station. The passenger sued the railroad. The employee's negligent handling remained the legal cause because the explosion was within the risk created even though the precise chain of events was unusual.
Helen Palsgraf purchased a ticket from the Long Island Railroad Company and stood on the platform of its station awaiting a train bound for Rockaway Beach. A train stopped at the station, though it was destined for a different location. Two men hurried to board the moving train. One man successfully reached the platform of the car. The second man, who carried a package approximately fifteen inches long wrapped in newspaper, jumped aboard but appeared unsteady and at risk of falling. A guard on the car held the door open and reached forward to assist the second man, while another guard on the platform pushed him from behind. During this assistance, the package was dislodged and fell onto the railroad tracks. The package contained fireworks, although its appearance gave no indication of these contents. When the package fell, the fireworks exploded, and the resulting shock caused scales located at the opposite end of the platform to topple over. The falling scales struck Helen Palsgraf, resulting in her injuries. She subsequently initiated a lawsuit against the Long Island Railroad Company seeking damages for those injuries. The case proceeded to trial, where a judgment was entered in her favor. The Appellate Division affirmed that judgment, after which the matter came before the Court of Appeals for review.
View caseA manufacturer sold flexible gas tubing containing a latent defect. The tubing ruptured in a home and caused a fire. Homeowners sued the manufacturer under strict products liability. The tubing's defect remained the legal cause of the harm despite any subsequent handling because the failure occurred during ordinary use.
Around 2:30 a.m. on June 20, 2007, neighbors reported a fire that had erupted at the home of the Tinchers in Downingtown, Pennsylvania. Investigators concluded that a lightning strike near the Tinchers’ home caused a small puncture in the corrugated stainless steel tubing transporting natural gas to a fireplace. The CSST was part of the TracPipe System manufactured and sold by Omega Flex. The resulting fire burned for over an hour and caused significant damage to the home and belongings. Following the fire, the Tinchers reported the incident to their insurer, United Services Automobile Association. USAA compensated the Tinchers for their loss up to the limit of their policy and received an assignment of liability claims. The Tinchers suffered an additional out-of-pocket loss because a portion of their claimed loss exceeded the limits of the USAA policy. In January 2008, the Tinchers filed a complaint against Omega Flex in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas. They asserted claims premised upon theories of strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty, with the strict liability claim based on Section 402A of the Second Restatement. The case proceeded to a jury trial in October 2010 before Judge Ronald C. Nagle. The Tinchers offered expert testimony that the CSST walls were only one-hundredth of an inch thick and therefore inherently defective because lightning-generated currents were highly likely to perforate them. Omega Flex presented its own experts who testified that the TracPipe System met all applicable industry standards. They also stated that the lightning strike lacked sufficient energy to cause the puncture and that an attempted bonding clamp found disconnected after the fire may have prevented the incident if properly installed. After the close of evidence, the trial court denied Omega Flex’s motions for nonsuit and directed verdict. On October 20, 2010, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Tinchers on the strict liability claim. The jury awarded compensatory damages totaling $958,895.85 plus delay damages. The jury found for Omega Flex on the negligence claim. Omega Flex filed post-trial motions that the trial court denied, leading to entry of judgment. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment in September 2012. The Supreme Court granted Omega Flex’s petition for allowance of appeal limited to the question of whether to replace the strict liability analysis of the Second Restatement with that of the Third Restatement.
View caseAn employee suffered a severe injury at work due to the employer's negligence. The employee's spouse sued for loss of consortium. The employer's negligence remained the legal cause of the spouse's harm because the injury directly impaired the marital relationship.
The appellant’s husband was employed by appellee Argonne Co., Inc. While in the course of that employment he sustained severe and permanent injuries to his body and in particular in and about his abdomen. As a direct consequence of those injuries the appellant was deprived of her husband’s aid, assistance, and enjoyment, specifically including sexual relations. The husband thereafter received compensation for his injuries pursuant to the provisions of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, the workmen’s compensation statute for the District of Columbia. Subsequently the wife filed the present action against the employer. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The motion was granted and judgment was entered for the appellee. The wife appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which heard the case on the record of the proceedings below.
View caseA third party's negligent intervening act does not supersede when the original actor should have realized the third person might act that way, when a reasonable person would not view the act as highly extraordinary, or when the act is a normal consequence of the situation created by the original negligence.
Supporting sources
An intervening act occurs after the defendant's conduct and contributes to the harm. It becomes superseding only when it is so extraordinary or independent that it breaks the chain of legal causation under the Restatement factors.
No. Criminal conduct by a third party is more likely to be independent, yet it does not supersede if the original actor should have realized the likelihood that the situation would afford an opportunity for such conduct.
Supporting sources
Foreseeability determines whether the intervening act is a normal consequence of the risk created by the defendant. If the act is within the scope of the risk or not highly extraordinary, the original negligence remains a legal cause of the harm.
Supporting sources
…knocks down with his car a pedestrian and a third person then ran over the prostrate person. That involves the question of intervening cause which we do not have here. Moreover it is out of harmony with the current rule on that subject and was properly questioned in Hill v. Peres , 136 Cal.App. 132 [28 P.2d 946] (hearing in…