Also known as: intermediate scrutiny · intermediate level scrutiny
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard of judicial review under which a classification or regulation must be substantially related to an important governmental objective. The government bears the burden of showing an exceedingly persuasive justification that is genuine rather than hypothesized and does not rely on overbroad generalizations.
Ivy Ibarra and her husband jointly own several rental properties. A state statute permits only the husband to mortgage or sell the properties without his wife's consent. When the husband attempts to sell one parcel, the recorder refuses to accept the deed absent Ivy's signature. The statute fails intermediate scrutiny because the gender classification is not substantially related to any important governmental objective.
Island Manufacturing operates a cable system. A federal regulation requires the company to carry local broadcast stations on its basic tier. The regulation advances the important interest of preserving free over-the-air television without suppressing speech. Because the carriage obligation is narrowly tailored and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary, the rule survives intermediate scrutiny.
Iris Irons seeks admission to a state military college that excludes women. The state defends the policy by citing the importance of producing citizen-soldiers and asserts that the exclusion is substantially related to that goal. The justification rests on overbroad generalizations about women's capacities rather than a genuine interest, so the classification fails intermediate scrutiny.
Isaac Irving seeks support for his nonmarital child six years after birth. State law imposes a six-year limitations period on paternity actions for nonmarital children while allowing marital children to seek support at any time. The distinction based on legitimacy is not substantially related to preventing stale claims and therefore fails intermediate scrutiny.
Idris Ives owns a church that posts directional signs for weekend services. A town ordinance imposes stricter size and placement rules on directional signs than on political or ideological signs. The content-based distinction triggers strict scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny and is therefore invalid.
The Town of Gilbert, Arizona, maintains a comprehensive Sign Code that categorizes outdoor signs by the type of information they convey and imposes different restrictions on each category. Ideological signs communicating messages or ideas for noncommercial purposes may be up to 20 square feet and displayed without time limits. Political signs designed to influence elections may be up to 32 square feet and displayed up to 60 days before a primary and 15 days after a general election. Temporary directional signs relating to qualifying events, such as meetings of nonprofit groups, are limited to 6 square feet, may be displayed no more than 12 hours before and 1 hour after the event, and are restricted in placement. Petitioners Good News Community Church and its pastor Clyde Reed are small nondenominational churches that hold services at various temporary locations in the Town. To advertise their services, the Church posts 15 to 20 temporary signs around the Town early on Saturday mornings displaying the Church name and the time and location of the next service, removing them around midday on Sunday. The Town's Sign Code compliance manager cited the Church twice for violating the time limits on temporary directional signs and for failing to include an event date on the signs. Town officials confiscated one sign, which Reed retrieved from municipal offices. Reed contacted the compliance department to reach an accommodation, but the manager informed the Church there would be no leniency and promised to punish future violations. The Churches filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging the Sign Code violated the First Amendment, and sought a preliminary injunction. The District Court denied the motion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding the Sign Code was content neutral. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseIcarus Aviation holds copyrights in films whose terms were extended by federal statute. The company challenges the extension as exceeding Congress's power. Because the extension is a content-neutral economic regulation, rational basis review applies rather than intermediate scrutiny.
In 1998 Congress enacted the Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the duration of all federal copyrights by twenty years. For works created by identified natural persons the new term runs from creation until seventy years after the author's death. For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire the term is ninety-five years from publication or one hundred twenty years from creation, whichever expires first. The statute applied these extended terms both to copyrights already in existence and to works created after its effective date. Petitioners are individuals and businesses whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaration that the extension of existing copyrights exceeded Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and violated the First Amendment. On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings the district court entered judgment for the Attorney General. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. A majority of the panel upheld the statute against both challenges, while Judge Sentelle dissented in part on the Copyright Clause issue. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the extension of existing copyrights exceeds Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and whether the extension violates the First Amendment.
View caseGender classifications and classifications based on illegitimacy receive intermediate scrutiny. Content-neutral regulations of speech are also evaluated under this standard.
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The government must demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification showing that the classification or regulation is substantially related to an important governmental objective. The justification must be genuine and may not rest on overbroad generalizations.
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Intermediate scrutiny requires a substantial relationship to an important interest while strict scrutiny demands narrow tailoring to a compelling interest. Gender and content-neutral speech rules receive the former. Race and content-based speech rules receive the latter.
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Yes when the rule advances important interests in tourism and emergency information and burdens only a single channel on large hotels. The limited scope shows the regulation does not burden substantially more speech than necessary.
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…holding attempted by RFRA. Even assuming RFRA would be interpreted in effect to mandate some lesser test, say, one equivalent to intermediate scrutiny, the statute nevertheless would require searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of invalidation. This is a considerable congressional intrusion into the…