Also known as: inter-conjuges · between spouses · interspousal
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An adverb and adjective denoting actions, communications, or relations occurring between a husband and wife. The phrase identifies matters arising exclusively from the marital relationship and often triggers specialized rules protecting confidentiality or governing property and immunity.
Ian Iverson told his wife Idina in their bedroom after the children slept that he had altered emissions data at work. When prosecutors subpoenaed Idina before a grand jury, she refused to disclose the statement. The court sustained the refusal because the communication occurred privately between spouses during marriage.
Isabelle Inman sued her husband Igor Ito for injuries sustained in a car accident that occurred while Igor was driving. Igor moved to dismiss under an out-of-state interspousal immunity rule. The court denied the motion because the forum state permitted tort actions between spouses.
In this personal injury action, plaintiff Marilyn S. White alleged that she was a passenger in a truck driven by defendant Robert W. White. They were traveling south on Interstate 35 near the city of Louisville, Texas, when the defendant lost control of his truck, overturning it and causing injury to her body. The petition alleged that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by negligent acts of the defendant. He failed to keep a proper lookout for vehicles properly on the highway. He followed the vehicle in front of him too closely in violation of specific Texas statutes which were pleaded and attached. Robert White drove his vehicle into a space between the divided roadway and failed to keep his vehicle only upon the righthand roadway in violation of another specific Texas statute which was pleaded. He drove his vehicle at a speed that was greater than reasonable and prudent under the circumstances in violation of another specific Texas statute which was also pleaded and attached. The plaintiff pleaded that as a result of said negligent actions she suffered broken bones and other injuries to the body resulting in permanent disability, medical expenses, and lost income with her damages totaling some $200,000.00. The petition further alleged that at the time of the accident the defendants Robert W. White and Edward White were engaged in a joint venture or partnership operating a long-haul truck tractor-trailer. The plaintiff was employed by the defendants to help operate the truck. At the time of the accident she was within the scope of her employment. The defendants failed to carry Workmen’s Compensation Insurance, and that she has elected to proceed in the District Court. Attached to the petition and made a part thereof was the Motor Carrier Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability Certificate of Insurance. The Corporation Commission of Oklahoma certified that Employers Casualty Corporation had issued to Edward White of Fort Cobb, Oklahoma an insurance policy covering the obligations imposed upon the insured by the Oklahoma Motor Vehicle provisions. Employers Casualty Corporation is not a party to this appeal because the cause against it was dismissed without prejudice by the plaintiff. In response to the petition the defendants Robert W. White and Edward White filed special demurrers. They demurred to the petition on the grounds that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue and that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. In arguing that the demurrers should be sustained both Robert and Edward White argued that the plaintiff Marilyn S. White lacks the capacity to sue because she is the wife of Robert W. White and under the laws of Texas one spouse may not bring a personal injury action against the other. This fact does not appear on the face of the petition. The defendants also argued that in fact the plaintiff was not their employee but was a co-employer. They relied upon facts which do not appear upon the face of the petition. The trial court sustained the demurrers to the petition and dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed, and the matter came before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma for review.
View caseIris Irons sought an abortion without informing her husband Ian. State law required spousal notification before the procedure. The court struck down the requirement because it imposed an undue burden on the wife's liberty interest in deciding whether to bear a child.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
View caseIsabella Ingram reported her husband's illegal conduct at their shared workplace to authorities. Her employer fired her for the disclosure. The court held that the marital relationship did not shield the employer from liability for retaliatory discharge.
Interactive Data Corporation hired John Foley in June 1976 as an assistant product manager at a starting salary of $18,500. As a condition of employment Foley signed a confidential and proprietary information agreement. The company's president told Foley that if he performed his job well he would have a long and rewarding employment with the firm. Over the next six years and nine months Foley received steady salary increases, promotions, bonuses, awards, and superior performance evaluations, rising to branch manager of the Los Angeles office with an annual salary of $56,164 plus a merit bonus. In January 1983 Foley learned that his new supervisor, Robert Kuhne, was under investigation by the FBI for embezzlement from his former employer, Bank of America. Foley reported the information to Vice President Richard Earnest because he was worried about working for Kuhne in a supervisory position. Earnest told Foley not to discuss rumors and to forget what he had heard. In early March 1983 Kuhne informed Foley that the company had decided to replace him for performance reasons and offered a transfer to another division. Foley was later told he could continue as branch manager if he agreed to a performance plan, but when Kuhne met with him the next day Kuhne instead gave Foley the choice of resigning or being fired. Foley was discharged on March 13, 1983. Foley filed suit against Interactive Data Corporation alleging three causes of action: tortious discharge in violation of public policy, breach of an implied-in-fact contract to terminate only for good cause, and tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The superior court sustained the company's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted review.
View caseIan Iverson was injured while riding as a passenger in a car driven by his wife Idina in another state. The forum court applied its own law allowing interspousal tort suits rather than the other state's immunity rule. The decision turned on the forum's stronger interest in compensating its resident.
The plaintiff, Mrs. Haumschild, and her husband were domiciled in Wisconsin at all relevant times. Wisconsin is both the state of the forum and of the domicile while California is the state where the alleged wrong was committed. While the couple was traveling in California, Mrs. Haumschild sustained personal injuries in an automobile accident that was allegedly caused by her husband's negligence. She subsequently commenced an action in Wisconsin circuit court against her husband and Continental Casualty Company, his insurer, seeking damages for those injuries. The defendants asserted that California law barred a wife from suing her husband in tort and therefore precluded recovery. The circuit court rendered judgment against the plaintiff on that ground. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The appeal was argued before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin on March 2, 1959. On April 10, 1959, the court reversed the judgment in an opinion authored by Justice Currie, with Justice Fairchild filing a separate concurrence joined by Justice Brown.
View caseIsabelle Inman and her husband Igor challenged a state statute criminalizing use of contraceptives by married couples. The court dismissed the suit for lack of justiciability because the statute had never been enforced against married persons.
In 1961 two appeals reached the Supreme Court from judgments of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors sustaining demurrers and dismissing actions brought by Dr. C. Lee Buxton, a Yale professor of obstetrics and gynecology who also served as medical director of the Planned Parenthood Center in New Haven, together with married patients Paul and Pauline Poe and Jane Doe. The complaints sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-32 and 54-196. The women had consulted Dr. Buxton, who advised that contraceptive methods were medically indicated because of prior pregnancies that had resulted in stillbirths or critical illness. The statutes prevented them from obtaining or following such advice. The complaints further alleged that the New Haven County State's Attorney had made public statements threatening to prosecute violators of the statutes. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors held that the allegations failed to show any specific threat of prosecution against these plaintiffs. It also held that the plaintiffs had not committed or were about to commit acts subjecting them to liability. Therefore, the court dismissed the actions for lack of a justiciable controversy. The cases came to the United States Supreme Court on appeal. The Court noted probable jurisdiction. The challenged statutes had been on the books since 1879. In the more than eighty years since enactment, the only recorded prosecution was a 1940 test case against two doctors and a nurse at a birth-control clinic. That case ended when the State moved to dismiss the information after the state supreme court upheld the statutes. Contraceptives were commonly and openly sold in Connecticut drug stores. Yet no prosecutions for sale or use were recorded.
View caseCourts presume that private communications between spouses during marriage are confidential. The party seeking disclosure bears the burden of rebutting the presumption by showing the communication was not intended to remain secret.
The privilege protecting confidential communications made during marriage continues even after the marriage ends. Either former spouse may still assert it to block disclosure of those earlier exchanges.
The witness spouse alone holds the privilege against adverse testimony. The defendant spouse cannot prevent the witness from testifying voluntarily, though the communications privilege may still bar specific confidential statements.
…U. S., at 69. In our view, the spousal notice requirement is a rational attempt by the State to improve truthful communication between spouses and encourage collaborative decision making, and thereby fosters marital integrity. See Labine v. Vincent , 401 U. S. 532, 538 (1971) ("[T]he power to make rules to establish, protect,…