Also known as: intention to agree · intents to agree · mutual assent
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
The mental state in which a person consciously intends to enter into an agreement with one or more others. This element is required for conspiracy liability and is distinct from the separate intent to achieve the criminal objective of the agreement.
Ike Ingram tells India Inoue he will sell her a shipment of widgets for ten thousand dollars. India believes the price covers only the base units while Ike intends it to include custom packaging. Because each attaches a materially different meaning and neither knows of the other's understanding, no mutual assent forms and no agreement arises.
Iris Energy and Icarus Aviation exchange emails confirming they will trade fuel credits for flight hours. Each side's messages show a conscious decision to bind itself to the exchange of performances. The resulting bargain satisfies the requirement of mutual assent between two persons.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
Integrity Partners begins installing equipment on Ironclad Industries' site after the companies orally agree on price and scope. By starting performance each party manifests its intent to agree to the exchange, satisfying the requirement that mutual assent be shown through promise or performance.
Ivy Ibarra emails an offer to supply parts to Isaiah Ishikawa. Isaiah replies accepting the terms without change. The sequence of offer and acceptance supplies the ordinary form of mutual assent to the exchange.
Ingrid Innes and Ian Iverson negotiate over several days by exchanging revised drafts and making incremental concessions until both begin performing the described work. Mutual assent exists even though no single document can be labeled the offer or the acceptance.
Ike Ingram mails an offer to sell equipment to India Inoue and states it will remain open for ten days. India decides on day three to accept. The offer continues to give her the power to complete mutual assent by acceptance until the stated period expires.
Conspiracy requires both the intent to agree to enter the conspiracy and the separate intent to achieve the criminal objective of that agreement. The intent to agree is without moral content by itself and must be paired with the second intent.
Yes. When one participant only pretends to agree and never forms genuine intent to enter the agreement, no true bilateral conspiracy exists. Both parties must actually intend to agree for liability to attach.
The intent to agree focuses solely on the decision to join the conspiracy itself. The intent to commit the object offense concerns the further purpose of accomplishing the underlying crime the conspirators set out to achieve.
…require “specific intent” before a defendant may be convicted. Section 53a-48 requires that a defendant must possess a specific intent to agree to the performance or causation of criminal conduct; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-48, Commission Comment; while § 53a-49 requires a defendant to have a specific intent to commit the crime…