A standard that Congress must articulate when delegating rulemaking or regulatory authority to an executive agency or officer. The standard must be sufficiently clear to permit courts to determine whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of the delegation and to prevent the agency from exercising unfettered legislative power.
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Cases
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Common Examples
6
Manufacturing Standards Board Challenge
Congress enacted the Industrial Modernization Act creating the Manufacturing Standards Board and directing it to issue rules that advance modern industry by setting production methods and output quotas. Rivera Manufacturing, a family-owned plant, challenged the resulting regulations as an unconstitutional delegation. The court upheld the delegation because the statutory directive to advance modern industry supplied an intelligible principle that guided the Board's discretion.
Occupational Safety Standard Dispute
Congress authorized the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to issue standards that are reasonably necessary to protect workers from toxic substances. Industrial Union Department challenged a benzene exposure limit on nondelegation grounds. The reviewing court sustained the delegation because the statutory directive to set standards requisite to protect health supplied an intelligible principle.
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute448 U.S. 607, 686–87 (1980)
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 directed the Secretary of Labor to develop standards ensuring safe and healthful working conditions for every working man and woman. Benzene, a colorless aromatic liquid produced in quantities of approximately 11 billion pounds in 1976, was used in motor fuels, solvents, detergents, and other organic chemicals. Over one million workers faced additional low-level exposures through employment in petroleum refining, petrochemical processing, rubber manufacturing, and gasoline service stations.
In 1971 the Secretary adopted a national consensus standard limiting airborne benzene to 10 parts per million as an eight-hour time-weighted average with a 25 ppm ceiling for ten-minute periods. Between 1974 and 1977 additional epidemiological studies linked benzene to leukemia. NIOSH conducted an interim study of two Pliofilm plants in Ohio that reported at least a fivefold increase in expected leukemia incidence among workers exposed from 1940 to 1949. Other studies, including one by Dow Chemical, identified leukemia deaths among workers whose exposures had not exceeded 2 to 9 ppm.
In October 1976 NIOSH recommended an emergency temporary standard of 1 ppm. The Fifth Circuit temporarily restrained the emergency standard. OSHA then proposed and, after hearings that began in July 1977, promulgated a permanent standard in February 1978. The permanent standard reduced the permissible exposure limit to 1 ppm, imposed a 5 ppm ceiling for any fifteen-minute period, required initial monitoring and semiannual medical examinations when exposures exceeded 0.5 ppm, mandated engineering controls rather than respirators where feasible, and prohibited skin or eye contact with liquids containing more than 0.5 percent benzene after a three-year phase-in.
The standard exempted storage, transportation, distribution, sale, or use of gasoline after discharge from bulk terminals. OSHA estimated capital costs of approximately $266 million, first-year operating costs of $187 million to $205 million, and recurring annual costs of $34 million, with the largest per-employee expenditures falling on the petroleum refining and petrochemical segments. On pre-enforcement review under 29 U.S.C. § 655(f), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the regulation invalid in 1978. The Supreme Court reviewed the Fifth Circuit judgment.
Sentencing Guidelines Challenge
Congress created a sentencing commission within the judicial branch and directed it to promulgate guidelines that further the purposes of sentencing. A defendant challenged the resulting guidelines as an invalid delegation. The court upheld the statute because the directive to further the statutory purposes of sentencing provided an intelligible principle.
Mistretta v. United States488 U.S. 361 (1989)
In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act to address widespread criticisms that federal sentencing was a national scandal marked by unwarranted disparities and uncertainty. The legislation created the United States Sentencing Commission as an independent commission in the judicial branch consisting of seven voting members. The President appoints the members with the advice and consent of the Senate, and at least three members must be federal judges selected after consideration of recommendations from the Judicial Conference of the United States, while the Attorney General serves as an ex officio nonvoting member.
Petitioner John M. Mistretta was indicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri on three counts centering on a cocaine sale. He pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The district court sentenced him under the Guidelines to 18 months' imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release, along with a $1,000 fine and a $50 assessment.
Mistretta appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, challenging the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission and the Guidelines. Both Mistretta and the United States petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari before judgment in the Eighth Circuit. The Court granted the petitions because of the imperative public importance of the issue and the disarray among the federal district courts.
Budget Reduction Authority Dispute
Congress directed the Comptroller General to calculate automatic spending reductions when deficit targets were missed. A member of Congress challenged the mechanism as an unconstitutional delegation. The court sustained the delegation because the statutory formula for calculating reductions supplied an intelligible principle.
Bowsher v. Synar478 U.S. 714 (1986)
On December 12, 1985, the President signed into law the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. The statute sets a maximum deficit amount for each fiscal year from 1986 through 1991. It requires across-the-board cuts in specified federal programs if the deficit exceeds the target by more than a specified sum. These cuts, called sequestrations, are made by the President on the basis of a report prepared by the Comptroller General.
The Comptroller General, after reviewing the Directors' reports, then reports his conclusions to the President. The Comptroller General must use the more pessimistic of the two sets of estimates, may make adjustments he deems appropriate, and must specify the precise reductions required on a program-by-program basis. The President is then required to issue a sequestration order that incorporates the Comptroller General's report without modification.
The Comptroller General is an officer of the Legislative Branch. He is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a 15-year term. The Comptroller General is the head of the General Accounting Office (GAO), which is an independent office in the legislative branch of the Government. He is removable not only by impeachment, but also by joint resolution of Congress at any time for permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude.
He is required to make such investigations and reports as shall be ordered by either House of Congress or by any committee of either House. He is to make recommendations to the Congress and to the heads of Federal agencies on legislation and other measures to improve the efficiency and economy of Government operations. Within hours of the Act's signing, Congressman Mike Synar, who had voted against it, and eleven other Members of Congress filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional. The National Treasury Employees Union filed a parallel action alleging injury to its members from suspended cost-of-living benefit increases.
A three-judge District Court, appointed pursuant to 2 U. S. C. § 922(a)(5), invalidated the reporting provisions. The District Court held that the role of the Comptroller General in the deficit reduction process violated the Constitution's command that Congress may not retain the power to remove an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment. The court therefore held that the reporting requirements of the Act were unconstitutional. It declared the presidential sequestration order based on those reports to be without force and permanently enjoined the Secretary of the Treasury from implementing the sequestration order. The parties appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction and expedited consideration.
Air Quality Standard Challenge
Congress directed the Environmental Protection Agency to set ambient air quality standards requisite to protect public health. American Trucking Associations challenged the resulting ozone standard on nondelegation grounds. The court upheld the delegation because the health-protection directive supplied an intelligible principle.
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001)
In July 1997 the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency revised the national ambient air quality standards for particulate matter and ozone. American Trucking Associations, Inc., and its co-respondents, including the States of Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia, challenged the new standards in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
The District of Columbia Circuit held that Section 109(b)(1) delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of the Constitution because it provided no intelligible principle to guide the agency's exercise of authority. The court remanded the NAAQS to the agency for reconsideration. On rehearing the panel adhered to its position on the delegation point and on the implementation question, and it rejected the EPA's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to reach the implementation question.
The Administrator and the EPA petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the delegation, jurisdiction, and implementation questions. The respondents conditionally cross-petitioned for review of the costs question. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on both petitions in 2000 and consolidated the cases for decision.
At the same time the EPA proposed the revised ozone NAAQS in 1996, it also proposed an interim implementation policy. After accepting comments, the White House published a memorandum prescribing implementation procedures, and the EPA announced in the preamble to its final ozone NAAQS that the provisions of subpart 1 of part D would apply to the implementation of the new standards.
Tariff Adjustment Dispute
Congress authorized the President to adjust tariff rates to equalize production costs between domestic and foreign manufacturers. An importer challenged the resulting rate adjustment as an invalid delegation. The court sustained the delegation because the statutory goal of equalizing costs supplied an intelligible principle.
J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States276 U.S. 394, 48 S.Ct. 348, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928)
J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Company imported barium dioxide into New York. The collector of customs assessed the importation at a dutiable rate of six cents per pound. This was two cents per pound more than that fixed by statute under a presidential proclamation issued pursuant to section 315 of the Tariff Act of September 21, 1922.
The proclamation was issued by President Calvin Coolidge on May 19, 1924, after the United States Tariff Commission conducted an investigation into differences in costs of production between the United States and Germany, the principal competing country. The investigation included a public hearing at which interested parties could present evidence. The proclamation recited that the statutory duty did not equalize those cost differences and raised the rate on barium dioxide to six cents per pound, within the fifty-percent limit allowed by the statute.
Hampton protested the assessment and appealed under section 514 of the Tariff Act. The United States Customs Court heard the case and a majority upheld the assessment. Hampton then appealed to the United States Court of Customs Appeals, which affirmed the Customs Court judgment on October 16, 1926.
The Attorney General certified that the case warranted Supreme Court review. Hampton petitioned for certiorari on May 10, 1927, and the Supreme Court granted the writ.
5 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What is the minimum guidance Congress must provide when delegating authority to an agency?
Congress must supply an intelligible principle that guides the agency's exercise of discretion. Courts have upheld very general directives such as protecting public health or advancing a balanced energy supply. The principle need not be detailed or quantitative.
Does the intelligible principle requirement apply when Congress delegates authority to a commission within the judicial branch?
Yes. The requirement remains the same. Congress may delegate sentencing guideline authority to a commission that includes judges provided it supplies an intelligible principle and the delegation does not undermine judicial integrity.
How does a court determine whether a statute supplies an intelligible principle?
The court construes the statute to identify the task delegated and the instructions provided. If the statute states a general policy and boundaries for agency action, the delegation is valid even if the agency retains significant discretion over implementation details.
Can procedural requirements such as public hearings substitute for an intelligible principle?
No. Procedural safeguards help ensure agency action remains tied to the statutory goal but do not replace the need for a substantive standard. The statute must still articulate a policy that guides the agency's substantive choices.
What happens if a statute supplies no intelligible principle at all?
The delegation is unconstitutional. Congress may not hand an agency completely standardless legislative power because that would violate separation of powers by allowing the executive to make fundamental policy decisions.
." Rather, it speaks in much simpler terms: " All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress." U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 1 (emphasis added). I am not convinced that the…
" to guide the exercise of the delegated discretion. Third, and derivative of the second, the doctrine ensures that courts charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative…
Constitutional LawThe separation of powers · The powers of CongressUBEIntermediate