531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001)
In July 1997 the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency revised the national ambient air quality standards for particulate matter and ozone.1 American Trucking Associations, Inc., and its co-respondents, including the States of Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia, challenged the new standards in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).2
The District of Columbia Circuit held that Section 109(b)(1) delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of the Constitution because it provided no intelligible principle to guide the agency's exercise of authority.3 The court remanded the NAAQS to the agency for reconsideration.4 On rehearing the panel adhered to its position on the delegation point and on the implementation question, and it rejected the EPA's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to reach the implementation question.5
The Administrator and the EPA petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the delegation, jurisdiction, and implementation questions.6 The respondents conditionally cross-petitioned for review of the costs question.7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on both petitions in 2000 and consolidated the cases for decision.8
At the same time the EPA proposed the revised ozone NAAQS in 1996, it also proposed an interim implementation policy.9 After accepting comments, the White House published a memorandum prescribing implementation procedures, and the EPA announced in the preamble to its final ozone NAAQS that the provisions of subpart 1 of part D would apply to the implementation of the new standards.1011
Whether Section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act delegates legislative power to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency?12
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution vests all legislative powers in Congress, permitting no delegation of those powers.13 Congress may obtain assistance from coordinate branches so long as it lays down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to exercise the delegated authority is directed to conform.14
No. In July 1997 the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency revised the national ambient air quality standards for particulate matter and ozone. American Trucking Associations, Inc., and its co-respondents, including the States of Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia, challenged the new standards in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). The District of Columbia Circuit held that Section 109(b)(1) delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of the Constitution because it provided no intelligible principle to guide the agency's exercise of authority. The court remanded the NAAQS to the agency for reconsideration.
On rehearing the panel adhered to its position on the delegation point and on the implementation question, and it rejected the EPA's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to reach the implementation question. The Administrator and the EPA petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the delegation, jurisdiction, and implementation questions. The respondents conditionally cross-petitioned for review of the costs question. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on both petitions in 2000 and consolidated the cases for decision.
Section 109(b)(1) supplies the requisite intelligible principle by instructing the Administrator to set standards requisite to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety.15
Section 109(b)(1) does not delegate legislative power in contravention of Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution.16
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas agrees that Section 109 provides an intelligible principle comparable to other directives the Court has approved.17 He also agrees that the Court of Appeals erred by remanding to the agency for a corrective interpretation.18 Thomas writes separately to express concern that the intelligible principle doctrine may not prevent all cessions of legislative power when the significance of the delegated decision is simply too great to be called anything other than legislative.19
He notes that the parties did not examine the constitutional text or ask the Court to reconsider its precedents on cessions of legislative power.20 Thomas would be willing to address on a future day whether delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from the Founders' understanding of separation of powers.21
Joined by Justice Souter
Justice Stevens joins the Court's result and its explanation that the Court of Appeals erred in finding an unconstitutional delegation.22 He endorses the outcome with the caveat that the Court should acknowledge the delegated power as legislative yet constitutional because it is adequately limited by the authorizing statute.23 Stevens argues that the proper characterization of governmental power depends on the nature of the power rather than the identity of the person exercising it.24
An executive agency's exercise of rulemaking authority pursuant to a valid delegation is legislative.25 He concludes that when Congress enacted Section 109 it effected a constitutional delegation of legislative power to the EPA.26
Whether the Administrator may consider the costs of implementation in setting national ambient air quality standards under Section 109(b)(1)?27
Section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act instructs the Administrator to set primary ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which are requisite to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety.28 The text does not permit the Administrator to consider the costs of implementation in setting those standards.29
No. Section 109(b)(1) instructs the EPA to set primary ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which are requisite to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety.30 The language is absolute.31 It requires the Administrator to identify the maximum airborne concentration of a pollutant that the public health can tolerate, decrease the concentration to provide an adequate margin of safety, and set the standard at that level.32 Nowhere are the costs of achieving such a standard made part of that initial calculation.33
The statute's structure confirms that costs are considered elsewhere in the Act during implementation by the States rather than in the standard-setting process itself.34
The Administrator may not consider the costs of implementation in setting national ambient air quality standards under Section 109(b)(1).35
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Breyer joins the determination that the Clean Air Act does not permit the EPA to consider economic costs of implementation when setting NAAQS under Section 109(b)(1).36 He would not rest this conclusion solely on the statutory language or a presumption requiring a clear textual commitment.37 Instead, Breyer relies on legislative history showing that Congress intended the statute to be technology-forcing.38
Congress aimed to establish what the public interest requires to protect health even if industries must do what seems impossible at the present time.39 He concludes that the Act's structure and history reflect a congressional decision not to delegate to the agency the legal authority to consider economic costs of compliance.40 The statute still permits consideration of costs during implementation and allows the Administrator flexibility to avoid ruinous standards.41
Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the EPA's interpretation of Part D of Title I of the Clean Air Act with respect to implementing the revised ozone NAAQS?42
Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act grants the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over any nationally applicable regulations promulgated or final action taken by the Administrator.43 An agency's interpretation constitutes final action when it marks the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process.44
Yes. The EPA proposed an interim implementation policy in 1996 at the same time it proposed the revised ozone NAAQS.45 After accepting comments, the White House published a memorandum prescribing implementation procedures.46 The EPA announced in the preamble to its final ozone NAAQS that the provisions of subpart 1 of part D would apply to the implementation of the new standards.
This announcement constituted final agency action because it marked the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process on the implementation question.47 The effects on the respondent States, which must promptly undertake the task of developing state implementation plans, satisfy the ripeness requirements under the special judicial-review provision of the Clean Air Act.48 The implementation issue was fairly included within the challenges to the final ozone rule that were properly before the Court of Appeals.49
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the EPA's interpretation of Part D of Title I of the Clean Air Act with respect to implementing the revised ozone NAAQS.50
Whether the EPA's interpretation of that part was permissible?51
Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the implementation question the court must defer to a reasonable interpretation made by the Administrator.52 The interpretation must not go beyond the limits of what is ambiguous or contradict what is clear in the statute.53
No. Subpart 2 of Part D provides for classifying nonattainment ozone areas under the revised standard through Table 1 in Section 7511(a)(1).5455 That table defines five categories of ozone nonattainment areas and prescribes attainment deadlines.56 The EPA's interpretation that subpart 1 alone controls implementation of the revised ozone NAAQS renders Subpart 2's carefully designed restrictions on agency discretion utterly nugatory.57 It contradicts the statute's textually explicit applicability to nonattainment areas under the new standard.58
Although the statute is ambiguous concerning the manner in which Subpart 1 and Subpart 2 interact with regard to revised ozone standards, the EPA's interpretation goes beyond the limits of ambiguity.59 It makes Subpart 2 abruptly obsolete despite its manifest purpose to govern implementation for some time.60
The EPA's interpretation of Part D of Title I of the Clean Air Act with respect to implementing the revised ozone NAAQS was not permissible.61