Also known as:independent tortfeasors · independent tortfeasor · independent tort feasor · several tortfeasors · concurrent tortfeasors
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Tortfeasors whose separate negligent or intentional acts combine to produce a single indivisible harm without any concert of action or common design. Each remains subject to liability for the entire harm when apportionment is impossible, yet a judgment against one does not automatically bind the others under res judicata principles.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Judgment Against One Does Not Release Others
Ira Irving obtained a $300,000 judgment against Inertia Dynamics after its truck struck his vehicle. He later sued Imperial Motors, whose defective brake component contributed to the same crash. The court treated the satisfied judgment against Inertia as equivalent to a release, allowing Imperial to offset the payment but preserving Ira's right to pursue any shortfall.
Prior Judgment Has No Preclusive Effect
Ivan Ivanov won a full judgment against Ivy Investments for a defective railing that caused his fall. He then sued Icarus Aviation, whose negligent maintenance of the same structure contributed to the identical injury. Because the defendants were independent tortfeasors, the earlier judgment did not bar Ivan from litigating Icarus's separate liability.
Ismael Ibrahim was struck by shots fired simultaneously by Ian Iverson and Idina Iverson from different locations. Medical evidence could not separate the contribution of each bullet to his single wound. The court held both independent tortfeasors jointly and severally liable, shifting to each the burden of proving his or her own share of the harm.
Summers v. Tice199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948)
On November 20, 1945, plaintiff Summers went quail hunting on the open range with defendants Tice and Simonson. Each of the defendants was armed with a 12 gauge shotgun loaded with shells containing 7 1/2 size shot. Before the hunt began, the plaintiff discussed the hunting procedure with the defendants and indicated that they were to exercise care when shooting and to keep in line.
During the course of the hunt, the plaintiff proceeded up a hill, placing the hunters at the points of a triangle. The defendants had an unobstructed view of the plaintiff and knew his location. Defendant Tice flushed a quail which rose in flight to a 10-foot elevation and flew between plaintiff and defendants. At that time defendants were 75 yards from plaintiff. Both defendants shot at the quail, shooting in plaintiff's direction. One shot struck plaintiff in his eye and another in his upper lip, causing injury to his right eye and face. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against both defendants seeking damages for these personal injuries.
The case was tried by the court without a jury. The trial court found that defendants were negligent in so shooting and plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. Each of the defendants appealed from the judgment entered against them, and the appeals were consolidated pursuant to stipulation.
Imperial Motors and Inertia Dynamics each negligently maintained separate sections of a shared loading dock. A worker suffered an indivisible back injury when both sections failed. The court permitted allocation of fault between the two independent tortfeasors under comparative principles while preserving the plaintiff's right to collect the full judgment from either.
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court20 Cal.3d 578, 590, 578 P.2d 899, 906, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 189
On April 22, 1974, Glen Gregos, a teenage boy, was injured while participating in a cross-country motorcycle race for novices sponsored by the American Motorcycle Association and the Viking Motorcycle Club. Glen's second amended complaint alleged that the American Motorcycle Association and Viking negligently designed, managed, supervised, and administered the race and negligently solicited entrants. Such negligence was a direct and proximate cause of his injuries, including a crushed spine resulting in permanent loss of the use of his legs.
Glen's parents, acting as guardians ad litem, filed the underlying action against the American Motorcycle Association, the Viking Motorcycle Club, and the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission. The American Motorcycle Association answered the complaint, denying the charging allegations and asserting affirmative defenses that included a claim that Glen's own negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries.
Thereafter the American Motorcycle Association sought leave of court to file a cross-complaint against Glen's parents. The first cause of action alleged that the parents knew motorcycle racing is dangerous, were knowledgeable about Glen's training, directly participated in his decision to enter the race by signing a parental consent form, and negligently failed to exercise their power of supervision over their minor child. The second cause of action sought declaratory relief. It asked for a declaration of the allocable negligence of Glen's parents so that any damages awarded against the American Motorcycle Association could be reduced by the percentage allocable to the parents' negligence.
The trial court denied the American Motorcycle Association's motion for leave to file the cross-complaint. The American Motorcycle Association petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to grant the motion. The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ. Ultimately the court granted a peremptory writ of mandate. Because of the statewide importance of the questions presented, the Supreme Court ordered a hearing in the case on its own motion.
Isla Ireland developed cancer after exposure to DES manufactured by several companies whose products reached the market in identical form. Because the independent manufacturers could not be distinguished as the source of her particular pills, the court imposed liability on each in proportion to its market share.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980)
Judith Sindell and Maureen Rogers filed separate lawsuits in California against several pharmaceutical companies that manufactured diethylstilbestrol, commonly known as DES. The complaints stated that the plaintiffs' mothers had taken DES during pregnancy to prevent miscarriage, and that the plaintiffs later developed cancerous and precancerous conditions as a result. Sindell alleged exposure led to a malignant bladder tumor requiring surgery and ongoing adenosis necessitating frequent monitoring. Rogers' allegations were substantially similar.
DES was first developed in 1938 and received FDA approval in 1941 for use in preventing miscarriages. Manufacturers produced the drug in multiple forms and strengths under many trade names, but all followed an identical formula set forth in the United States Pharmacopoeia. In 1971 the FDA ordered companies to stop marketing DES for miscarriage prevention after studies linked it to adenocarcinoma in the daughters of women who had used the drug. Hundreds of companies had manufactured DES between 1941 and 1971.
Because of the long latency period between ingestion and the appearance of injuries, and because pharmacists often filled prescriptions with whatever brand was in stock, the plaintiffs could not determine which company had produced the particular DES their mothers received. The trial court sustained demurrers filed by the defendants, including Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly and Company, E.R. Squibb & Sons, the Upjohn Company, and Rexall Drug Company, on the basis that the plaintiffs had not identified the manufacturer of the injurious product. The actions were consolidated for appeal to the Supreme Court of California.
Sindell sought compensatory damages of one million dollars and punitive damages of ten million dollars on her own behalf, along with class-wide equitable relief requiring the defendants to warn physicians and establish free clinics for screening. The complaints further alleged that the defendants had continued to market DES without adequate testing or warnings even after they knew or should have known of its carcinogenic properties.
When are independent tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for an indivisible injury?
Independent tortfeasors face joint and several liability when their separate acts produce a single harm that cannot be apportioned with reasonable certainty. The plaintiff may recover the full amount from any one defendant, leaving contribution issues among the tortfeasors themselves.
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Does a judgment against one independent tortfeasor bar suit against another?
No. The effect of a judgment for or against one independent tortfeasor is governed by ordinary res judicata rules. Absent privity or identity of parties, the judgment does not preclude claims against others who may have contributed to the same harm.
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How does a satisfied judgment against one independent tortfeasor affect recovery from another?
The discharge of a judgment against one independent tortfeasor is treated like a release or covenant not to sue. The second tortfeasor receives credit for the amount paid but remains liable for any unsatisfied portion of the plaintiff's damages.
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What happens when independent tortfeasors cause distinct rather than indivisible harms?
Each independent tortfeasor is liable only for the portion of harm that can be attributed to that defendant's conduct. The plaintiff must prove a reasonable basis for division. Otherwise the harms are treated as indivisible.
Supporting sources
199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948)
…as liable on the same basis as joint tortfeasors, and hence the last-cited cases are distinguishable inasmuch as they involve independent tort feasors. In addition to that, however, it should be pointed out that the same reasons of policy and justice shift the burden to each of defendants to absolve himself if he can—relieving the…