Also known as: inadequately represented · inadequate representations · ineffective representation · ineffective assistance
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
An element of the test for intervention as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) requiring a proposed intervenor to show that existing parties may not protect the intervenor's interest in the subject of the action.
An element of the test for intervention as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) requiring a proposed intervenor to show that existing parties may not protect the intervenor's interest in the subject of the action.
Irene Ingalls and other minority applicants moved to intervene in a challenge to the university's race-conscious admissions policy. The university defended the policy but planned to emphasize institutional diversity rather than the applicants' specific enrollment interests. The court found that this divergence satisfied the inadequate-representation prong and granted intervention as of right.
A client's allegation that counsel's performance fell short in a manner that places the quality of the representation at issue, thereby triggering the self-defense exception to attorney-client privilege.
Ian Iverson sued his former law firm for overbilling on a commercial lease matter. The firm sought to use Iverson's own discovery responses and instructions to defend the fee claim. Because Iverson had placed the representation at issue by alleging inadequate representation, the self-defense exception allowed the firm to obtain and use the necessary client communications.
A client's allegation that counsel's performance fell short in a manner that places the quality of the representation at issue, thereby triggering the self-defense exception to attorney-client privilege.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Before us are two cases in which proposed defendant-intervenors were denied intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and (b). The actions were brought against the University of Michigan to contest the use of an applicant's race as a factor in determining admission. The appeals come from separate district courts but present similar issues. We have therefore consolidated the two cases for purposes of this opinion. In Gratz v. Bollinger, the named plaintiffs are two white applicants who were denied admission to the College of Literature, Arts and Science. They allege that the College's admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. The plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief forbidding continuation of the alleged discriminatory admissions process, and admission to the College. The proposed intervenors are 17 African-American and Latino/a individuals who have applied or intend to apply to the University, and the Citizens for Affirmative Action's Preservation (CAAP), a nonprofit organization whose stated mission is to preserve opportunities in higher education for African-American and Latino/a students in Michigan. The district court denied their motion for intervention as of right, holding that the plaintiffs did not have a substantial interest in the litigation and that the University could adequately represent the proposed intervenors' interests. The district court also denied the proposed intervenors' alternative motion for permissive intervention. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the named plaintiff is a white woman challenging the admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School. She alleges that the race-conscious admissions policy utilized by the law school violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. Grutter seeks compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief forbidding continuation of the alleged discriminatory admissions process, and admission to the law school. The proposed intervenors are 41 students and three pro-affirmative action coalitions. The individual proposed intervenors include 21 undergraduate students of different races who currently attend different undergraduate institutions, all of whom plan to apply to the law school for admission. Five black students who currently attend local high schools also plan to apply to the law school for admission. Twelve students of different races currently attend the law school. A paralegal and a Latino graduate student at the University of Texas at Austin intend to apply to the law school for admission. A black graduate student at the University of Michigan is a member of the Defend Affirmative Action Party. The district court denied the motion to intervene as of right on the basis that the intervenors failed to show that their interests would not be adequately represented by the University. The district court also denied the proposed intervenors' alternative motion for permissive intervention. The plaintiff opposed the motion to intervene, but the defendants, officials of the Law School and the University, did not oppose the motion. The appeals were argued on June 8, 1999, and decided on August 10, 1999.
View caseIsabelle Inman sought to intervene in a proceeding to terminate her parental rights. The state agency pursued removal while Inman wanted to retain custody and present additional evidence of her fitness. Because the agency's objectives diverged from Inman's, the court recognized that existing parties would not adequately represent her interests.
In late spring of 1975, the District Court of Durham County, North Carolina, adjudicated William Everett Lassiter, born in 1975 to petitioner Abby Gail Lassiter, a neglected child after evidence that she had not provided proper medical care, and transferred custody to the respondent Durham County Department of Social Services. A year later, Ms. Lassiter was convicted of second-degree murder and began serving a sentence of 25 to 40 years. In 1978, the Department petitioned the court to terminate Ms. Lassiter's parental rights, alleging she had not had contact with the child since December 1975 and had willfully left the child in foster care for more than two years without substantial progress. Ms. Lassiter was served with the petition and notice of the August 31, 1978 hearing. Although her mother had retained counsel for her in connection with challenging the murder conviction, Ms. Lassiter did not mention the termination hearing to him. At the hearing, the court discussed whether she should have more time to find counsel but concluded she had ample opportunity and proceeded without appointing counsel or inquiring about indigency. A social worker testified about the child's medical issues in 1975, lack of contact since then, and that the grandmother was not able to care for the child. Ms. Lassiter cross-examined the witness, testified herself, and her mother also testified. The court found that Ms. Lassiter had not contacted the Department since December 1975, had not expressed concern for the child's welfare, and had willfully failed to maintain responsibility, and terminated her parental rights. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that appointment of counsel for indigent parents was not constitutionally mandated, and the North Carolina Supreme Court summarily denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
View case2 common questions
The movant must show that existing parties' interests diverge from the intervenor's in a way that may leave the intervenor's position unprotected. Divergence need not be certain. A realistic possibility that the existing party will not advance all of the intervenor's arguments is enough.
All four elements—timeliness, interest, impairment, and inadequate representation—must be satisfied. Failure on any one defeats intervention as of right, but a strong showing on inadequate representation can help establish the practical-impairment element when interests are not fully aligned.
Idris Ives was convicted of capital murder after his appointed lawyer failed to investigate mitigating evidence of Ives's troubled childhood. The court held that this omission constituted inadequate representation under the Sixth Amendment because a reasonable probability existed that the evidence would have changed the sentencing outcome.
In September 1976, respondent David Washington committed a series of crimes over a ten-day period in the Miami area that included three brutal stabbing murders along with torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, Washington surrendered to police and gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third criminal episode. The State of Florida indicted him for kidnapping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him. Washington waived his right to a jury trial against counsel's advice and pleaded guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder counts. In the plea colloquy he stated that he had committed a string of burglaries but had no significant prior criminal record and that he had been under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family. Counsel spoke with Washington about his background, contacted his wife and mother by telephone, but did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination. At the sentencing hearing before the trial judge, counsel's strategy relied primarily on the plea colloquy to convey remorse and emotional stress and argued that these factors justified sparing Washington the death penalty. Counsel successfully moved to exclude Washington's rap sheet and decided not to request a presentence report because it would have included his criminal history. The trial judge found multiple aggravating circumstances for each murder and no mitigating circumstances, sentencing Washington to death on each of the three murder counts. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Washington sought collateral relief in state court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on six grounds including failure to request a psychiatric report, investigate and present character witnesses, and seek a presentence investigation report. He submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives willing to testify and two reports from a psychiatrist and psychologist. The state trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Washington then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. After an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel testified, the District Court denied relief, concluding that although counsel made errors in judgment by failing to investigate mitigating evidence further, no prejudice resulted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for application of a new framework it developed for analyzing ineffectiveness claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding.
View caseIke Ingram filed a federal habeas petition claiming that his trial counsel's failure to object to racially discriminatory jury selection amounted to inadequate representation. The court examined whether the state court's rejection of the claim was contrary to clearly established federal law.
In 1950 petitioner Brown, a Negro, was convicted of rape in Forsyth County, North Carolina, and sentenced to death. Petitioner Speller, also a Negro, was convicted of rape in Bertie County after two prior convictions were set aside, and sentenced to death. Petitioners Daniels, two Negroes aged seventeen at the time of arrest, were convicted of murder in Pitt County and sentenced to death. In each case the defendants raised claims of racial discrimination in the selection of grand and petit juries and, in some instances, the use of coerced confessions. The defendants appealed their convictions through the North Carolina courts, presenting their federal constitutional claims to the state trial and supreme courts. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the convictions. Petitions for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court raising the same federal issues were denied. The defendants then filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, again raising the claims of jury discrimination and coerced confessions. The district court in each case examined the records from the state proceedings. The district court adopted findings from the state trial courts regarding jury composition and voluntariness of confessions, and in two cases heard additional evidence. The district court denied the writs of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denials. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgments. The records before the district courts included transcripts of the state trials showing the methods of jury selection from tax lists in the respective counties, with evidence of the percentages of Negroes on jury panels and in the population. In the Daniels case, the state supreme court had refused to consider the appeal on the merits because the statement of the case on appeal was served one day late.
View caseIlana Isaacs was convicted by a nonunanimous jury in state court. On postconviction review she argued that her counsel provided inadequate representation by failing to object to the nonunanimous verdict instruction. The court considered whether the objection would have succeeded under then-existing precedent.
Evangelisto Ramos was charged with a serious criminal offense and tried in a Louisiana state court. At trial, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict of guilty by a vote of ten to two. Under Louisiana law at the time, non-unanimous verdicts were permitted in criminal cases, and only Louisiana and Oregon allowed such verdicts among the states. Ramos's conviction was upheld under the authority of Apodaca v. Oregon, in which the Supreme Court had held that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous verdicts in federal criminal trials but permits non-unanimous verdicts in state trials. Subsequently, Louisiana voters approved a constitutional amendment requiring unanimous jury verdicts for criminal convictions. Ramos then challenged his conviction on direct review, arguing that the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated against the states, mandates unanimous verdicts in state criminal trials for serious offenses. The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Ramos's argument, relying on the precedent established in Apodaca. The case reached the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to consider whether Apodaca should be overruled. On April 20, 2020, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.
View case1 common questions
Yes. When a client sues for malpractice or disputes fees by claiming inadequate representation, the lawyer may use otherwise privileged communications and work product necessary to defend against those specific allegations.
…of similar effects in Michigan is more than sufficient to meet the minimal requirements of the impairment element. Inadequate Representation Finally, the prospective intervenors must show that the existing defendant, the University, may not adequately represent their interests. However, the proposed intervenors are "not…