Also known as:greater weight of evidence · preponderance of the evidence
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard of proof requiring the party bearing the burden to persuade the factfinder that a fact is more likely true than not. This standard governs most civil claims and affirmative defenses.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Slayer Determination in Probate
Hannah petitions to bar Catherine from inheriting shares under Dorothy's will after the plane crash. The probate court weighs the pre-flight modifications, Catherine's leadership comments, and weather conditions. Finding Catherine responsible for the killing by a greater weight of the evidence, the court denies her the devise.
Prior Acts in Embezzlement Trial
The prosecution offers Steve's earlier nonprofit payments to prove motive and absence of mistake in the current embezzlement case. The court admits the evidence after confirming sufficient facts for the jury to find the prior acts occurred under Rule 104(b) and that their probative value is not substantially outweighed by prejudice.
Helen and Ruby each claim the training facility shares under the coach's will. The probate court reviews public statements, facility ownership history, and private conversations. Determining the coach's intention by a greater weight of the evidence, the court awards the shares to Helen.
Sufficiency Review in Criminal Appeal
After conviction, the defendant challenges whether the evidence supports the verdict. The reviewing court asks whether any rational trier of fact could find the elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a higher standard than the greater weight of the evidence used in civil cases.
Jackson v. Virginia443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979)
On July 29, 1972, the body of Mary Houston Cole was discovered in a secluded church parking lot in Chesterfield County, Virginia. She had been shot twice at close range with a .38-caliber pistol. The victim had last been seen alive the previous evening in the company of petitioner Hugh Jackson, who was carrying a .38-caliber pistol.
Jackson had befriended Cole while he was imprisoned on a disorderly conduct charge at the local county jail. After his release she arranged for him to live in the home of her son and daughter-in-law. On the day of the killing Jackson had been drinking and had spent considerable time shooting at targets with his revolver. Late in the afternoon he unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Cole to drive him to North Carolina. She instead drove him to a local diner where both were observed by several police officers.
A deputy sheriff later observed Jackson and Cole preparing to leave the diner in her car. Jackson was in possession of his revolver and a kitchen knife was visible in the vehicle. Cole's body was found the following day and a half later, naked from the waist down with her slacks beneath her body. Six cartridge cases fired from Jackson's gun were recovered nearby. Jackson drove the victim's car to North Carolina, made a short trip to Florida, and was arrested several days later.
In a post-arrest statement introduced at trial, Jackson admitted shooting Cole but claimed the shooting occurred accidentally during a struggle. He said the victim had attacked him with a knife when he resisted her sexual advances. He stated he had first fired warning shots into the ground and reloaded before the fatal shots. At trial he asserted self-defense or, alternatively, that intoxication had prevented him from forming the specific intent required for first-degree murder under Virginia law.
The trial judge, sitting as factfinder, convicted Jackson of first-degree murder and sentenced him to thirty years in prison. Jackson's motion to set aside the judgment was denied. The Virginia Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of error alleging insufficient evidence.
Jackson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The District Court applied the Thompson v. Louisville no-evidence standard and granted relief after finding insufficient proof of premeditation. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that judgment.
Charged with second-degree murder, the defendant claims extreme emotional disturbance to reduce the offense. The state requires the defendant to prove this mitigating circumstance by a greater weight of the evidence without shifting the burden on any element of the crime.
Civil Commitment Proceeding
The state seeks to commit Addington indefinitely. The trial court instructs the jury on the greater weight of the evidence standard. The Supreme Court holds that due process requires the higher clear and convincing evidence standard instead.
What does greater weight of the evidence require a party to show?
The party must persuade the factfinder that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence. This is the ordinary civil standard of proof.
How does the greater weight standard differ from proof beyond a reasonable doubt?
Greater weight requires only that a fact be more likely true than not. Beyond a reasonable doubt is the stricter criminal standard that demands moral certainty of guilt.
When is the greater weight standard constitutionally insufficient?
It is insufficient in certain civil proceedings that threaten fundamental liberty interests, such as termination of parental rights or indefinite civil commitment, where clear and convincing evidence is required.
Can a criminal conviction conclusively establish a fact under the greater weight standard in a later civil case?
Yes. A final criminal conviction for felonious and intentional killing conclusively establishes slayer status in a subsequent civil proceeding applying the greater weight standard.
Does the greater weight standard apply to admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence?
No. The trial court need not find the prior act proved by a greater weight of the evidence. Admission turns on whether the jury could reasonably find the act occurred under Rule 104(b) and whether its probative value is not substantially outweighed by prejudice.
397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970)
…that "[a]ny determination at the conclusion of [an adjudicatory] hearing that a [juvenile] did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence." During a subsequent dispositional hearing, appellant was ordered placed in a training school for an initial period of 18 months, subject to annual extensions of his commitment…