Also known as: good behaviour · good conduct
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional standard that permits federal judges to hold their offices for life. The standard subjects judges to removal only through impeachment for misconduct rather than at the pleasure of the political branches.
Georgia Gibbs receives a presidential appointment to the federal district court and Senate confirmation. She serves for decades while issuing rulings that draw criticism from members of Congress. Because she holds office during good behavior, Congress cannot remove her by statute or by cutting her salary.
Greta Goldstein is appointed as a special trial judge in the Tax Court. Parties challenge whether the appointment satisfies Article III requirements. The Court upholds the structure because the position does not exercise the full judicial power reserved for judges who hold office during good behavior.
In 1969 Congress established the United States Tax Court as an Article I court of record and authorized it to appoint commissioners, later renamed special trial judges, to assist its judges. The Tax Court consists of nineteen judges appointed by the President with Senate confirmation to fifteen-year terms. In 1984 and 1986 Congress expanded the Chief Judge's authority to assign special trial judges to hear four categories of proceedings, including any other proceeding the Chief Judge may designate, though only regular Tax Court judges may enter final decisions in the fourth category. Several petitioners deducted approximately $1.5 billion in losses from a tax shelter scheme on their federal income tax returns. In March 1982 they petitioned the Tax Court for review of deficiency determinations. Their cases were assigned to Tax Court Judge Richard C. Wilbur and trial began in 1984. Judge Wilbur became ill in November 1985. The Chief Judge assigned Special Trial Judge Carleton D. Powell to preside over the trial as evidentiary referee with proceedings videotaped. When Judge Wilbur retired effective April 1, 1986, the cases were reassigned to Judge Powell with petitioners' consent for preparation of written findings and an opinion. Judge Powell concluded that the tax shelter consisted of sham transactions and that petitioners owed additional taxes. The Chief Judge adopted Judge Powell's opinion as the opinion of the Tax Court. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the Tax Court's decision. Petitioners contended on appeal that assignment of their complex cases to a special trial judge exceeded statutory authority and violated the Appointments Clause. The Fifth Circuit held that the constitutional claim could be raised for the first time on appeal but rejected it on the merits, finding waiver by consent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the statutory and constitutional questions.
View caseGideon Graves, a sitting state judge, challenges a rule barring personal solicitation of campaign funds. The Court sustains the restriction because states may regulate judicial elections differently from the federal system in which judges hold office during good behavior.
Florida entered the Union in 1845 with judges elected by the legislature. Over subsequent decades the state shifted to popular election of trial and appellate judges. Following corruption scandals in the early 1970s that prompted four justices to resign, Florida amended its constitution to provide merit selection for appellate judges while retaining popular election for trial judges. In response to those scandals the Florida Supreme Court adopted a Code of Judicial Conduct containing Canon 7C(1). Lanell Williams-Yulee, who had practiced law in Florida since 1991, filed paperwork in September 2009 to run for a seat on the county court in Hillsborough County. She drafted a letter announcing her candidacy that described her experience and desire to bring fresh ideas to the bench. The letter then solicited contributions of twenty-five, fifty, one hundred, two hundred fifty, or five hundred dollars payable to the Lanell Williams-Yulee Campaign for County Judge and asked recipients to help meet primary election fundraising goals. Yulee signed the letter, mailed it to local voters, and posted it on her campaign website. Yulee lost the primary to the incumbent judge. The Florida Bar filed a complaint charging her with violating Rule 4-8.2(b) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar by failing to comply with Canon 7C(1). A referee appointed by the Florida Supreme Court held a hearing, recommended a finding of guilt, and proposed a public reprimand together with an order to pay one thousand eight hundred sixty dollars in costs. The Florida Supreme Court adopted the referee's recommendations in a 2014 decision. Yulee sought review in the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
View caseGretchen Graham argues that public protests should prompt reconsideration of a prior constitutional ruling. The joint opinion notes that federal judges holding office during good behavior are unlikely to be swayed by such pressure when applying stare decisis.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
View caseGwen Gallagher, a nontenured university instructor, claims a right to continued employment. The Court distinguishes her one-year contract from the life tenure during good behavior enjoyed by Article III judges, finding no protected property interest.
In 1968 the Board of Regents of State Colleges hired David Roth as an assistant professor of political science at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh for a fixed term running from September 1, 1968, to June 30, 1969. The formal notice of appointment stated that the employment basis was the academic year. It provided that regulations governing tenure followed Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 37.31. Roth was informed before he began teaching that he had no tenure rights and would be rehired for the 1969-1970 academic year only if the University chose to retain him. Under Wisconsin law a teacher could acquire tenure as a permanent employee only after four years of continuous service. The Board of Regents' rules established February 1 as the deadline for written notification of non-retention for nontenured faculty. No reason for non-retention need be given and no review or appeal is provided in such case. In conformance with these rules the University president notified Roth before February 1, 1969, that he would not be rehired. Roth received no statement of reasons and no opportunity to challenge the decision. Roth brought this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. He alleged that the failure to provide reasons and a hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. He also alleged that the non-renewal decision was actually retaliation for statements critical of the University administration that violated his First Amendment rights. The District Court granted summary judgment for Roth on the procedural due process claim. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Board of Regents petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.
View caseGustavo Gutierrez, a public employee facing discharge, seeks a pre-termination hearing. The Court holds that due process requires some opportunity to respond, but the protections remain far less than the life tenure during good behavior granted to federal judges.
In 1979 the Cleveland Board of Education hired James Loudermill as a security guard. On his job application Loudermill stated that he had never been convicted of a felony. Eleven months later a routine check revealed that Loudermill had been convicted of grand larceny in 1968. By letter dated November 3, 1980 the Board's Business Manager informed Loudermill that he had been dismissed for dishonesty in filling out the employment application. Loudermill received no opportunity to respond to the charge or to challenge the dismissal before it took effect. Under Ohio law Loudermill was a classified civil servant who could be discharged only for cause and who could file an administrative appeal within ten days of receiving notice of dismissal. Loudermill filed an appeal with the Cleveland Civil Service Commission on November 12, 1980. A referee held a hearing on January 29, 1981 and recommended reinstatement. On July 20, 1981 the full Commission heard argument and upheld the dismissal. Richard Donnelly was hired as a bus mechanic by the Parma Board of Education in 1979. Donnelly had been fired by the same Board in 1977 for failing an eye examination but had been reinstated after appeal. On his new application Donnelly listed his prior employment with the Board but did not disclose the earlier discharge. When the omission was discovered Donnelly was again fired for dishonesty. He received no opportunity to respond to the charge before termination. Donnelly appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which affirmed the dismissal. Loudermill and Donnelly filed separate suits in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio alleging that the dismissal procedures violated their rights to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court dismissed both complaints for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseThe standard requires removal only through impeachment for misconduct. Congress may not shorten a judge's term or reduce compensation to effect removal.
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No. The clause applies only to judges of constitutional courts vested with the judicial power of the United States. Administrative adjudicators and Article I judges serve under different statutory terms.
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Congress may create such tribunals for public rights or as adjuncts to Article III courts, but it may not assign core judicial power to officials without life tenure and salary protection.
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It prevents the political branches from removing judges through ordinary legislation or salary manipulation, thereby insulating judicial decisions from short-term political pressure.
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…this statement, although it may be doubted that Members of this Court, holding their tenure as they do during constitutional "good behavior," are at all likely to be intimidated by such public protests. But the joint opinion goes on to state that when the Court "resolve[s] the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected…