Also known as: fundamental questions · ultimate questions · ultimate issue
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A criterion used to identify a religion for First Amendment purposes. The criterion requires that a belief system confront deep and imponderable matters of human existence and meaning rather than isolated or tangential concerns.
Fiona Foster sought conscientious-objector status based on her personal philosophy. An expert retained by the government reviewed her writings and testified that the philosophy addressed fundamental and ultimate questions about the purpose of human life. The court admitted the opinion even though it touched the decisive issue in the case.
Fernando Farrell was acquitted after a jury found he had not participated in an alleged scheme. Prosecutors later charged him with a related offense that again required proof he had acted from the same religious convictions. The court dismissed the second prosecution because the earlier verdict had resolved the ultimate factual question of his involvement.
Francois Fortier applied for exemption from military service. He described a belief system centered on the moral equality of all living beings and the impermissibility of taking life under any circumstance. The board examined whether those convictions addressed fundamental and ultimate questions of existence before granting the exemption.
Daniel Andrew Seeger was originally classified 1-A in 1953 by his local board. This classification changed in 1955 to 2-S student status, which continued until reclassification as 1-A in 1958. In 1957 Seeger filed a conscientious-objector claim. He declared conscientious opposition to war in any form by reason of religious belief. He left open the question of belief in a Supreme Being. He described a belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes as a religious faith in a purely ethical creed. He cited Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza. The local board denied the claim solely because it was not based upon a belief in a relation to a Supreme Being as required by § 6(j). Arlo Jakobson was originally classified 1-A in 1953 and held intermittent student classifications until 1956. In April 1958 he claimed noncombatant classification as a conscientious objector. He stated belief in a Supreme Being as Creator of Man ultimately responsible for the existence of man and as the Supreme Reality. In December 1958 he requested full 1-O classification. The Appeal Board classified him 1-A without indicating whether the decision rested on insincerity or on a finding that his belief was only a personal moral code. Forest Britt Peter was classified 1-A in 1959. He attached a statement that he felt it a violation of his moral code to take human life. He quoted Reverend John Haynes Holmes's definition of religion as the consciousness of some power manifest in nature which helps man in the ordering of his life. He noted that his convictions derived from reading and meditation in American democratic culture. He stated that one could call his belief a belief in the Supreme Being or God. Each registrant refused induction and was convicted in federal district court. Seeger and Jakobson were convicted in the Southern District of New York. Peter was convicted in the Northern District of California. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions of Seeger and Jakobson but affirmed Peter's conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the cases' importance in the administration of the Act.
View caseFumiko Fujimoto's children refused to salute the flag on the ground that their family's belief system treated all symbols of state power as violations of personal conscience. The court assessed whether those beliefs constituted a religion by determining whether they addressed fundamental and ultimate questions about the proper relationship between the individual and authority.
Following the Supreme Court's 1940 decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the West Virginia legislature amended its statutes to require all schools in the state to conduct courses of instruction in history, civics, and the Constitutions of the United States and West Virginia for the purpose of teaching, fostering, and perpetuating the ideals, principles, and spirit of Americanism. The State Board of Education was directed to prescribe the courses of study covering these subjects for public schools. Private, parochial, and denominational schools were required to prescribe similar courses. On January 9, 1942, the West Virginia State Board of Education adopted a resolution ordering that the salute to the flag become a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools, with all teachers and pupils required to participate. The resolution specified the stiff-arm salute with the right hand raised and palm turned up while repeating the pledge: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." Refusal to salute was defined as an act of insubordination to be dealt with by expulsion. Readmission was denied by statute until compliance. The expelled child was treated as unlawfully absent. Parents or guardians faced prosecution with fines not exceeding $50 and jail terms not exceeding thirty days. The appellees are citizens of the United States and West Virginia who are Jehovah's Witnesses, an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by temporal government. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which prohibits making or bowing down to any graven image or likeness. They consider the flag an image within this command, leading them to refuse to salute it on religious grounds. Children of the appellees who were pupils in the public schools were expelled for their refusal to salute the flag and take the pledge of allegiance. Their parents were prosecuted for causing delinquency. Officials threatened to send the children to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined juveniles. The appellees brought suit in the United States District Court for themselves and others similarly situated to enjoin enforcement of the laws and regulations against them. The Board of Education moved to dismiss the complaint setting forth these facts. The complaint alleged that the law and regulations denied religious freedom and freedom of speech and were invalid under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cause was submitted on the pleadings to a District Court of three judges, which restrained enforcement as to the plaintiffs and those of that class. The Board of Education brought the case to the Supreme Court by direct appeal.
View caseFelipe Figueroa sought to discontinue life-sustaining treatment for a family member. He asserted that his belief system regarded artificial prolongation of unconscious life as an affront to human dignity. The court evaluated the claim by asking whether the asserted beliefs addressed fundamental and ultimate questions concerning the meaning and termination of life.
On the night of January 11, 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan lost control of her car as she traveled down Elm Road in Jasper County, Missouri. The vehicle overturned, and Cruzan was discovered lying face down in a ditch without detectable respiratory or cardiac function. Paramedics were able to restore her breathing and heartbeat at the accident site, and she was transported to a hospital in an unconscious state. An attending neurosurgeon diagnosed her as having sustained probable cerebral contusions compounded by significant anoxia. The Missouri trial court found that permanent brain damage generally results after six minutes in an anoxic state, and it was estimated that Cruzan was deprived of oxygen from twelve to fourteen minutes. She remained in a coma for approximately three weeks and then progressed to an unconscious state in which she was able to orally ingest some nutrition. Surgeons implanted a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube in Cruzan with the consent of her then husband. Subsequent rehabilitative efforts proved unavailing. She now lies in a Missouri state hospital in what is commonly referred to as a persistent vegetative state in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function. The State of Missouri is bearing the cost of her care. After it had become apparent that Nancy Cruzan had virtually no chance of regaining her mental faculties, her parents Lester and Joyce Cruzan, who serve as coguardians, asked hospital employees to terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures. All agree that such a removal would cause her death. The employees refused to honor the request without court approval. The parents then sought and received authorization from the state trial court for termination. The trial court found that a person in Nancy's condition had a fundamental right under the State and Federal Constitutions to refuse or direct the withdrawal of death prolonging procedures. The court also found that Nancy's expressed thoughts at age twenty-five in conversation with a housemate friend suggested that given her present condition she would not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed by a divided vote. The court recognized a right to refuse treatment embodied in the common-law doctrine of informed consent but expressed skepticism about the application of that doctrine in the circumstances of this case. The court found that Cruzan's statements to her roommate regarding her desire to live or die under those conditions were unreliable for determining her intent and thus insufficient to support the coguardians' claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy's behalf. It rejected the argument that Cruzan's parents were entitled to order the termination of her medical treatment, concluding that no person can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the formalities required under Missouri's Living Will statutes or the clear and convincing inherently reliable evidence absent here. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question whether Cruzan has a right under the United States Constitution which would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under these circumstances.
View caseCourts examine whether the beliefs address fundamental and ultimate questions, whether the system is comprehensive rather than limited to a single issue, and whether the system displays formal or external signs such as clergy or rituals.
No. The test focuses on the content of the beliefs themselves. Formal signs are relevant only as one possible indicator and are not required.
A secular philosophy that addresses only isolated practical questions fails the test. A system that confronts deep questions of existence, purpose, and meaning meets the criterion even if it lacks traditional theistic elements.