Also known as: Federal Rule of Evidence 803 · Fed. R. Evid. 803 · hearsay exceptions · Rule 803
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A collection of hearsay exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence that permit admission of specified out-of-court statements even when the declarant does not testify at trial.
Global Media offered a field log created days after the events to prove wind conditions in a crop-damage suit. The court considered the totality of circumstances surrounding its creation and found it more probative than other available evidence on the point. The log was admitted under the residual exception because it fell outside Rule 803.
Fred introduced a government investigator's report concluding that Elena's pesticide had drifted onto his fields. The report contained both observations and the investigator's conclusions from an official inquiry. The court admitted the findings as a public record under the exception.
The prosecution sought to introduce a witness's prior statement to police describing the defendant's role in a fraud scheme. The witness was unavailable at trial and the defendant had never cross-examined her. The court excluded the statement under the Confrontation Clause even though it might otherwise satisfy a Rule 803 exception.
The government offered a recorded conversation in which one alleged conspirator described the defendant's participation in a drug transaction. The court found the statement was made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. It admitted the statement though not under Rule 803.
In May 1984, Clarence Greathouse, working as an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, arranged to sell a kilogram of cocaine to Angelo Lonardo. Lonardo agreed that he would find individuals to distribute the drug. When the sale became imminent, Lonardo stated in a tape-recorded telephone conversation that he had a "gentleman friend" who had some questions to ask about the cocaine. In a subsequent telephone call, Greathouse spoke to the "friend" about the quality of the drug and the price. Greathouse then spoke again with Lonardo, and the two arranged the details of the purchase. They agreed that the sale would take place in a designated hotel parking lot, and Lonardo would transfer the drug from Greathouse's car to the "friend," who would be waiting in the parking lot in his own car. Greathouse proceeded with the transaction as planned. FBI agents arrested Lonardo and petitioner immediately after Lonardo placed a kilogram of cocaine into petitioner's car in the hotel parking lot. In petitioner's car, the agents found over $20,000 in cash. Petitioner was charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Petitioner was also charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The Government introduced, over petitioner's objection, Angelo Lonardo's telephone statements regarding the participation of the "friend" in the transaction. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that, considering the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's statements over the telephone, the Government had established by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy involving Lonardo and petitioner existed. The court also found that Lonardo's statements over the telephone had been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the trial court held that Lonardo's out-of-court statements satisfied Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and were not hearsay. Petitioner was convicted on both counts and sentenced to 15 years. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the admission of the recorded statements and related evidentiary and constitutional questions.
View caseThe prosecution introduced certificates from laboratory analysts stating that substances seized from the defendant tested positive for cocaine. The analysts did not appear at trial. The court held the certificates violated the confrontation right because they were testimonial even if potentially covered by a Rule 803 exception.
In 2001 Boston police officers received a tip that a Kmart employee was engaging in suspicious activity involving repeated short trips in a blue sedan. Officers set up surveillance in the parking lot, observed the described sequence of events, detained the employee upon his return, and discovered four clear plastic bags containing a substance resembling cocaine. The officers then arrested the two men in the car, one of whom was petitioner Luis Melendez-Diaz. The officers placed all three suspects in a police cruiser. During the short drive to the police station the officers observed their passengers fidgeting and making furtive movements in the back of the car. After depositing the men at the station they searched the police cruiser and found a plastic bag containing nineteen smaller bags hidden in the partition between the front and back seats. The officers submitted the seized substances to the State Laboratory Institute of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, which was required by law to conduct chemical analysis upon police request. Analysts at the laboratory performed the tests on November 28, 2001, and prepared three certificates of analysis that reported the weight of the bags and stated that the substance was found to contain cocaine. Each certificate was sworn before a notary public by the analysts, as required under Massachusetts law, and reprinted the statutory provision making the certificates prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and net weight of the narcotic analyzed. Melendez-Diaz was charged with distributing cocaine and trafficking in cocaine in an amount between 14 and 28 grams. At trial the prosecution introduced the bags seized from the codefendant and from the cruiser along with the three certificates. Petitioner objected to admission of the certificates, asserting that Crawford v. Washington required the analysts to testify in person. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the certificates pursuant to the state statute. The jury found Melendez-Diaz guilty. He appealed, contending that admission of the certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed the convictions, relying on a prior decision of the Supreme Judicial Court that had held forensic analysts are not subject to confrontation. The Supreme Judicial Court denied review, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA shooting victim told responding officers that the defendant had just shot him and was still nearby. The officers questioned the victim to determine the extent of the threat. The court admitted the statements because the primary purpose was to address an ongoing emergency rather than to create evidence for trial under a Rule 803 exception.
Roughly 25 minutes after Anthony Covington had been shot, Detroit police responded to a 911 call reporting that a gunshot victim had appeared at a neighborhood gas station. They quickly arrived at the scene, and in less than 10 minutes five different Detroit police officers questioned Covington about the shooting. Each asked him a similar battery of questions: what happened and when, who shot the victim, and where did the shooting take place. After Covington would answer, they would ask followup questions, such as how tall is the shooter, how much does he weigh, what is the exact address or physical description of the house where the shooting took place, and what chain of events led to the shooting. The battery relented when the paramedics arrived and began tending to Covington's wounds. Covington knew the threatening situation had ended six blocks away and 25 minutes earlier when he fled from Bryant's back porch. Bryant had not confronted him face to face before he was mortally wounded, instead shooting him through a door. Covington knew the shooting was the work of a drug dealer, not a spree killer who might randomly threaten others. Covington interrupted their interrogation to ask when is EMS coming. Sergeant Wenturine admitted that he interrogated Covington because he had a man here that he believed was dying so he was gonna find out who did this, period. The fifth officer to arrive at the scene did not need to run straight to Covington and ask a battery of questions to determine the need for emergency assistance. The value of asking the same battery of questions a fifth time was to ensure that Covington told a consistent story and to see if any new details helpful to the investigation and eventual prosecution would emerge. Bryant was convicted after the first jury could not reach a verdict. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the conviction, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA court may admit the statement if it is supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness after considering the totality of circumstances and if it is more probative on the point than any other evidence the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.
Yes. Public records and reports admissible under Rule 803(8) include factual findings and conclusions resulting from investigations made pursuant to legal authority, subject to trustworthiness limits.
The Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial hearsay against a criminal defendant unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, even if the statement otherwise satisfies a Rule 803 exception.
…that exceptions were invoked to admit testimonial statements against the accused in a criminal case. Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial — for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy. We do not infer from these that the Framers…