FRE 801(a)

In May 1984, Clarence Greathouse, working as an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, arranged to sell a kilogram of cocaine to Angelo Lonardo. Lonardo agreed that he would find individuals to distribute the drug. When the sale became imminent, Lonardo stated in a tape-recorded telephone conversation that he had a "gentleman friend" who had some questions to ask about the cocaine. In a subsequent telephone call, Greathouse spoke to the "friend" about the quality of the drug and the price. Greathouse then spoke again with Lonardo, and the two arranged the details of the purchase. They agreed that the sale would take place in a designated hotel parking lot, and Lonardo would transfer the drug from Greathouse's car to the "friend," who would be waiting in the parking lot in his own car. Greathouse proceeded with the transaction as planned. FBI agents arrested Lonardo and petitioner immediately after Lonardo placed a kilogram of cocaine into petitioner's car in the hotel parking lot. In petitioner's car, the agents found over $20,000 in cash. Petitioner was charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Petitioner was also charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The Government introduced, over petitioner's objection, Angelo Lonardo's telephone statements regarding the participation of the "friend" in the transaction. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that, considering the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's statements over the telephone, the Government had established by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy involving Lonardo and petitioner existed. The court also found that Lonardo's statements over the telephone had been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the trial court held that Lonardo's out-of-court statements satisfied Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and were not hearsay. Petitioner was convicted on both counts and sentenced to 15 years. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the admission of the recorded statements and related evidentiary and constitutional questions.

In June 1966, petitioner George William Bruton and codefendant Evans were jointly tried before a jury in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. They faced a federal charge of armed postal robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2114. A postal inspector testified that during two interrogations at the St. Louis city jail on April 11 and May 4, 1966, Evans orally confessed that he and Bruton had committed the robbery and that Evans had an accomplice whom he would not name. The interrogations followed an April 8 confession Evans gave to local police officers without warnings while held on state charges. Both defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court set aside Evans’ conviction on the ground that his oral confessions should not have been received in evidence against him. However, the court affirmed Bruton’s conviction because the trial judge had instructed the jury that Evans’ confession was competent evidence only against Evans and inadmissible hearsay against Bruton. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The trial had begun one week after Miranda v. Arizona, and the Court of Appeals applied that decision to hold the confessions tainted. On retrial Evans was acquitted. The Solicitor General later submitted a memorandum stating that in light of the record the judgment as to Bruton should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

On August 5, 1999, Michael Crawford stabbed Kenneth Lee in the torso during a confrontation at Lee's apartment. Crawford and his wife Sylvia had gone there after Sylvia alleged that Lee had attempted to rape her several weeks earlier. Lee was taken to the hospital and later died from his wounds. Police arrested both Crawford and Sylvia that night. Detectives gave Miranda warnings and interrogated Sylvia twice at the station house. In her recorded statement Sylvia initially denied involvement but eventually admitted she had led Crawford to Lee's apartment and had seen the stabbing. Crawford also gave police a statement describing the events and his belief that Lee may have reached for something before the stabbing. At trial Crawford asserted self-defense, but Sylvia did not testify because of Washington's marital privilege. The State offered Sylvia's tape-recorded statement as evidence that the stabbing was not in self-defense and invoked the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. The trial court admitted the statement after finding it bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The jury convicted Crawford of assault. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed after applying a nine-factor test and concluding the statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. It determined that Sylvia's statement interlocked with Crawford's statement and therefore bore adequate guarantees of trustworthiness, noting that both accounts were ambiguous on whether Lee had possessed a weapon. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Marvin Bockting resided in Las Vegas, Nevada, with his wife Laura Bockting, their three-year-old daughter Honesty, and Laura’s six-year-old daughter Autumn from a prior relationship. One night while Bockting was at work, Autumn awoke from a dream crying and, after reassurance from her mother, described repeated sexual assaults by Bockting, noting that he had warned her not to tell. Laura confronted Bockting the next day, and he left the home while denying the allegations. Two days later, Laura contacted a rape crisis hotline and took Autumn to a hospital for examination, where Detective Charles Zinovitch of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department ordered a rape exam that produced physical evidence of assaults. Detective Zinovitch later interviewed Autumn in her mother’s presence, during which she gave a detailed account of the assaults and demonstrated the acts using anatomically correct dolls. Bockting was arrested and a state grand jury indicted him on four counts of sexual assault on a minor under fourteen years of age. At the preliminary hearing, Autumn testified that she knew the difference between truth and lies but became distressed and could not recall how Bockting had touched her or what she had told others. The trial court nonetheless bound Bockting over for trial based on the accounts from Laura Bockting and Detective Zinovitch. At trial, Autumn proved too distressed to be sworn in as a witness, prompting the State to seek admission of her out-of-court statements through the testimony of her mother and the detective pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. § 51.385. The trial court admitted the statements over defense objection. The jury convicted Bockting of three counts of sexual assault on a minor under the age of fourteen, resulting in two consecutive life sentences and one concurrent life sentence. Bockting appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, which issued its final decision in 1993 affirming the conviction. The state court applied the then-controlling precedent of Ohio v. Roberts to uphold the admission of Autumn’s statements based on particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, including the spontaneity of her initial disclosure and her use of anatomically correct dolls. Bockting subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, which denied relief. While his appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Crawford v. Washington. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Crawford applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Ninth Circuit’s decision created a conflict with every other court of appeals and state supreme court that had considered the retroactivity of Crawford. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.