Also known as: Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 · Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 · Rule 8 · FRCP Rule 8
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A federal procedural rule requiring that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The rule demands enough factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face rather than merely possible or consistent with liability.
PixelPost LLC sued four media corporations alleging an unlawful conspiracy to deny it premium advertising inventory. The complaint stated only that PixelPost received lower ad rates than legacy outlets and that all defendants used the same ad network. The court disregarded the bare label of conspiracy and found the remaining allegations equally consistent with independent business decisions, so the claim failed to cross the plausibility threshold.
PixelSpark LLC sued ConnectNet Corp. for an antitrust conspiracy to block its app from app stores. The complaint cited vague industry-wide coordination and several roughly simultaneous policy changes across platforms. The court treated the parallel conduct as consistent with lawful independent decisions and held that the allegations remained only conceivable rather than plausible.
Sean sued Global Cargo alleging misclassification as an independent contractor. The complaint stated only that he worked full time under company control on exclusive routes. The court found the single allegation conclusory because it supplied none of the specific facts about schedules, supervision, or equipment ownership needed to support a plausible inference of employee status.
Carl sued Premier Athletic for breach of a multi-year endorsement contract after termination without cause. The complaint identified the parties, the contract, and the termination but offered no specific provisions or breach details. The court held that the general assertions supplied the short and plain statement required and therefore denied the motion to dismiss.
The petitioners, Negro members of the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, brought this class suit in a Federal District Court in Texas on behalf of themselves and other Negro employees similarly situated. They sued the Brotherhood, its Local Union No. 28, and officers of both the Brotherhood and Local Union No. 28. The petitioners worked for the Texas and New Orleans Railroad at its Houston Freight House, where Local 28 acted as the designated bargaining agent for their unit under the Railway Labor Act. A contract between the Union and the Railroad protected employees in the unit from discharge and loss of seniority. In May 1954 the Railroad claimed to abolish 45 jobs held by the petitioners or other Negroes, leading to their discharge or demotion. The jobs were actually filled by white employees, although a few Negroes were rehired without their prior seniority. The Union, following a plan, ignored the petitioners' repeated requests for protection and declined to offer them the same safeguards provided to white employees. The complaint also asserted that the Union had failed overall to represent Negro employees equally and in good faith, seeking declaratory judgment, injunction, and damages for the alleged violation of fair representation rights under the Railway Labor Act. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the National Railroad Adjustment Board possessed exclusive jurisdiction, that the Railroad was an indispensable party not joined as a defendant, and that the complaint did not state a claim for relief. The District Court dismissed the action on the basis of the Adjustment Board's exclusive jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed that dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the case presented an important question about employee rights under the Railway Labor Act.
View caseA plaintiff offered a statement into evidence during trial but failed to mark it for identification. The court declined to consider whether the document could support any claim because the contents were unknown and the record contained no factual allegations that could be evaluated under the short and plain statement requirement.
This case arose out of a grade crossing accident which occurred in Massachusetts on the night of December 25, 1940. Diversity of citizenship brought the suit to the federal District Court in New York. Respondent Hoffman brought several causes of action individually and as administrator of his wife's estate, alleging negligence under a Massachusetts statute and at common law. The trial court submitted three issues to the jury on negligence: failure to ring a bell, to blow a whistle, and to have a light burning in the front of the train. The jury returned a verdict in favor of respondent individually for some $25,000 and in favor of respondent as administrator for $9,000. The District Court entered judgment on the verdict, which the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. On December 27, 1940, the engineer of the train, who died before the trial, made a statement at a freight office of petitioners where he was interviewed by an assistant superintendent of the road and by a representative of the Massachusetts Public Utilities Commission. Petitioners offered this statement in evidence under the Act of June 20, 1936, claiming it was made in the regular course of business. Respondent’s objection to its introduction was sustained by the trial court. One of respondent’s witnesses testified on cross-examination that he had given a signed statement to one of respondent’s lawyers. Counsel for petitioners asked to see it, but the court ruled that if he inspected the document, respondent could offer the statement in evidence. Counsel declined to inspect the statement and took an exception. The court charged the jury that petitioners had the burden of proving contributory negligence without distinguishing between the common law and statutory causes of action. Petitioners excepted to the charge and requested an instruction that the burden was on respondent, which was refused. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the three points presented by the petition for a writ of certiorari.
View caseA defendant in a diversity action moved to dismiss a complaint that contained only general assertions about contract existence and termination. The court applied the federal short and plain statement standard to assess sufficiency rather than any state heightened pleading requirement and denied the motion on that basis.
On February 6, 1963, petitioner, a citizen of Ohio, filed her complaint in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming damages in excess of $10,000 for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident in South Carolina, allegedly caused by the negligence of one Louise Plumer Osgood, a Massachusetts citizen deceased at the time of the filing of the complaint. Respondent, Mrs. Osgood's executor and also a Massachusetts citizen, was named as defendant. On February 8, service was made by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint with respondent's wife at his residence, concededly in compliance with Rule 4 (d) (1). Respondent filed his answer on February 26, alleging, inter alia, that the action could not be maintained because it had been brought contrary to and in violation of the provisions of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 197, Section 9. On October 17, 1963, the District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure posed by the decision below.
View caseA complaint must include enough factual matter, taken as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Courts disregard conclusory allegations and then decide whether the remaining facts allow a reasonable inference of liability rather than conduct that is merely consistent with liability.
Supporting sources
No. Although a complaint must still provide a short and plain statement, that statement must now contain sufficient factual content to make the claim plausible rather than merely possible. Conclusory labels and facts consistent with both lawful and unlawful conduct are insufficient.
Supporting sources
A court grants the motion when the complaint, after disregarding legal conclusions, fails to allege facts that nudge the claim across the line from conceivable to plausible. Parallel conduct or vague references to coordination without concrete details of an agreement typically produce dismissal.
Supporting sources