Also known as: 4th Amendment standing · 4th Amend. standing · standing under the Fourth Amendment
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
A threshold requirement in Fourth Amendment litigation that limits a defendant's ability to seek suppression of evidence to situations in which the government search or seizure violated that defendant's own reasonable expectation of privacy. The existence of such an expectation is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances, with relevant factors including ownership, control, and the nature and location of the property searched. Mere ownership of contraband placed inside another person's container does not by itself establish the required privacy interest.
Francisco Frost placed illegal pills inside a locked tin and gave the tin to a hotel bellhop for storage in the bellhop's employee locker. Hotel security opened the locker at police request and discovered the pills. Frost moved to suppress the evidence. Because Frost exercised no control over the locker and the hotel retained routine access, he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the locker itself.
Fatima Flores owned a home in which several telephone conversations occurred among her guests. Federal agents recorded those conversations without a warrant. Flores sought to suppress the recordings. Her ownership of the premises supplied the privacy interest needed to challenge the interception even though she did not participate in every conversation.
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Fumiko Fujimoto's bank records were obtained through an unlawful search of a third party's briefcase. Prosecutors later used the records against Fujimoto at trial. Fujimoto moved to suppress the evidence. Because the search did not invade any privacy interest belonging to Fujimoto, she lacked standing to object even though the evidence was used against her.
Faith Fitzgerald rode as a passenger in a car driven by a friend. Officers searched the car's glove compartment without a warrant and found incriminating items. Fitzgerald moved to suppress the evidence. Because Fitzgerald had no ownership or control over the glove compartment, she possessed no reasonable expectation of privacy in that space and therefore lacked standing to challenge the search.
No. Standing requires a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched, not merely an ownership interest in the items seized. Courts evaluate the totality of the circumstances, including control over the container and the nature of the location.
Yes. All occupants of a vehicle are seized when police stop the car. A passenger therefore possesses standing to contest the constitutionality of the stop itself and to seek suppression of evidence obtained as a result.
No. Fourth Amendment rights are personal. A defendant may seek suppression only when the search or seizure infringed that defendant's own reasonable expectation of privacy, not when the violation affected solely a third party.
Yes. An overnight guest ordinarily possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in the host's residence and therefore has standing to object to a warrantless search of the premises.
…dissatisfaction with reliance on "legitimate presence" to resolve Fourth Amendment questions. Trager & Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 41 Brooklyn L. Rev. 421, 448 (1975); White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 333, 344-345 (1970). And, as we earlier noted, supra , at 142 n. 10,…