forgery

The Los Angeles Municipal Code defined a "convicted person" to include any individual convicted of an offense punishable as a felony in California after January 1, 1921, or equivalent out-of-state offenses. The code made it unlawful for such a person to remain in Los Angeles for more than five days without registering with the Chief of Police. It also made it unlawful to enter the city five or more times in a thirty-day period without registering. Failure to register constituted a continuing offense with each day counting separately. Virginia Lambert had lived in Los Angeles for more than seven years at the time of her arrest. During that time she had been convicted in Los Angeles of forgery, a felony under California law. She had not registered as required by the municipal code when she was arrested on suspicion of another offense and charged with violating the registration law. At her trial Lambert offered proof that she lacked actual knowledge of the duty to register, but the court refused to consider this defense. The jury convicted her, and the court fined her two hundred fifty dollars while placing her on three years' probation. She moved for arrest of judgment and a new trial, but the trial court denied the motions. The Appellate Department of the Superior Court affirmed the judgment on appeal. The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) to review the case.

Late in 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with murdering a couple and wounding their two children. He was arraigned in the District Court for Canadian County, Oklahoma, in February 1980. His behavior at arraignment and in other prearraignment incidents at the jail was so bizarre that the trial judge, sua sponte, ordered him to be examined by a psychiatrist for the purpose of advising with the Court as to his impressions of whether the Defendant may need an extended period of mental observation. The examining psychiatrist reported that at times Ake appeared to be frankly delusional and claimed to be the sword of vengeance of the Lord. He diagnosed Ake as a probable paranoid schizophrenic and recommended a prolonged psychiatric evaluation to determine whether Ake was competent to stand trial. In March 1980, Ake was committed to a state hospital to be examined with respect to his present sanity. On April 10, the chief forensic psychiatrist informed the court that Ake was not competent to stand trial. The court held a competency hearing at which a psychiatrist testified that Ake was a psychotic with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia chronic with exacerbation, that he was dangerous, and that he required a maximum security facility. The court found Ake to be a mentally ill person in need of care and treatment and incompetent to stand trial, and ordered him committed to the state mental hospital. Six weeks later, the chief forensic psychiatrist informed the court that Ake had become competent to stand trial while receiving 200 milligrams of Thorazine three times daily. At a pretrial conference in June, Ake's attorney informed the court that his client would raise an insanity defense. Counsel requested that a psychiatrist examine Ake with respect to his mental condition at the time of the offense or that the court provide funds for such an examination. The trial judge denied the motion. Ake was tried for two counts of murder in the first degree and two counts of shooting with intent to kill. At the guilt phase, defense counsel called the psychiatrists who had examined Ake at the state hospital, but none testified about his mental state at the time of the offense. The jury rejected the insanity defense and returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. At the sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor relied on the testimony of the state psychiatrists that Ake was dangerous to society. Ake had no expert witness to rebut this testimony or to introduce evidence in mitigation. The jury sentenced Ake to death on each of the two murder counts and to 500 years' imprisonment on each of the two counts of shooting with intent to kill. On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Paul Lewis Hayes was indicted by a Fayette County, Ky., grand jury on a charge of uttering a forged instrument in the amount of $88.30. This offense was then punishable by a term of 2 to 10 years in prison. After arraignment, Hayes, his retained counsel, and the Commonwealth’s Attorney met in the presence of the Clerk of the Court to discuss a possible plea agreement. During these conferences the prosecutor offered to recommend a sentence of five years in prison if Hayes would plead guilty to the indictment. He also said that if Hayes did not plead guilty, he would return to the grand jury to seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act. This would subject Hayes to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment by reason of his two prior felony convictions. Hayes chose not to plead guilty. The prosecutor obtained an indictment charging him under the Habitual Criminal Act. The recidivist charge was fully justified by the evidence. The prosecutor possessed this evidence at the time of the original indictment. Hayes’ refusal to plead guilty led to the habitual criminal indictment. A jury found Hayes guilty on the principal charge. In a separate proceeding the jury found that he had twice before been convicted of felonies. He was sentenced to a life term in the penitentiary. The Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected Hayes’ constitutional objections to the enhanced sentence in an unpublished opinion. On Hayes’ petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied the writ. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider a constitutional question of importance in the administration of criminal justice.