355 U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957)
The Los Angeles Municipal Code defined a "convicted person" to include any individual convicted of an offense punishable as a felony in California after January 1, 1921, or equivalent out-of-state offenses.1 The code made it unlawful for such a person to remain in Los Angeles for more than five days without registering with the Chief of Police.2 It also made it unlawful to enter the city five or more times in a thirty-day period without registering.3 Failure to register constituted a continuing offense with each day counting separately.4
Virginia Lambert had lived in Los Angeles for more than seven years at the time of her arrest.5 During that time she had been convicted in Los Angeles of forgery, a felony under California law.6 She had not registered as required by the municipal code when she was arrested on suspicion of another offense and charged with violating the registration law.7
At her trial Lambert offered proof that she lacked actual knowledge of the duty to register, but the court refused to consider this defense.8 The jury convicted her, and the court fined her two hundred fifty dollars while placing her on three years' probation.9 She moved for arrest of judgment and a new trial, but the trial court denied the motions.10
The Appellate Department of the Superior Court affirmed the judgment on appeal.11 The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) to review the case.12
Whether the registration provisions of the Los Angeles Municipal Code violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to a person who has no actual knowledge of the duty to register, and where no showing is made of the probability of such knowledge?13
Due process requires actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of such knowledge before a conviction may stand for wholly passive conduct consisting of mere failure to register.14
Yes. The ordinance defines a convicted person to include anyone with a felony conviction such as Lambert's forgery.15 It makes it unlawful to remain in the city more than five days without registering, with each day of failure constituting a separate offense.16 Lambert had lived in Los Angeles over seven years after her local felony conviction.17 She offered proof of no actual knowledge, which the trial court refused to consider.18 The record contains no showing of the probability of such knowledge.19 The conduct at issue is wholly passive.20 It consists only of presence in the city without any affirmative act or failure under circumstances that would alert the person to the duty.21
Application of criminal penalties in these circumstances therefore violates the notice requirement of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.22
The registration provisions of the Los Angeles Municipal Code violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to a person who has no actual knowledge of the duty to register, and where no showing is made of the probability of such knowledge.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Harlan And Whittaker
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Harlan and Whittaker, dissented on the ground that the majority's distinction between affirmative acts and mere omissions has no place in constitutional analysis.24 He observed that numerous regulatory statutes impose liability without any requirement of awareness or consciousness of wrongdoing, and he warned that the logic of the decision would place a vast body of legislation in jeopardy.25 Frankfurter concluded that the ordinance represented a valid exercise of the police power and that the majority opinion amounted to an isolated deviation from established precedent.26