fixed-point or fixed-date residency requirements

In August 1972 appellee Diaz filed a class action complaint. He is a Cuban refugee over age 65 who had been lawfully admitted to the United States less than five years earlier. The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. It challenged the denial of his application for enrollment in the Medicare Part B supplemental medical insurance program. The complaint alleged that the denial rested on his failure to satisfy the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2) as a noncitizen. It sought relief on behalf of a class of persons denied enrollment for the same reasons. On September 28, 1972, the District Court granted leave to add appellees Clara and Espinosa as plaintiffs and to file an amended complaint. Clara is another Cuban refugee in similar circumstances who remained in the country at the discretion of the Attorney General. Espinosa is an alien admitted for permanent residence since 1971 who had not applied because he could not meet the five-year residence requirement. The amended complaint sought relief on behalf of a class represented by Diaz and Clara and a subclass represented by Espinosa. On October 24, 1972, the Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that none of the plaintiffs had exhausted administrative remedies under the Social Security Act. Two days later Espinosa filed his application for enrollment. Although none of the appellees completely exhausted available administrative review, the Secretary acknowledged that the applications of Diaz and Clara raised no disputed issues of fact and treated the interlocutory denials as final, satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Secretary also stipulated that Espinosa’s application could not be allowed under the statute. The District Court overruled the motion to dismiss and, on cross-motions for summary judgment, held that the five-year residence requirement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and could not be severed from the permanent residence requirement, enjoining the Secretary from refusing to enroll members of the represented classes. The Secretary appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.

California participates in the federal AFDC program under the Social Security Act. In 1992 California enacted section 11450.03 of its Welfare and Institutions Code. That statute limited the maximum AFDC benefits payable to any family that had resided in California for less than twelve months to the amount the family would have received in its state of prior residence. In one year the AFDC program served an average of 2,645,814 persons per month at an annual state cost of $2.9 billion. The full monthly grant for a family of two was $456, compared with $275 in Arizona. Three California residents who had recently moved from Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Colorado filed suit in the Eastern District of California. They alleged that their grants would be reduced from $641 or $504 to $190, $341, or $280 for the first year. The district court issued a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Anderson v. Green because the Secretary of Health and Human Services had not yet determined whether the statute complied with federal requirements. After the Secretary issued a waiver the case was dismissed. In 1996 Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. That statute replaced AFDC with TANF and expressly authorized states to apply the benefit rules of a family’s prior state for the first twelve months of residence. California then announced that enforcement of section 11450.03 would begin April 1, 1997. On that date two new plaintiffs, one who had moved from Oklahoma and one from the District of Columbia, filed the present action in the Eastern District of California. They acted on behalf of a certified class of all present and future TANF applicants who would be denied full California benefits because they had not resided in the state for twelve consecutive months. The district court again issued a temporary restraining order and, after hearing evidence, a preliminary injunction. The evidence showed that California’s benefits ranked sixth highest in absolute terms but eighteenth when housing costs were considered. New residents from forty-three states would face higher living costs. The statute would save the state approximately $10.9 million annually. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction without finally deciding the merits. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The All County Letter implementing the statute provided that even lifelong California residents who left the state for part of a year would have their benefits calculated under the law of the other state for that period. The lower benefit level applied regardless of whether the family had received welfare in the prior state or the motive for moving. Families arriving from another country were exempt. The district court noted that other programs such as homeless assistance and an extra food-stamp allowance partially offset the disparity. The state did not dispute that the statute created significant differences between newcomers and longer-term residents.

Carmen Richardson, a lawfully admitted resident alien who emigrated from Mexico in 1956, was 64 years old when she instituted suit in July 1969 after becoming permanently and totally disabled. She had resided continuously in Arizona but was denied assistance to the permanently and totally disabled under Arizona Revised Statutes section 46-233 solely due to the requirement that aliens reside in the United States for fifteen years. Similar provisions conditioned old-age assistance and aid to the needy blind on citizenship or the same durational residency. Richardson brought a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the Commissioner of the Department of Public Welfare seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as back payments. The three-judge court upheld Mrs. Richardson's motion for summary judgment on equal protection grounds. The Commissioner appealed. Probable jurisdiction was noted. In the consolidated Pennsylvania case, Elsie Mary Jane Leger, who arrived from Scotland in 1965 and later entered a common-law marriage with a United States citizen, and Beryl Jervis, who arrived from Panama in 1968, both lawfully admitted resident aliens and taxpaying residents, were denied general assistance under Pennsylvania Public Welfare Code section 432(2) because they were not citizens. Both had become ill and unable to work, rendering them ineligible for federal programs, and Leger received a temporary restraining order allowing her to obtain benefits. The Pennsylvania plaintiffs filed class actions in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against state welfare officials. After a stipulation that denial caused undue hardship and encouraged departure from the state, the three-judge court enjoined enforcement of the citizenship restriction. The defendants appealed, with probable jurisdiction noted, and the cases reached the Supreme Court for review. The Arizona program participated in federal categorical assistance under the Social Security Act, while the Pennsylvania general assistance was state-funded only.

The city of Mobile was incorporated in 1814. In 1866 its charter was superseded by a new one that established a three-member Board of Commissioners elected at large. One commissioner was elected to an executive position, and the other two were elected to positions with legislative and quasi-judicial responsibilities. In 1911 the Alabama Legislature authorized every large municipality to adopt a commission form of government. Mobile established its City Commission in the same year and has maintained that basic system ever since. The three commissioners jointly exercise all legislative, executive, and administrative power. In 1931 the Alabama Legislature enacted a statute authorizing voters to adopt a three-member commission form with all members elected at large for concurrent four-year terms in a single election where the top three vote-getters win. Mobile voters approved this system, which has remained in place since. Candidates run citywide for numbered posts and must win by majority vote. After election the commissioners designate one as mayor for a largely ceremonial role. Mobile's population is approximately 190,000, of whom approximately 35% are Negro. No Negro has ever been elected to the City Commission. Negro citizens of Mobile brought a class action in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Alabama against the city and its three incumbent commissioners. The complaint alleged that the at-large system unfairly diluted Negro voting strength in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment. Following a bench trial the District Court found that the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs had been violated. It entered judgment for them and ordered that the commission be replaced by a mayor-council government with members elected from single-member districts. The District Court found that Mobile has a long history of public and private discrimination against Negroes, that Negroes register and vote in lower numbers than whites, and that Negroes and whites tend to vote as blocs. It also found that the at-large system has the effect of diluting Negro voting strength, yet found that the commission has been responsive to the needs of the Negro community and that there are no official obstacles preventing Negroes from registering, voting, or becoming candidates. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, agreeing that the at-large elections violated the Fourteenth Amendment. It did not reach the Fifteenth Amendment issue. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction. The case was originally argued in the 1978 Term and reargued in the present Term.