First Amendment right of access

Globe Newspaper Company, publisher of The Boston Globe, attempted to cover a criminal trial in the Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, Massachusetts, after reporting on November 8, 1979, that two girls ages nine and ten had been raped in a Dedham courthouse restroom. A suspect was arrested and arraigned, and Globe sent a reporter to the probable cause hearing, which was closed to the press and public under Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 278, § 16A. The underlying trial involved a defendant charged with forcible rape and forced unnatural rape of three girls who were minors at the time of trial—two aged sixteen and one aged seventeen. In April 1979, during preliminary motion hearings, the trial judge ordered the courtroom closed by placing a sign marked "closed" on the door and directing personnel to turn away entrants. Globe moved to intervene for the limited purpose of asserting access rights, to revoke the closure order, and to hold hearings on future orders, but the trial court denied the motions on its own initiative and excluded the press and general public during the entire trial. The defendant objected to the exclusion, and the prosecution noted for the record that the order was issued on the court's motion rather than the Commonwealth's request. Globe immediately sought injunctive relief from a justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which conducted a hearing the next day; the Commonwealth, on behalf of the victims, waived any rights it might have to exclude the press, yet relief was denied. The rape trial proceeded to acquittal of the defendant. Globe appealed to the full Supreme Judicial Court, which dismissed the appeal as moot due to trial completion but reached the merits, construing section 16A to require closure only during minor victims' testimony while upholding the statute. Globe appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. On remand, the Supreme Judicial Court adhered to its construction of the statute, found an exception to the tradition of open trials in sexual assault cases involving minors, and upheld the mandatory closure rule as serving genuine state interests that would be defeated by case-by-case determinations. Globe again sought review, and the U.S. Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs were four California prison inmates and three professional journalists who sued the Director of the California Department of Corrections and subordinate officers. They challenged the constitutionality under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of section 415.071 of the California Department of Corrections Manual. That section provides that press and other media interviews with specific individual inmates will not be permitted. The regulation was promulgated under authority from section 5058 of the California Penal Code and applies uniformly throughout the state's penal system. Pell, Segal, and Jacobs requested permission to interview specific inmates Spain, Bly, and Guile. The editors of a periodical requested permission to visit inmate Hillery to discuss publishing his writings and to interview him concerning prison conditions. All these requests were denied pursuant to the regulation. The plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. A three-judge District Court in the Northern District of California was convened. The court granted summary judgment to the inmate plaintiffs, holding that the regulation infringed their constitutional rights. It granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the media plaintiffs' claims. The defendants appealed the judgment regarding the inmates, and the media plaintiffs appealed the rejection of their claims. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of both appeals and consolidated the cases for argument. The regulation was imposed in 1971 in response to a violent episode at San Quentin State Penitentiary. Officials viewed the episode as the climax of mounting disciplinary problems caused in part by the prior liberal policy on press interviews. Under current corrections policy, both the press and the general public are accorded full opportunities to observe prison conditions. Newsmen are permitted to visit both maximum and minimum security sections, stop and speak to any inmates they encounter, and interview inmates selected at random by corrections officials. However, the regulation prohibits face-to-face interviews with individual inmates specifically designated by the press.

On December 23, 1981, the State of California filed a complaint in the Riverside County Municipal Court charging Robert Diaz with 12 counts of murder and seeking the death penalty. The complaint alleged that Diaz, a nurse, murdered 12 patients by administering massive doses of the heart drug lidocaine. The preliminary hearing on the complaint commenced on July 6, 1982. Diaz moved to exclude the public from the proceedings under Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 868 (West 1985). The Magistrate granted the unopposed motion, finding that closure was necessary because the case had attracted national publicity and "only one side may get reported in the media." The preliminary hearing continued for 41 days. Most of the testimony and the evidence presented by the State was medical and scientific; the remainder consisted of testimony by personnel who worked with Diaz on the shifts when the 12 patients died. Diaz did not introduce any evidence, but his counsel subjected most of the witnesses to vigorous cross-examination. Diaz was held to answer on all charges. At the conclusion of the hearing, petitioner Press-Enterprise Company asked that the transcript of the proceedings be released. The Magistrate refused and sealed the record. On January 21, 1983, the State moved in Superior Court to have the transcript of the preliminary hearing released to the public; petitioner later joined in support of the motion. Diaz opposed the motion, contending that release of the transcript would result in prejudicial pretrial publicity. The Superior Court found that the information in the transcript was "as factual as it could be," and that the facts were neither "inflammatory" nor "exciting." It concluded that there was nonetheless "a reasonable likelihood that release of all or any part of the transcripts might prejudice defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial." Petitioner then filed a peremptory writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal. That court originally denied the writ but, after being so ordered by the California Supreme Court, set the matter for a hearing. Meanwhile, Diaz waived his right to a jury trial and the Superior Court released the transcript. After holding that the controversy was not moot, the Court of Appeal denied the writ of mandate. The California Supreme Court thereafter denied petitioner's peremptory writ of mandate. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

On the evening of October 18, 1975, local police found the six members of the Henry Kellie family murdered in their home in Sutherland, Nebraska, a town of about 850 people. Police released the description of a suspect, Erwin Charles Simants, to the reporters who had hastened to the scene of the crime. Simants was arrested and arraigned in Lincoln County Court the following morning. Three days after the crime, the County Attorney and Simants' attorney joined in asking the County Court to enter a restrictive order relating to matters that may or may not be publicly reported. This request responded to the mass coverage by news media and the reasonable likelihood of prejudicial news that would make difficult the impaneling of an impartial jury. The County Court heard oral argument but took no evidence. On October 22 the County Court granted the motion and entered an order. The order prohibited everyone in attendance from releasing for public dissemination any testimony given or evidence adduced. It also required members of the press to observe the Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines. Simants' preliminary hearing was held the same day, open to the public but subject to the order. The County Court bound the defendant over for trial to the State District Court on charges that included commission of the murders in the course of a sexual assault. Petitioners, several press and broadcast associations, publishers, and individual reporters, moved on October 23 for leave to intervene in the District Court. They asked that the restrictive order be vacated. The District Court conducted a hearing at which the County Judge testified and newspaper articles about the case were admitted in evidence. On October 27 the District Court granted the motion to intervene and entered its own restrictive order. The order applied only until the jury was impaneled. It specifically prohibited reporting of the existence or contents of a confession Simants had made to law enforcement officers, statements Simants had made to other persons, the contents of a note he had written the night of the crime, aspects of the medical testimony at the preliminary hearing concerning the sexual assault, and the identity of the victims of the alleged sexual assault. Four days later petitioners asked the District Court to stay its order. They applied to the Nebraska Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, a stay, and an expedited appeal. The Nebraska Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 25 and on December 1 issued a per curiam opinion that modified the District Court's order. The modified order prohibited reporting of only three matters: the existence and nature of any confessions or admissions made by the defendant to law enforcement officers, any confessions or admissions made to any third parties except members of the press, and other facts strongly implicative of the accused. The Nebraska Supreme Court remanded the case to the District Judge for reconsideration of whether pretrial hearings should be closed to the press and public. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. The parties informed the Court that Simants had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death, with his appeal pending in the Nebraska Supreme Court. The restrictive order expired by its own terms when the jury was impaneled on January 7, 1976. There were no restraints on publication once the jury was selected.