final process

Knudsen filed a claim for compensation against Benson under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act with Deputy Commissioner Crowell of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission. The evidence introduced before the deputy commissioner was directed largely to the employment issue and was conflicting. After considering the evidence the deputy commissioner found that Knudsen was in Benson's employ at the time of the injury and filed an order for compensation. Benson then brought suit in the United States District Court to enjoin enforcement of the award. Benson alleged that Knudsen was not his employee at the time of the injury and that the claim lay outside the deputy commissioner's jurisdiction. An amended complaint further challenged the constitutionality of the Act on multiple grounds. Those grounds included alleged violations of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial, the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, and the judicial power provisions of Article III. The District Judge denied motions to dismiss and granted a hearing de novo upon the facts and the law. The case was transferred to the admiralty docket, answers were filed presenting the issue as to the fact of employment, and the evidence of both parties having been heard, the District Court decided that Knudsen was not in the employ of the petitioner and restrained the enforcement of the award. The decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and this Court granted writs of certiorari.

In May 1966, Harrell Alexander, Sr., a black man, was hired by Gardner-Denver Co. to perform maintenance work at its Denver, Colorado plant. In June 1968, he was awarded a trainee position as a drill operator, which he held until his discharge on September 29, 1969. The company stated that he was discharged for producing too many defective or unusable parts. On October 1, 1969, Alexander filed a grievance under the collective-bargaining agreement between the company and his union, Local No. 3029 of the United Steelworkers of America, stating that he had been unjustly discharged and seeking reinstatement with full seniority and pay. No explicit claim of racial discrimination was made at that time. The agreement included provisions for management rights to discharge for proper cause, a nondiscrimination clause, just cause for discharge, and a multi-step grievance procedure culminating in compulsory arbitration whose decision would be final and binding. The union processed the grievance through the steps, and Alexander raised the racial discrimination claim in the final pre-arbitration step. Prior to the arbitration hearing, Alexander filed a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which referred it to the EEOC on November 5, 1969. At the November 20, 1969 arbitration hearing, Alexander testified that his discharge resulted from racial discrimination and that he had filed the charge because he could not rely on the union; the union introduced evidence including a letter from Alexander claiming preferential discriminatory treatment. On December 30, 1969, the arbitrator ruled that Alexander had been discharged for just cause, making no reference to the racial discrimination claim. On July 25, 1970, the EEOC determined there was not reasonable cause to believe a Title VII violation had occurred and later issued a right-to-sue notice. Alexander then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. The District Court granted summary judgment to the company, finding the claim had been submitted to arbitration and resolved adversely, binding Alexander. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed per curiam on the basis of the District Court’s opinion. The Supreme Court granted petitioner’s application for certiorari.

Congress enacted the Emergency Price Control Act on January 30, 1942, as a temporary wartime measure. Congress amended it by the Stabilization Act of October 2, 1942. The Act authorized the Price Administrator, after consultation with industry representatives, to issue regulations fixing maximum prices that in his judgment would be generally fair and equitable and would effectuate the Act's purposes of stabilizing prices and preventing inflation. On April 28, 1942, the Administrator issued the General Maximum Price Regulation effective May 11, 1942, setting maximum prices at the highest price charged by the seller during March 1942. On December 10, 1942, the Administrator issued Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 169, establishing specific maximum prices for wholesale cuts of beef and veal. Petitioners Yakus and others operated wholesale meat businesses in Massachusetts. Between December 1942 and early 1943 they sold wholesale cuts of beef at prices exceeding the maximums prescribed by Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 169. Federal grand juries in the District of Massachusetts returned indictments charging them with willful violations of sections 4(a) and 205(b) of the Act. When the indictments were returned, the sixty-day period for filing administrative protests against the regulation had already expired. At trial the petitioners offered evidence on the validity of the regulation. They contended that the prices it fixed were not generally fair and equitable and that enforcement would compel them to sell at a loss. The district court excluded the evidence as irrelevant. It refused to submit the validity issue to the jury and convicted the petitioners on verdicts of guilty. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the convictions. Petitioners in related cases were likewise convicted in the same district court for selling processed textile futures above maximum prices established by Maximum Price Regulation No. 188 and Supplementary Regulation No. 271. Those convictions were also affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in all cases because of the importance of the issues to administration of the Act.