felon

In July 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas. Hannah intended to lease the property to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) for use as a group home. The home would house thirteen mentally retarded men and women under constant staff supervision. The building contained four bedrooms and two baths, and CLC planned to add a half bath while complying with all applicable state and federal regulations for an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded. The site lay in an R-3 Apartment House District. The city's zoning ordinance permitted apartment houses, boarding houses, hospitals, and nursing homes in that district without special permission. However, the ordinance required a special use permit, renewable annually after a public hearing, for hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded. The city classified the proposed group home as a hospital for the feeble-minded and informed CLC that a permit was required. After a public hearing, the City Council voted three to one to deny the application. CLC and its prospective residents filed suit in federal district court against the city and its officials. They alleged that the ordinance and its application discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court upheld the ordinance and the denial. It found that the council's decision was motivated by the residents' mental retardation yet rationally related to legitimate interests such as neighborhood safety and property values. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect class and that the ordinance was invalid both facially and as applied. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the equal protection issues raised by the zoning ordinance and its application to the proposed group home.

In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a twelfth-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38-caliber handgun and five bullets. Acting on an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted Lopez, who admitted possessing the weapon. Local police arrested him and charged him under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The following day, state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of knowing possession of a firearm at a school zone. Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress's power to legislate control over public schools. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate activities affecting commerce because the business of schools affects interstate commerce. After a bench trial, the court found Lopez guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release. Lopez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the conviction, holding that the statute was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.

On February 1, 2001, Michelle McCottry placed a 911 call reporting that her former boyfriend Adrian Davis was beating her with his fists inside her house. The 911 operator asked a series of questions about the location, whether weapons were involved, whether Davis had been drinking, his full name and middle initial, and his current actions. McCottry answered that Davis had just run out the door and was leaving in a car. Police arrived within four minutes, observed fresh injuries on McCottry's face and forearm along with her shaken state, and noted her efforts to gather her belongings and children. Davis was charged with felony violation of a domestic no-contact order. At trial McCottry did not appear, and the court admitted the 911 recording over Davis's Confrontation Clause objection, leading to his conviction, which the Washington Court of Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed. On February 26, 2003, police responded late at night to a reported domestic disturbance at the home of Hershel and Amy Hammon. Upon arrival Amy Hammon appeared somewhat frightened on the front porch but initially stated nothing was the matter. After officers entered and separated the couple, one officer questioned Amy in the living room while the other stayed with Hershel in the kitchen. Amy described a verbal argument that became physical, including Hershel breaking the furnace, lamps, and phone, shoving her into broken glass, and punching her in the chest. Amy then completed and signed a battery affidavit stating those events. Hershel was charged with domestic battery and probation violation. At his bench trial Amy did not appear, and the court admitted the officer's recounting of her statements as excited utterances along with the affidavit over objection. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed Hershel's convictions, and the Indiana Supreme Court held Amy's oral statements nontestimonial while finding the affidavit testimonial but its admission harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Davis v. Washington and the consolidated Hammon v. Indiana cases to address the testimonial character of the statements. The evidence introduced at each trial consisted solely of the out-of-court statements, as neither victim appeared to testify and no other witnesses could identify the assailant or describe the cause of the injuries.