Also known as: fee-simple · fees simple · fee simples · fee simple absolute
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An estate in land of potentially infinite duration that passes by inheritance to the owner's heirs upon death. The estate confers full rights of possession, use, and alienation subject only to general legal limits such as zoning or eminent domain.
Finn Fletcher conveys Blackacre to Forrest Falconer and his heirs so long as the land remains used for farming. When Falconer later converts the parcel to a commercial warehouse, the special limitation ends the estate and title shifts automatically to the designated successor. Falconer therefore loses the fee simple interest he initially received.
Lucas holds two beachfront parcels in fee simple. A state statute bars all development on the lots, eliminating their economic value. The Supreme Court holds that the total deprivation of use constitutes a taking of Lucas's fee simple interest.
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation. Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures. Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.
View caseRoy Smith claims an interest in farmland after an oral arrangement with his brother. He testifies that he used the land exactly as if it were his own in fee simple terms. The court recognizes that Roy treated the parcel as a fee simple interest despite the lack of a recorded deed.
Roy Smith and his twin brother Ray Smith became involved in a dispute over land ownership that originated with acquisitions in the 1940s and 1950s. Ray Smith purchased an 80-acre rectangular tract in 1943. In 1950, Ray, Roy, and their mother obtained joint title to a 42-acre tract positioned cattycornered southwest of Ray's 80 acres. In 1960, Ray and their mother transferred their interests in the 42-acre tract to Roy. This allowed Roy to mortgage the property and acquire an additional 80-acre tract north of the 42 acres and west of Ray's original holding. The brothers differed on the purpose behind the 1960 conveyance of the 42-acre tract. Ray maintained that it served only to help Roy finance the northern 80-acre purchase, with the understanding that Roy would later transfer half of the 42 acres back to Ray. Roy asserted that the transfer formed part of their parents' plan for the twins to achieve equal land ownership through mutual conveyances of half their respective parcels. On December 30, 1963, Roy conveyed about 20 acres from the 42-acre tract to Ray. Roy alleged that this transfer occurred under an oral agreement whereby Ray would convey the northern half of his 80-acre tract to Roy in exchange. Ray denied entering into any such agreement. Seventeen years later, in May 1981, Roy initiated a lawsuit against Ray seeking specific performance of the alleged oral contract. The case proceeded to a bench trial without a jury, resulting in a judgment for Roy. Ray then appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama, raising three grounds of error related to the enforcement of the oral contract.
View caseHeirs hold small undivided interests in allotted land originally conveyed in fee simple. A federal statute mandates escheat of fractional interests upon death. The Supreme Court examines whether the statute unconstitutionally burdens the fee simple ownership rights of the heirs.
In the late 19th century, Congress enacted a series of land acts that divided communal Indian reservations into individual allotments for Indians and unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. The Act of March 2, 1889, allotted 320 acres to each male Sioux head of household and 160 acres to most other individuals on the Great Reservation of the Sioux Nation, with the allotted lands held in trust by the United States. Ownership of these allotted lands fragmented over successive generations into numerous undivided interests, with some parcels having hundreds of owners. Because the land was held in trust and often could not be alienated or partitioned, the fractionation problem grew over time. This created administrative difficulties and economic waste. A 1928 report and comprehensive 1960 House and Senate studies indicated that one-half of approximately 12 million acres of allotted trust lands were held in fractionated ownership. In 1983, Congress enacted the Indian Land Consolidation Act. Section 207 provided that no undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted land within a tribe's reservation shall descend by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to the tribe if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to escheat. The provision was signed into law on January 12, 1983, and became effective immediately, with no compensation provided to owners of escheated interests. Four enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe died in 1983 while owning fractional interests subject to the escheat provision. Chester Irving died on March 18, Mary Poor Bear-Little Hoop Cross died on March 23, Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed died on April 2, and Edgar Pumpkin Seed died on June 23. Collectively the four decedents owned 41 such interests whose values included approximately $100 for the two interests lost by the Irving estate, approximately $2,700 for the 26 interests in the Cross estate, and approximately $1,816 for the 13 interests in the Pumpkin Seed estates. The three appellees are enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe who are or represent heirs or devisees of the decedents. Mary Irving is the daughter of Chester Irving, Eileen Bissonette is the guardian for the five minor children of Mary Poor Bear-Little Hoop Cross, and Patrick Pumpkin Seed is the son of Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed and nephew of Edgar Pumpkin Seed. But for the escheat provision the fractional interests would have passed to the appellees or those they represent. Appellees filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota claiming that the escheat provision resulted in a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the Government. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseHomeowners hold their residences in fee simple. The city condemns the parcels for transfer to a private developer under an economic-development plan. The Supreme Court upholds the taking because the public purpose justifies acquisition of the fee simple titles.
In the late 1990s the city of New London, Connecticut, confronted severe economic decline after the 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed more than 1,500 people. The city's unemployment rate stood nearly double the state average and its population had dropped below 24,000 residents from a 1970 high of 30,000. State and local officials therefore designated the Fort Trumbull peninsula for targeted economic revitalization. In 1998 the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit entity, was reactivated to prepare a redevelopment plan covering roughly 90 acres. The plan divided the area into seven parcels designated for a waterfront conference hotel and marinas, retail and entertainment space, research and office facilities, parking and park support, residential units, a Coast Guard museum, and additional office and retail uses. The city council formally approved the plan in January 2000 and authorized the NLDC to acquire needed parcels by purchase or, if necessary, by eminent domain. Petitioners Susette Kelo, Wilhelmina Dery, and seven other owners held fifteen properties within parcels 3 and 4A; ten of those parcels were occupied by the owners or their family members and none was alleged to be blighted. After negotiations with the NLDC failed, the corporation initiated condemnation proceedings against the remaining properties in November 2000. In December 2000 the petitioners filed suit in New London Superior Court asserting that the proposed takings violated the public-use limitation of the Fifth Amendment. Following a seven-day bench trial the Superior Court entered a permanent restraining order barring condemnation of the parcel 4A properties but denied relief as to the parcel 3 properties. Both sides appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which upheld the validity of all challenged takings. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the federal constitutional question.
View caseA city holds land in fee simple under a trust requiring racial segregation. After a court invalidates the racial restriction, the trust terminates and the property reverts to the settlor's heirs. The Supreme Court confirms that the fee simple interest returns to the heirs rather than remaining with the city.
In 1911, United States Senator Augustus O. Bacon executed a will that devised a tract of land to the Mayor and Council of the City of Macon for use as a park and pleasure ground exclusively for white people, with control vested in a Board of Managers composed entirely of white persons, and the will expressed the Senator's view that the two races should be forever separate while providing that the property under no circumstances was to be devoted to any other purpose. The city accepted the trust and initially operated the park on a segregated basis, but after it began allowing Negroes to use the park, members of the Board of Managers sued in state court to remove the city as trustee and appoint new trustees, prompting Negro citizens to intervene in the proceedings. Following the city's resignation as trustee, the Georgia courts appointed private trustees, but in Evans v. Newton the United States Supreme Court held that the park must be operated without racial discrimination, leading the Georgia Supreme Court to determine that the purpose of the trust had become impossible to fulfill and to remand the case for further proceedings. The trial court declined to apply the cy pres doctrine, ruled that the trust had failed, and determined that the property had reverted to Senator Bacon's heirs, a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia; petitioners, the Negro citizens of Macon who had sought integration of the park, challenged the termination of the trust, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
View caseModern statutes and presumptions allow a fee simple to pass even without the words 'and his heirs.' A conveyance that lacks any words of limitation or duration is presumed to transfer a fee simple absolute unless the instrument clearly shows a contrary intent.
A fee simple lasts potentially forever and passes to heirs, while a life estate ends at the death of the measuring life and cannot be inherited beyond that point. The duration of the fee simple is not tied to any human life.
Yes. A fee simple may be made defeasible by a special limitation, condition subsequent, or executory limitation. When the stated event occurs the estate ends or shifts to another person.
Supporting sources
Yes. Ownership in fee simple includes the right to possess, use, exclude others, and transfer the land, subject only to general legal restrictions such as zoning or eminent domain.
…of) value. In any event, we avoid this difficulty in the present case, since the "interest in land" that Lucas has pleaded (a fee simple interest) is an estate with a rich tradition of protection at common law, and since the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas found that the Beachfront Management Act left each of Lucas's…