Federal Rule 801

The litigation arose from the July 13, 1982 crash of a Navy T-34C Turbo-Mentor aircraft at Middleton Field, Alabama, during touch-and-go exercises. Lieutenant Commander Barbara Ann Rainey, a flight instructor, and her student Ensign Donald Bruce Knowlton were killed when the plane banked sharply right after a premature left turn, lost altitude, and crashed. The surviving spouses of the pilots filed a product liability action against Beech Aircraft Corporation, the manufacturer, and Beech Aerospace Services, Inc., which serviced the plane, alleging that a defect in the fuel control system caused an engine rollback and loss of power. Because the aircraft was destroyed and there were no survivors, the cause of the accident could not be determined from the available evidence. The defense presented an investigative JAG Report prepared by Lieutenant Commander William Morgan pursuant to Navy authority. The report contained sections on findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations, including statements that the engine was operating at reduced power at impact and that the most probable cause was the pilots' failure to maintain proper interval, while noting the possibility of rollback. Five or six months after the accident, plaintiff John Rainey, the deceased pilot's husband and a Navy flight instructor, sent a letter to Morgan outlining his own investigation and concluding that the most probable cause was a loss of useful power due to a pneumatic sensing or fuel flow malfunction. At trial, the defense called Rainey as an adverse witness and questioned him about portions of the letter concerning his wife's attempt to cancel the flight and a hard right turn by the aircrew. On cross-examination, the court sustained an objection to a question asking whether Rainey had stated in the letter that rollback was the most probable primary cause. After a two-week trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed, and on rehearing en banc the court divided evenly on one issue while unanimously holding that the district court erred in restricting cross-examination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

A deputy sheriff stopped Reginald Harris's rental car for weaving on the highway. Harris consented to a search that uncovered 19 kilograms of cocaine in two suitcases in the trunk, leading to his immediate arrest. Shortly after the arrest, DEA Special Agent Donald Walton interviewed Harris by telephone. Harris stated that he obtained the cocaine from an unidentified Cuban in Fort Lauderdale, that the cocaine belonged to petitioner Fredel Williamson, and that it was to be delivered to a particular dumpster that night. Physical evidence also connected Williamson to the car: the luggage bore the initials of Williamson's sister, Williamson was listed as an additional driver on the rental agreement, and an envelope addressed to Williamson along with a receipt bearing his girlfriend's address were found in the glove compartment. Several hours later, Agent Walton spoke with Harris in person. Harris explained that he had rented the car a few days earlier, driven it to Fort Lauderdale to meet Williamson, and received the cocaine from a Cuban acquaintance of Williamson along with a note instructing him on the delivery. Harris repeated that he was to leave the drugs in a dumpster, return to his car, and depart without waiting. When Agent Walton prepared to arrange a controlled delivery, Harris admitted he had lied about the Cuban, the note, and the dumpster. He stated instead that he was transporting the cocaine to Atlanta for Williamson, who was traveling ahead in another rental car, and that Williamson had driven past the stop and seen the police searching the trunk. Harris explained he had lied out of fear of Williamson and refused to have his statement recorded or to sign a written version, though Walton promised to report any cooperation to the prosecutor. At Williamson's trial on charges of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and traveling interstate to promote the distribution of cocaine, Harris refused to testify despite receiving use immunity and being held in contempt. The District Court admitted Agent Walton's testimony about Harris's statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), finding them against Harris's penal interest, Harris unavailable, and sufficient corroboration present. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction without opinion, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In May 1984, Clarence Greathouse, working as an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, arranged to sell a kilogram of cocaine to Angelo Lonardo. Lonardo agreed that he would find individuals to distribute the drug. When the sale became imminent, Lonardo stated in a tape-recorded telephone conversation that he had a "gentleman friend" who had some questions to ask about the cocaine. In a subsequent telephone call, Greathouse spoke to the "friend" about the quality of the drug and the price. Greathouse then spoke again with Lonardo, and the two arranged the details of the purchase. They agreed that the sale would take place in a designated hotel parking lot, and Lonardo would transfer the drug from Greathouse's car to the "friend," who would be waiting in the parking lot in his own car. Greathouse proceeded with the transaction as planned. FBI agents arrested Lonardo and petitioner immediately after Lonardo placed a kilogram of cocaine into petitioner's car in the hotel parking lot. In petitioner's car, the agents found over $20,000 in cash. Petitioner was charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Petitioner was also charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The Government introduced, over petitioner's objection, Angelo Lonardo's telephone statements regarding the participation of the "friend" in the transaction. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that, considering the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's statements over the telephone, the Government had established by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy involving Lonardo and petitioner existed. The court also found that Lonardo's statements over the telephone had been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the trial court held that Lonardo's out-of-court statements satisfied Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and were not hearsay. Petitioner was convicted on both counts and sentenced to 15 years. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the admission of the recorded statements and related evidentiary and constitutional questions.

In 1995 Samuel Mullet purchased land in Jefferson County, Ohio. That land became the Bergholz Amish community in 2001 when a sufficient number of ordained ministers qualified it as a separate Amish church district. The new community appointed Mullet as its bishop. As bishop, Mullet controlled all aspects of life in the Bergholz compound and had the ability to order the shunning of community members who failed to follow the tenets of their Amish faith. In 2006 Mullet excommunicated several church members who questioned Bergholz community practices and his leadership. Included in the group were Lavern and Mattie Troyer, whose son Aden was married to Mullet's daughter Wilma, as well as Melvin and Anna Shrock, whose son Emanuel was married to Mullet's daughter Linda. The excommunications led to family divisions, including a divorce and a custody dispute. Amish bishops from across the country met and voted unanimously to reverse the excommunications. From September 6 to November 9, 2011, several Bergholz community members committed five separate attacks on nine different individuals connected to the community by family or religious ties. The assailants sliced off the men's beards and cut the women's hair. The victims were seen as Amish hypocrites by the assailants. A federal grand jury indicted sixteen members of the Bergholz community for violating and conspiring to violate the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, as well as other charges. At trial, the government presented evidence that the assaults were motivated by the victims' religion, while the defendants presented evidence of personal and family disputes as alternative motives. The jury convicted all sixteen defendants of at least one hate-crime violation. The district court instructed the jury that the victims' religion need only be a significant motivating factor even if other reasons existed. The defendants twice requested a but-for causation instruction, which the court rejected. The defendants appealed their convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.