513 U.S. 150 (1995)
Tome was charged in a one-count indictment with the felony of sexual abuse of a child, his own daughter A. T., aged four at the time of the alleged crime.1 The case arose on the Navajo Indian Reservation, and Tome was tried by a jury in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, where he was found guilty of violating 18 U. S. C. §§ 1153, 2241(c), and 2245(2)(A) and (B).2
Tome and the child's mother had been divorced in 1988, with a tribal court awarding joint custody of A. T. to both parents but Tome having primary physical custody.3 In 1989 the mother unsuccessfully petitioned the tribal court for primary custody of A. T., though she was awarded custody for the summer of 1990.4 On August 27, 1990, the mother contacted Colorado authorities with allegations that Tome had committed sexual abuse against A. T.5
At trial A. T., then 6½ years old, was the Government's first witness.6 For the most part her direct testimony consisted of one- and two-word answers to a series of leading questions.7 Cross-examination took place over two trial days, during which the defense asked A. T. 348 questions.8 On the first day A. T. answered all the questions posed to her on general, background subjects.9 The next day there was no testimony, and the prosecutor met with A. T.; when cross-examination resumed she was reluctant to discuss those conversations and reluctant at many points to answer questions about the allegations of abuse.10
After A. T. testified, the Government produced six witnesses who testified about a total of seven statements made by A. T. describing the alleged sexual assaults.11 A. T.'s babysitter recited A. T.'s statement to her on August 22, 1990, that she did not want to return to her father because he "gets drunk and he thinks I'm his wife," and related further details given by A. T. on August 27, 1990, while A. T.'s mother stood outside the room and listened.12 The mother recounted what she had heard A. T. tell the babysitter.13 A social worker recounted details A. T. told her on August 29, 1990, about the assaults.14 Three pediatricians, Drs. Kuper, Reich, and Spiegel, related A. T.'s statements to them describing how and where she had been touched by Tome.15 All but A. T.'s statement to Dr. Spiegel implicated Tome.16
A. T.'s out-of-court statements, recounted by the six witnesses, were offered by the Government under Rule 801(d)(1)(B).17 The trial court admitted all of the statements over defense counsel's objection.18 The court also admitted A. T.'s August 22d statement to her baby sitter under Rule 803(24), and the statements to Dr. Kuper (and apparently also to Dr. Reich) under Rule 803(4).19 Following trial, Tome was convicted and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment.20 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.21 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.22
Whether out-of-court consistent statements made after the alleged fabrication, or after the alleged improper influence or motive arose, are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)?23
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) permits the introduction of a declarant's consistent out-of-court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive only when those statements were made before the charged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.24 The Rule embodies the common-law premotive requirement.25
No. The rule requires that the consistent statements predate the alleged motive to fabricate.26 In this case the custody dispute between Tome and the mother, including the 1989 petition for primary custody and the award of summer custody in 1990, established the motive for A.T. to fabricate allegations to remain with her mother.27 The statements made by A.T. to her babysitter on August 22 and August 27, 1990, to the social worker on August 29, 1990, and to the three pediatricians were all made after this motive had arisen.28 As a result these statements do not meet the temporal requirement for admissibility under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to rebut the charge of recent fabrication.29
The out-of-court consistent statements are not admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) because they were made after the alleged motive arose.30
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment of the Court and joined its opinion except for Part II-B.31 That Part relied on the Advisory Committee's Notes as displaying the purpose or intent of the draftsmen.32 He argued that the Notes are persuasive scholarly commentaries but bear no special authoritativeness as the work of the draftsmen.33
It is the words of the Rules that have been authoritatively adopted by this Court or by Congress.34 Justice Scalia noted that the body of common law knowledge must be a source of guidance in interpreting the Rules.35 Rule 801(d)(1)(B) uses language that tracks common-law cases and prescribes a result that makes no sense except on the assumption that it adopts the common-law premotive rule.36